It was unexpected. But, probably the IAEA inspectors compelled the South Koreans to voluntarily declare their nuclear experimentations. The scientists at a government laboratory had performed two months of tests in early 2000 that enriched tiny amounts of uranium far above levels for known civilian uses. The South Korean government was quick to add that it has no nuclear weapons programme and these experiments were far below bomb-grade level and conducted largely to satisfy the curiosity of scientists, who used equipment assembled for other tests for carrying out these experiments.

South Korea is a signatory of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and in February it has signed the IAEA's Additional Protocol, giving inspectors the right to conduct more intrusive, short notice visits to nuclear sites than earlier permitted. South Korea may not have nuclear ambitions, but has a nuclear past. It had conducted plutonium-based nuclear research in the early 1980s. During the military dictatorship of Park Chung-hee in the 1970s, Seoul had launched a secret nuclear weapons programme, but the United States reportedly persuaded it to abandon it.

Seoul claims that this time the enriched uranium was produced by a group of rogue scientists, without the knowledge of the government. But, the method the scientists used was so expensive that it is normally associated with government directed weapons programmes. While the amount of Uranium enriched was very small, about two tenths of a gram, it was enriched to nearly 80 percent - a level only useful for making nuclear weapons. It would take several kilograms of such material to make even a crude nuclear weapon.

The experiments were conducted at Atomic Energy Research Institute which is a campus like concentration of laboratories for about 800 scientists in Taejon, about 100 miles south of Seoul. The Institute's work is supposed to revolve around civilian nuclear uses, largely nuclear power which is the source of about 40 percent of the country's electricity. South Korea imports all its oil, and relies on nuclear power plants for electricity generation.

The method chosen to enrich uranium, through the use of lasers is considered easy to hide. No other big nuclear power use lasers; they all use centrifuges. Laser techniques being expensive could only be used for military purposes where costs are no obstacle. Interestingly, South Korea, according to a 13-year old bilateral treaty with North Korea has agreed not to enrich uranium for production of nuclear power.

Much of South Korean news media see the enrichment issue as overblown, but international community and domestic opposition may not take the issue dismissively. It is a chance for South Korea's powerful conservative opposition to score political points. Bush administration has played down these enrichment experiments. But North Korea was quick to grab the opportunity and has already expressed fears of a 'nuclear arms race', in the Korean peninsula.

It is feared that South Korea's minor deviation from nuclear orthodoxy could be used by North Korea to justify its nuclear weapons programme and to boycott the next round of regional disarmament talks, tentatively scheduled for September 22 in Beijing. Iran also may take advantage of the situation. They are blamed for enriching uranium (for significantly larger quantity) but the treatment given to Tehran is entirely different than one given to South Korea. Naturally North Korea and Iran are going to accuse the US of following double standards when it comes to 'nuclear enrichment'.

Few analysts even argue that the timing of Seoul's announcement might have some relation to the Bush administration's decision to withdraw one third of 36,000 American troops from South Korea without demanding reciprocal security concessions from North Korea. This could be an attempt to shake up the Americans. Also fears are raised that such developments in the region may even force Japan to think of nuclear options.

Viewing purely from the energy point of view, the incident suggests that in future the energy needs of nation-states may force IAEA to rethink the rules of nuclear enrichment. Few states are importing enriched uranium at phenomenal costs and they may refuse to carry this financial burden in future.

Alternatively, the incident speaks volumes about the tough procedures adopted by IAEA. The inspectors were not convinced about the utility of the particular equipment in the South Korean laboratory and were to pickup environmental samples for further analysis. This has probably forced the scientists to declare the truth. The incident also clearly implies that the IAEA's guarantee and supervision procedures need to be stringent all the time and should be further strengthened.

Sadly, this clandestine activity has embarrassed the proliferation regime at a crucial time when Korean peninsula nuclear impasse is being tackled to pressure North Korea to end its nuclear weapons drive through six-party talks hosted by China. At this juncture South Korean activity even raises a doubt that they may be involved in illicit nuclear activity even before its recently disclosed experiment to enrich uranium.