What is Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)?

It is a broad international partnership of countries which, using their own laws and resources, will coordinate their actions to halt shipments of dangerous technologies to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern -- at sea, in the air, and on land. It seeks to reinforce, not replace, other nonproliferation mechanisms. It envisages cooperative and coordinated efforts by participating countries that will give substance to the broad political consensus against proliferation and address an increasingly important challenge to international security.

Origin and Imperatives

US President George Bush announced in Krakow (Poland) on 31 May 2003 significant strides in shaping a new environment to combat trafficking in WMD. In September 2003, 11 countries -- Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States -- agreed to and published the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles. Since then, many more countries have endorsed the Interdiction Principles. They derive from the US National Strategy to Combat WMD issued in December 2002. The strategy recognizes the need for more robust means to defeat proliferation with a greater focus on interdiction. It is claimed that the inherent principles in PSI are fully consistent with relevant international laws. It is also said to be consistent with the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Presidential Statement of January 1992 (also Security Council Resolution 1540), which states that the proliferation of WMDs constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and underlines the need for member states of the UN to prevent proliferation.

Interdiction Principles

PSI has delineated the following Interdiction Principles to meet its objectives:

• Undertake effective measures, either alone or in concert with other states, for interdicting proliferation activities to and from states and non-state actors which includes: (a) efforts to develop or acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems; or (b) transfers (either selling, receiving, or facilitating) of WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials.

• Evolve procedures for rapid exchange of relevant information in this regard.

• Protect the confidential character of classified information provided by other states as part of this initiative.

• Dedicate appropriate resources and efforts to interdiction operations.

• Strengthen the relevant international laws.

• Take action (also seize) to board and search any vessel in territorial seas or contiguous areas, of any other state, that is reasonably suspected of shipping (also flying) proliferation materials.

PSI vis-à-vis Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

Participation in the PSI is voluntary. PSI partners encourage all states to publicly support the PSI and to take the steps outlined in the principles, including steps to support PSI operational activities. Support for the PSI is an acknowledgment of the need for stronger measures to defeat proliferators by cooperation with other countries. The PSI is a set of activities; not a formal treaty-based organization. It is best understood as a set of partnerships that establishes the basis for cooperation on specific activities, when the need arises. It does not create formal "obligations" for participating states, but does represent a political commitment to establish "best practices" to stop proliferation-related shipments. PSI facilitates interdiction training and exercises to stop, search, and seize shipments.

On the other hand, the NPT is a treaty and the provisions of this treaty bind the countries that ratify it. However, most of the activities that PSI undertakes are in one way or the other inherent in the NPT. The objectives too are not different from NPT. Therefore, it remains to be seen as to how PSI will achieve what NPT could not in spite of its binding character, specially due to the fact that Nuclear-haves are often responsible for the proliferation that has occurred in different parts of the world.

A Critical Evaluation

• Though it reveals concern regarding international security, it does not provide any innovative scheme to stop proliferation;

• Building global capacity for Counter-proliferation or non-proliferation activities has proved a failure in its endeavors, and therefore, the need of the hour is to place emphasis on disarmament (a road to nuclear weapons free world);

• The attempt at sharing relevant information for PSI endeavors carries little weight in the world of real-politik; for capable countries of the world what matters is their national interest. Hence, they will participate in PSI only if it serves their national interest.

• It seems more like adventurism and adhocism than any serious initiative towards the non-proliferation problem.

• The provision that allows PSI countries to search any vessel on sea or air, on grounds of suspicion of carrying WMDs or related materials, goes against international law. Such a provision gives the US and its allies the right to interdict any vessel and aircraft arbitrarily.