The May 1998 nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan increased nuclear sabre-rattling in the Indian sub-continent. The Kargil intrusions, attack on the Indian Parliament and the Indo-Pakistan border confrontation further aggravated nuclear tensions. Matters climaxed with the terrorist attack in Kaluchak, Jammu, on 14 May 2002. The possibility of a war seemed imminent. The recent change of Government provides an important opportunity to modify Indian nuclear policy. The United Progressive Alliance Government in its Common Minimum Programme has asserted that India will maintain a credible minimum nuclear deterrent while evolving demonstrable and verifiable confidence-building measures (CBMs).

Two specific means of reducing nuclear risks without jeopardizing national security are not to deploy nuclear weapons and stop installing early warning systems to mitigate the dangers of nuclear conflict with China and Pakistan. Deployment of nuclear weapons requires maintaining nuclear warheads mated with delivery vehicles on high alert, to undertake punitive retaliation. The US and Russia continue to keep thousands of nuclear weapons on high alert for launch-on-warning. Although India and Pakistan are yet to deploy nuclear-armed missiles, this possibility seems likely in view of the prevailing nuclear tension in the region.

The potential dangers arising from such deployment are, first, an increase in the possibility of nuclear weapons being used accidentally or by unauthorized personnel, especially during a crisis. Unlike conventional weapons, nuclear weapons should only be authorized by the highest political authority. However, deployed nuclear weapons present conflicting demands. Deployment inevitably requires delegating some authority to military forces in the field to launch nuclear weapons. This problem becomes compounded by the unreliable state of communications in South Asia. An effective command and control system can avert unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. However, even the most carefully designed command and control systems are not foolproof. During a nuclear crisis, communication systems linking higher authorities and field personnel could get severely disrupted, leaving base commanders with the discretion to launch nuclear weapons without authorization. The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 at Malmstrom Air Force Base, US, resulted from faulty communication system picking signals of what appeared to be a missile launch from Cuba against Washington. Investigations revealed that base personnel had inserted a software test tape simultaneously when the communication network detected a satellite, thus causing confusion and bringing the superpowers on the brink of a disaster.

The second risk emanating from deployment is accidental nuclear explosions, especially if nuclear weapons are integrated with delivery systems such as missiles or aircraft. Even tightly coupled systems are prone to accidents. The highly combustible fuels used in the delivery systems and kept in the vicinity of nuclear weapons increases the possibility of nuclear weapons being ignited by external fires. The powerful high explosive (HE) surrounding the plutonium or the highly enriched uranium cores in a nuclear fission weapon could trigger a chain reaction. The US Department of Defence in 1981 listed 32 accidents involving US nuclear weapons between 1950 and 1980 caused by mishaps in delivery systems. On 23 February 2004, a serious accident occurred at the Sriharikota High Altitude Range when engineers were testing a motor for the Agni missile, which caught fire, killing six people. Hypothetically, if such disasters were to happen in a nuclear-warhead loaded Agni missile, the radioactive fallout caused by dispersal of fissile materials could lead to catastrophic results. Such accidents might be presumed to indicate a nuclear attack and trigger a nuclear response, escalating into a nuclear war.

Nuclear risks can be further reduced by stopping the installation of early warning systems. The draft Nuclear Doctrine has posited the need for these systems to detect incoming nuclear missiles and avert an impending attack. It would also inform decision-makers that a nuclear war has begun before the explosion of nuclear warheads. India has acquired the Green Pine radar from Israel and purchase of the Arrow anti-ballistic system is under negotiation. However, early warning systems raise the dangers of false alarms and miscalculations that could trigger an accidental nuclear war. The experience of the US from 1977 to 1984, despite having built an elaborate and sophisticated network of satellites and radars and using state-of-the-art technology is instructive. Out of an average of 2,598 warnings every year, only five percent required further evaluation. The rest were false.

In South Asia, the situation is made more dangerous by geographical proximity. The missile travel time between India and Pakistan is less than 10 minutes. This does not allow much time for any meaningful early warning system. A dysfunctional early warning system, however, will place immense pressure on decision-makers to launch a pre-emptive attack. This will further compound the situation.

Managing nuclear weapons in the real world have always posed unprecedented challenges. The problem is made more complicated in South Asia due to the nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan. It is imperative that both nations adopt responsible measures to mitigate the nuclear danger and increase safety and national security in the sub-continent.