Disarming Development
08 Sep, 2004 · 1489
Julie DaVanzo, Clifford Grammich, Brian Nichiporuk & C Christine Fair, on comparing two Muslim countries in South Asia, conclude that emphasis on military and defense sectors is inversely proportional to development in economic and social terms
Since separation in 1971, Bangladesh and Pakistan have pursued different strategies for development, which in turn have had not only differing results for development but also for the security issues each nation has faced. Bangladesh has generally welcomed multi-lateral agency assistance with its development, particularly in reducing its population growth. Pakistan framed its relationship with the international community within the context of its strategic relevance to South, Southwest, and Central Asia; as a result, both of its position and of its simmering conflicts (including that with India), Pakistan, and its allies, have emphasized military over social investment. As a result of these trends, Pakistan, rather than Bangladesh, is now by some measures (e.g., the United Nations Development Programme Human Development Index) the less developed of the two leading Muslim nations in South Asia. Furthermore, many of these trends may even help make Pakistan less secure in spite of its military investments.
Pakistani "Guns" and Bangladeshi "Butter"
Pakistan spends nearly 5 percent of its GDP on its military. Although this percentage has decreased since 1990, it is still one of the highest in the world. By contrast, Pakistani public health and education expenditures are, as measured by proportion of GDP, among the lowest in the world and shrinking. Public health and education expenditures in Bangladesh are similarly low, but they are increasing, recently surpassing those for Pakistan not only in relative terms of GDP but also, because of faster economic growth in Bangladesh, in absolute terms as well.
Decreasing Fertility Rates . . .
One reason for the larger health expenditure in Bangladesh may be its emphasis on reducing its rate of population growth. In part because of its extremely high population density (nearly 1,100 per sq km, more than twice that for any other nation with at least ten million persons), Bangladesh has a strong political commitment, boosted by aid agencies funding family planning programs, to reduce its rate of population growth. By contrast, Pakistani leaders have felt that deference to religious parties required ambivalence toward or refusal of aid for effective family planning programs. The results have been predictable. Contraceptive prevalence is higher and fertility rates lower in Bangladesh than in Pakistan. Fertility rates in Bangladesh have decreased from just over 6 children per woman in the early 1980s to just over 3 in recent years, while in that same time Pakistani fertility rates have decreased from about 7 to just under 5 children per woman. The population of Bangladesh, which, at the time of its 1971 independence (68.2 million) had been greater than that of Pakistan (62.5 million), was, by 2000, less (131 million) than that of Pakistan (138 million).
. . . and Increasing Life Expectancy . . .
As fertility has decreased, so has mortality. Statistics on life expectancy at birth demonstrate not only changes in mortality but also help summarize health conditions for differing populations. By this standard, the health of Bangladeshis has improved more than, though still trailing, that of Pakistanis, while that of women in both nations has improved more than that for men. Reductions in maternal mortality have likely contributed to the increase in women's lifespans; in recent years, lifetime risk of maternal death decreased by about half in each nation. For both sexes combined, life expectancy of Bangladeshis has increased 17 years since 1970, while that for Pakistanis has increased 14 years.
. . . Have Reduced the Number of Dependents per Worker
The sharper decreases in fertility in Bangladesh have led to a considerable decrease in its dependency ratio, its number of persons of dependent ages (less than 15 or more than 64 years of age) to its number of working age, whereas this ratio has barely changed in Pakistan since 1970 and has been higher than that in Bangladesh since 1990. (As the figure indicates, nearly all dependents in both nations are youths.) As a result, Bangladesh is in better position to reap a "demographic dividend" that can follow a decrease in fertility, which leads to relative growth in the working-age population and more resources for social investment if the additional workers have marketable skills and there are good jobs available to them. Should fertility in Pakistan continue to decrease, it, too, could soon have the opportunity to reap a demographic dividend.
Can These Trends Change?
These trends may become self-perpetuating. World Values Survey data indicate Bangladeshis are more likely than Pakistanis to believe the chief aim for their country should be a high level of economic growth, while Pakistanis are more likely to view the need for strong defense forces as the most important aim for government. The continuing paths of development for these nations merit monitoring for the lessons they offer regarding development and conflict in South Asia and in other nations of the Muslim world.