The Indian Navy unveiled its naval doctrine on 26 April 2004 at Vishakapatnam envisaging the need for a sea-based nuclear deterrent to inflict unacceptable damage on the adversary. The naval doctrine, made public on 23 June 2004, advocates the induction of nuclear submarines into the Indian Navy capable of launching nuclear-powered missiles from undersea. The new naval doctrine is not a policy declaration but is conceptual in nature. It is an exposition of power projection beyond the Indian shores as an instrument of state policy in times of peace and conflict. The objective is to help India pursue an independent foreign policy and exude the confidence of a nation aware of is role in the global strategic hierarchy.

After the May 1998 tests, India resolved to develop a minimum nuclear deterrent based on weapons delivered by aircraft, land-based missiles and sea-based platforms. Subsequently, India's draft Nuclear Doctrine of August 1999 emphasized the need for a nuclear triad. The Indian Maritime Doctrine revises the earlier defensive doctrine and accentuates the need for situating the most powerful component of the nuclear triad in the Navy. It marks a definite shift from coastal defence to three vital issues: strategic concerns in the East, power projection, and littoral warfare to aid the land forces in a conflict.

The Indian Maritime Doctrine is therefore an aggressive strategy aimed at developing a credible minimum nuclear deterrent. This is of relevance in the light of the Indian Navy's diverse and complex missions in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Since the 1990s, there has been a quantum increase of warships in the IOR. Singapore has already acquired a submarine. Malaysia, Thailand and Myanmar are also negotiating to induct them. The IOR, stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Malacca Straits, constitutes a legitimate area of interest for India. The Navy must play a more proactive role to control the strategically located IOR and protecting the sea lanes of communication from emerging threats.

Looking further East, the Naval Doctrine views with concern the strategic threat from China. The Chinese naval doctrine flows out of its military doctrine, based on the principle of active defence. The Chinese Navy is the only Asian navy with a SLBM capability that can travel underwater without being detected. Rapidly moving from being a coastal navy to an intimidating ocean-going force, it seeks to operate much beyond its coastal areas and establish itself as a hegemonic power in Asia. What is of immediate concern to India is the PLA Navy's plans to configure its force into two carrier groups. China's formidable naval capability is also growing with its acquisition of decommissioned carriers from Australia and Russia to study their construction details and operate its own carrier by 2015. It also seeks to induct SSBNs, nuclear-powered Type 093 attack submarines, apart from amphibious and logistic ships.

Equally disconcerting is China's naval cooperation with Myanmar by modernizing its naval bases at Hainggyi and Coco Islands. Beijing is also reported to have built a Signals Intelligence facility in the Coco Islands. This is of security concern to India as China could monitor India's maritime activities in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and its missile tests off the Orissa coast.

The Indian Maritime Doctrine also expresses concern over the flow of military technology and hardware into Islamabad. Pakistan has contracted a billion dollar deal with France for three Agosta-90B submarines equipped with Air Independent Propulsion technology and undersea-launched missile firing capability. This would enable Pakistan to carry out attacks on warships while remaining underwater. A Chinese built deep-sea port at Gawdar in Pakistan also raises security concerns. Moreover, with Washington conferring Major Non-NATO Ally Status on Islamabad, a quantum increase in Pakistan's naval forces seems likely.

India must develop a submarine-based nuclear deterrence capability to protect its security interests and remain a dominant regional power in Asia. The Naval Doctrine envisages nuclear deterrence against regional states and deters extra regional powers from jeopardizing our security interests by raising the cost of intervention. It also aims to provide second-strike nuclear capability. India's adherence to a no-first-use policy is linked to the survivability of its nuclear deterrent.

The 21^st century will witness the emergence of USA, European Union, Russia, China, Japan and India as major players in global politics. All these states either have an independent nuclear/missile capability or come under the nuclear umbrella of a strategic alliance. India is the only country that is devoid of credible nuclear deterrence.

The Indian Maritime Doctrine recognizes the fact that the Indian Navy is developing into a professional force, and to safeguard its maritime security, India must develop a submarine-based nuclear deterrent to support the Navy and achieve its strategic ambitions.