Economic mismanagement and corruption has been the two major issues related to failure of the governance process in Jammu and Kashmir. Where did the problem arise When did the rot set in

Habibullah states that it started with Ghulam Muhammad Bakshi becoming the Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir in 1953, to achieve the Union governments main objective to undermine Sheikh Abdullah and his NC support base. Bakshi undermined the Sheikhs support base by awarding contracts to exploit the resources of the states forests and by granting licenses for transport and tourist associated activities and for the distribution of essential commodities all for a price. Since Bakshi was quickly able to control the agitation resulting from Abdullahs unceremonious sacking, the policy was considered a success. The Bakshi tradition set an unhealthy economic precedent.

Since it suited Indian interests, there were hardly any efforts by the Union government in the 1950s and 1960s to prevent this corruption process. As a result, the effort to undermine the Sheikhs support base and construct an Indian constituency, created a corrupt lobby that included officials from the state and union governments, contractors and others.

This corrupt lobby became a state by itself; when the NC returned to power, instead of checking it, the NC went along with it. This lobby also became the visible face of the Union government and became the object of local hatred. The militants in the late 1980s and 1990s attacked this lobby to gain legitimacy, but it is doubtful, whether the militant movement arose only to target the corrupt elements as Habibullah comments. According to him, the uprising in 1989-90 was essentially predatory, the militants preying on corrupt elements within the states administrative infrastructure. The militant attacks on corrupt elements in the state, as one also notices in India's northeast, is mainly to garner legitimacy for their militant movement and increase their popularity.

What Habibullah does not point out is that, ironically, this corrupt lobby became a source of revenue for the militant groups at a later stage. In the second phase, they were targeted not to gain public support, but since they were the only ones who could be targeted and extorted. Extortion then became an industry; and was not reported in public for obvious reasons of not losing popular support!

Habibullah's report then reflects on a crucial phenomenon 'Ikhwans'. He considers them to be a 'notable group, who continue to prosper from the war. How do they benefit from the conflict Is that because they were allowed to retain their weapons, so that they could run their own extortion industry Or is it because some of them were incorporated into the Special Operations Group (SOG) Or is it because the state has failed to integrate them into the mainstream and decided to use them for outsourcing some of their 'difficult coordinates'

Habibullah's portrayal of this group, which really broke the bone of militancy during 1993-1996 could have been even handed rather than seeing them as a beneficiary of war. What could this group do when they did not have public sympathy; be the target of other militants; and being not integrated into the mainstream Unless a long-term policy is devised by the State and Union governments, which includes re-integrating them into society, defining their role in counter insurgency operations and disarming them taking into consideration the threat from other militant groups, Ikhwans would continue to have a vested economic interest in the continuation of conflict.

Besides the counter militants, the militants also have a vested economic interest in keeping the conflict going. Habibullah states that the militant organizations are able to recruit as they offer the best opportunity to make moneyFor those taking to this course, life may be short, but it is sweet. Recruits have access to luxuries unavailable to common folk, such as staying in houseboats and five star hotels and consorting with young women, themselves often orphans with no prospect for marriage and fed up with common place, increasingly burdensome lives(Kashmir youth) participation is motivated by economic considerations than by ideology.

Is every Kashmiri who is resorting to violence doing so for only economic considerations No doubt, a section has taken up arms for economic reasons; but there are others who have done this for certain non-economic and political reasons. Numbers may vary, but the fact is that one should not oversimplify the situation by asserting that every Kashmiri youth pursues violence for economic reasons. For example, the day-to-day pressure from the security forces, what is recognized as human rights violations by the Army and other paramilitary forces, does have a significant role to play in this regard.

If economic considerations are primary for the Kashmiri youths to take up arms and the state could provide them economic sustenance, would they give up violence Would increasing their recruitment into the State police forces address this issue Instead of focusing on the SOG, would a general emphasis on using the police forces be a better approach This would not only provide more jobs to the local youth, but in the long run would also reduce the presence of military and paramilitary forces, thereby reducing the allegations of human rights violations.