Since the new Indian government took office in May 2004, the Foreign Ministers of India and Pakistan have met three times on the sidelines of a multilateral conference. The last such meeting was at the SAARC Foreign Ministers Conference in Islamabad. The meeting provided fresh confirmation that the Indo-Pak composite dialogue process is well and truly underway, even if the pace appears to be slow. India’s Foreign Minister, Natwar Singh, also met General Pervez Musharraf and said, “India and Pakistan are committed to settle all bilateral issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, to the satisfaction of both sides.” Before this, the Indian and Pakistani official level delegations had met in the third week of June 2004 to discuss the crucial issue of nuclear confidence building measures (CBMs).

Though the agreement reached comprised mainly symbolic steps, it was welcomed internationally. A few days later, the Foreign Secretaries of the two countries met, discussed Kashmir and other issues related to peace and security and chalked out a programme to carry the dialogue process forward. From 28 July onwards, Indian and Pakistani officials and experts met to discuss the Wullar Barrage-Tulbul Navigation Project, promotion of friendly exchanges, the Siachen issue, Sir Creek, terrorism and drug trafficking, sharing of river waters and economic and commercial cooperation. India’s Defence Minister, Pranab Mukherjee, has now said that delegations of the two armies will meet to carry the talks on the Siachen issue further. The present round of intensive engagements will culminate in a formal meeting between the two Foreign Ministers on 5-6 September 2004 in New Delhi.

Quiet diplomacy has kept the Indo-Pak Composite Dialogue process on track despite General Musharraf’s belligerent rhetoric on finding an early solution for the permanent resolution of the Kashmir issue. Though there has not been substantive movement in any of the fields, the talks have been held in a “cordial and frank atmosphere” and have been viewed positively on both sides. Both countries need to understand that disputes carried over from history need a long “cooling off” period before efforts can commence to resolve them. Even then, it is only after patient and protracted negotiations over many years that the contours of a solution begin to emerge. The strategic goal of the present dialogue process should be to generate stability in the Indo-Pak relationship rather than to provide quick-fix solutions.

There is little likelihood of quick results on Kashmir as India sees the present dialogue process as a means of maintaining the status quo and Pakistan perceives it as a means to change the status quo in its favour. It would help the dialogue process to disaggregate the agreed agenda and discuss each issue separately. Progress on one issue should not be held hostage to progress on others. Issues such as the conflict on Siachen Glacier, the Wullar Barrage-Tulbul Navigation Project, the disputed Gujarat-Sind boundary along Sir Creek and the sharing of river waters are not as intractable as the Kashmir issue and should be brought to the forefront. The successful resolution of these issues one by one will generate confidence and goodwill to tackle the Kashmir issue in a spirit of mutual accommodation at a later date.

India’s flourishing liberal democracy and economic progress have brought about a change in the Pakistani mindset. There is mutual benefit in converting unofficial trade through third countries into official trans-border trade. Among other economic issues, the form of international guarantees for the overland natural gas pipeline from Iran should be taken up for discussion. The visa regime should be further liberalised to include new categories for instant visas. Sports and cultural ties need to be strengthened. The two armies should be encouraged to open up to each other so that the barriers and mutual suspicion built up over half a century of hostilities can gradually break down.

Perhaps the most important bilateral issue to be discussed should be nuclear confidence building measures (CBMs). The two nations should agree to set up monitoring centres with permanently manned hotlines between the two national command authorities for nuclear risk reduction. India and Pakistan should exchange and discuss nuclear doctrines to build confidence. India should make an offer to not cap short range ballistic missiles such as Prithvi and the Hatf series with nuclear warheads as these are inherently de-stabilising and do not add to the quality of deterrence. The ultimate nuclear CBM would, of course, be to sign a mutual “no first use” treaty but that could wait at present.

The Indo-Pak relationship is poised at strategic crossroads. The two countries can seize the historic moment with both hands and exorcise the ghosts of over half a century of animosity and bitterness – or, they can continue to behave tactically to squander the present opportunity for peace and stability.