Chairperson’s Remarks

It is worth asking ourselves whether we need to confine ourselves only to the boundary question as there are many fundamental questions that remain to be answered. Firstly, what sort of domestic preparations were made for the latest talks with China? In this connection, at least in academic circles, an honest reexamination is required, because the political will does not exist in political circles. Secondly, is there any deep urge to change the status quo in relations with China? It will be good for both countries to move beyond sovereignty questions to see mutual benefits. There is a recognition that Sino-Indian relations are growing in a positive way. But, we must do our homework and educate our political leadership on the nuances of these relations.

Vijay Nambiar

Sino-Indian relations are characterized by talks, but witness political clogging. Talks are renewed after some time and this cycle continues.  There is a lack of comprehensive understanding on bilateral issues.

Rajiv Gandhi’s China visit in 1988 was an important landmark. He, for the first time, articulated the need for a solution to bilateral issues based on ‘mutual understanding’ and ‘mutual adjustment’. This was translated into Joint Working Group meetings, which led to two major political developments. First, there were agreements on peace and tranquility as well as confidence building measures along the LAC in 1993 and 1996. Second, maps on the Middle Sector were exchanged, which is a significant improvement in the boundary negotiations. But there is a logjam in the exchange of maps in the Western and Eastern Sectors.

A major development in the bilateral relationship between India and China was the understanding reached during Vajpayee’s China visit to appoint special representatives at the political level to find “guiding principles” to carry the talks forward. A good rapport developed between Brajesh Mishra and Di Bingguo. The significant outcome in the first two rounds of talks between the special representatives is:

• An understanding on Sikkim; and

• India’s acceptance of the Tibet Autonomous Region as a part of PRC.

These two outcomes represent a substantial change in the earlier positions. The seriousness of the NDA government on foreign policy issues in the Chinese perception was also an important factor in these positive developments. But, with the change of government in India, the new interlocutor, J N Dixit, is yet to establish a personal equation with Bingguo. However, the latest (third) round of talks took place between the two countries in a positive manner.

Looking into the future, the economy is not likely to dominate politics in the bilateral relationship; nor is it a vulnerability. On political issues, there is some hesitation in the Chinese even to talk about support to India’s candidature for permanent membership of the UN Security Council. India does not figure very high in Chinese priorities. China’s mindset continues to be preoccupied by Taiwan and Tibet. On its part, India has failed to place its expectations firmly before China. The Indian concerns on Sino-Pak relations could be an important expectation. Unlike India, China never hesitates to express its demands.

G P Deshpande

The speaker took a different approach on this subject. He highlighted three sets of problems confronting Sino-Indian relations.

Firstly, he addressed the significance of domestic politics in both countries and their bearing on the bilateral relationship. In Chinese eyes, the NDA government under Vajpayee was taking bold and innovative steps in the foreign policy sphere. Neither the BJP nor any of the other constituents of the NDA was carrying any ‘historical baggage’ vis-à-vis China. Hence, it was easy to provide a positive momentum to their bilateral relations. On the other hand, the Congress has its own hang-over of uneasy relations with China in the past. And this hang-over continues to haunt the new UPA government headed by the Congress party. The Chinese are also having their doubts on the intentions of the new government.

            Secondly, there is a linkage between the type of political system and the pace of talks between the two countries. Given the Chinese political system, they have not thought of addressing the concerns of Indian public opinion. There is no understanding in China about the political compulsions in India. Therefore, they have not taken any initiatives. In decision making China has no major challenges to confront. But, in India, in the era of coalition governments, it is hard to run the government, despite there being a broad consensus on foreign policy issues.

            Thirdly, the practical problems that arise are not given much emphasis. Ironically, there is not even awareness about this. We have to think in terms of ‘group negotiations’ and looking for ‘common ground’ in multilateral fora, rather than placing all the eggs in the bilateral basket.

Without addressing these basic problems the future of bilateral relations is not bright.

R K Sawhney

Sino-Indian relations have to be seen in the strategic context of a resurgent China. There are very few commonalities between the two neighbours. Except for India, China has resolved almost all its border problems with its neighbours. This shows that Beijing has some hidden motives for not resolving its border problems with India, which can be resolved by some adjustments and a policy of ‘give and take’. China could return some Indian territory in Aksai Chin, while India could make concessions in the Eastern Sector. China should try and understand the political and security sensitivities in India.

China is perennially disturbed by the ‘encirclement’ that it suspects the US to be effecting. It has some doubts now whether India could become part of this ‘encirclement’. China is aware of the anti-West and particularly anti-US sentiments that have become pervasive all over the world. Wherever possible it is trying to reap the benefits out of these sentiments.

            The prospects of trade between India and China are much hyped. India’s trade with China, which is nearing $10 billion, is no doubt on the ascendant. But, the fact of the matter is that New Delhi’s trade with any other country is also displaying an increasing trend.

            Developments of late in Tibet are astonishing. Tourism is progressing fast and the religiosity that existed earlier has come down. Tibetans have started appreciating that their future lies in China. It would, therefore, be wrong to assume that they are waiting for us to liberate them. One of the important factors for the huge Chinese investments in Tibet (unlike in Sinkiang) is India. It is a conscious attempt to “detoxify” the Tibetans from looking towards India.

Discussion

      The discussion session that followed the panel presentations threw up the following points:

• The present phase of Sino-Indian relations is discouraging; there is no solution in sight for the border problem. The main reason for this is the deep suspicion that prevails. For India, there is no confidence in China; it is considered to be hostile and working towards the instability of India. For China, India is playing into the hands of the US in ‘encircling’ its northern neighbour. These suspicions cannot be easily removed. The solution lies in statesmanship. Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to China in 1988 can be cited as a good example.

• The contentious political issues between the two countries are due to do with the Chinese mindset. Beijing has its own apprehensions regarding Taiwan, Tibet and US.

• The memory of 1962 is still strong. However, there is a perception in India that, despite fluctuations, both countries need to develop stability in their relationship. But the time for establishing this stability is not ripe since there is no political will on either side. There is vast scope for creative diplomacy to handle the relationship. India has to think of reaching out to Western and Southern China for business. The use of multilateral fora like BIMST-EC, to further the bilateral relationship, can be explored. Southeast Asia could be the bridge between both the countries.

• In India, people wanting good relations with China are very small in numbers. Public opinion in India is waiting to be prepared. Youth, in particular, are important to change mindsets. It is crucial to groom them objectively without pandering to stereotypes. There is also an urgent need to redefine our relations with China.

• The ambiguity in having the LAC and ‘patrolling limit’ between India and China is peculiar to our system. There are technical difficulties in identifying them, except in the Western Sector. There are also definitional problems with the LAC unlike the LoC with Pakistan.

•  PLA has a high regard for the strength and professionalism of the Indian Army.

• Chinese military capability should be seen in the larger context i.e. as part of China’s development in other fields.

• Identifying complementarities in the two countries is vital to improving bilateral relations. Defence supplies are a good area for cooperation since both countries use Russian equipment. The manufacturing sector is another good area to look for complementarities, apart from Information Technology.