In spite of the seemingly difficult terrain in generating and implementing confidence-building measures in South Asia and Northeast Asia, all is not doomed or gloomy as it appears from a realist perspective. Based on existing regional and sub-regional arrangements both in South Asia as well as in Northeast Asia, it is possible to make the following conclusions.

First, India and Pakistan have embarked upon nuclear risk reduction measures through a series of bilateral agreements including the one that concluded on 28 June 2004 in New Delhi envisaging the settling up of hotlines at various decision making levels between Islamabad and New Delhi. In the case of North Korea, although the US administration under President George W. Bush prefers a multilateral arrangement, it is also not completely averse to a bilateral dialogue and to providing North Korea some kind of security guarantee in exchange for tangible movement on the nuclear issue to be undertaken by North Korea.

Second, both India and Pakistan have initiated a series of meaningful Track-II dialogues and discussions outside of regular governmental channels. The idea of having a nuclear risk reduction center in each country has received favorable reactions both within and outside South Asia, including from skeptics who had felt such a proposal to be too unrealistic. In the case of Korean peninsula, CSCAP (Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific) has evolved into a classic example of active cooperation at the Track-II level between the two Koreas in conjunction with other countries of Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia as well as member nations from the Asia Pacific and North America.

Third, in Northeast Asia, KEDO (Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization) has been hailed as a model case for international cooperation that deals with North Korea head on by addressing issues such as food aid and agricultural technical assistance so vital to that country. In South Asia too, India and Pakistan have tried to address various bilateral issues including trade, commerce, and cultural contacts within the regional framework of SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation).

Fourth, at the highest level of government, both India and Pakistan have tried to evolve a composite dialogue (including on the vexed issue of Kashmir). In particular, the period between 1999-2004 saw President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan and the former Prime Minister of India, Atal Behari Vajpayee, meet several times one-on-one and agreeing on the basic modalities of confidence-building measures. The very fact that the new government of India led by Manmohan Singh from the Congress Party has already committed itself to pursue and continue the path of dialogue is a welcome sign. In Northeast Asia, in spite of North Korea's official objection to South Korean military exercise with the US, it has, as a sign of keeping open the channel of communication, accepted humanitarian assistance from South Korea, Japan and other countries as was seen in the aftermath of a major train accident in North Korea in April 2004.

Fifth, although the hardliners in India and Pakistan still profess to have nuclear superiority over each other, the pro-engagement wings on either side, nevertheless have the upper hand at present. In the case of Northeast Asia, although the hard liners in the Bush administration seem to suggest a 'regime change' in Pyongyang, others in the administration voice a more cautious approach by trying to involve other countries in the region by as holding the six-nation talks at regular intervals.

Sixth, branding President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan as an irrational person only raised the specter of nuclear threat in South Asia. Similarly, treating Kim Jong-Il of North Korea as a paranoid dictator who is likely to be a risk taker will only push that nation to further dangerous isolation thus resulting in an escalation of crisis.

Confidence-building measures such as the establishment of secured hotlines between New Delhi and Islamabad provides a mechanism for the reduction of tension and in diffusing any imminent security issue that may snowball into a potential crisis. However, the key lies in building and expanding beyond these CBMs which were already agreed upon among the known adversaries (India/Pakistan) or perceived adversaries (North Korea/South Korea, North Korea/Japan).