India and Pakistan got involved in a broad-based engagement on 19-20 June 2004 for evolving nuclear CBMs aimed at reducing the risk of nuclear confrontation. Tariq Osman Haider, Pakistan’s additional secretary in the Foreign Office, heading an eight-member delegation met Sheel Kant Sharma, additional secretary (International Organisations) of the Indian MEA and others at New Delhi. India and Pakistan, after maintaining an overt nuclear posture for six long years, since the May 1998 tests, finally met together to address the possibilities of reducing nuclear danger.

The two-day dialogue on nuclear CBMs was preceded by the Lahore Declaration of 1999. On 21 February 1999, former Indian Foreign Secretary, K. Raghunath and his Pakistani counterpart, Shamshad Ahmed, signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) wherein both countries pledged to engage in bilateral negotiations on security concepts for shaping CBMs on nuclear matters.

The Lahore MoU, however, received a setback due to a series of unprecedented events. Problems that arose over the Kashmir issue exacerbated when the Kargil conflict broke out in May 1999 between the nuclear neighbours. Matters worsened when a terrorist squad stormed the Indian Parliament in December 2001. India-Pakistan relations reached an impasse when a million Indian and Pakistani soldiers were mobilized for 10 months on the international border. These debacles proved highly detrimental to India-Pakistan relations.

The recent change of government in India offers a significant opportunity to reconsider India-Pakistan nuclear policy. The United Progressive Alliance Government in its manifesto has declared that it “will take the initiative to have credible, transparent and verifiable confidence- building measures in treaty form to minimize the risk of nuclear and missile conflict with Pakistan and China.” Pakistan has also been actively propagating for a “strategic restraint regime” in the sub-continent. In a quest for developing a nuclear-safe, if not nuclear weapons-free zone, India and Pakistan identified areas of convergence in order to make the nuclear dialogue result-oriented.

The two-day talks concluded on a positive note with India and Pakistan enunciating a seven-point programme for building nuclear confidence. These include upgrading the existing hotline between the Directorate Generals of Military Operations (DGMOs); establishing a dedicated and secure hotline between the foreign secretaries to prevent misunderstandings; reiterating unilateral moratorium on further nuclear tests; notifying missile flight-testing; working towards the implementation of Lahore MoU; engaging in bilateral consultations on non-proliferation issues and holding regular working-level meetings among all nuclear powers to address issues of common concern.

Despite the optimism, one cannot but question the efficacy of the measures aimed at reducing the risk of nuclear danger. The proposal for establishing foreign secretaries’ hotline which existed between 1991 and 1994 cannot be expected to function effectively unless serviced by a control room, equipped and manned by competent officers round the clock. Else, it will serve merely as an additional means of communication. On the issue of further upgrading and securing the hotline between the DGMOs, former army officials claim that the existing hotline is secure enough. Ambiguity, thus, exists on the matter of hotlines. Prior notification on missile flight-testing has little relevance when the nuclear neighbours have reiterated their six-year old moratorium on nuclear tests.

In a well researched article titled “Minimum Nuclear Deterrence Posture in South Asia: An Overview”, Rodney W Jones, claims that India and Pakistan have nuclear warheads in the ratio of 2:1. This is a matter of serious concern. The widely prevalent view that nuclear powers do not engage in conventional war has been falsified twice ? by Kargil and when India mobilized its forces on the border in ‘Operation Parakram’ to wage a limited war ? betraying a stability-instability paradox. India and Pakistan have, however, realized their enormous responsibility to promote a stable environment. To this extent, a secured hotline between the foreign secretaries would prevent misunderstandings and reduce accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. Talks must also be negotiated by more senior level officers than just additional secretaries.

Moreover, reaffirming their commitments on unilateral moratorium on conducting further nuclear tests will only strengthen mutual confidence between both nations. Perhaps, the greatest scope for confidence-building provided by the talks lies in a better understanding of each other’s nuclear doctrines. This increases the possibility of exploring a common nuclear doctrine in the sub-continent. Regular working-level meetings among world’s nuclear powers would imply recognition of India and Pakistan as legitimate nuclear powers. It might also pave the way for China to accept India’s proposal to evolve a common nuclear doctrine between New Delhi, Beijing and Islamabad.

The two-day nuclear talks constitute a small but helpful nudge to a nascent peace process that began in February 1999. It is significant that a thaw has set in between India and Pakistan. However, it cannot be claimed that this round has made a substantial advance. It is to be hoped that subsequent rounds will usher in prospects of rapidly reducing the possibility of nuclear exchange between the two neighbours.