The genesis of the Kashmir problem, of late termed “dispute,” is over fifty years old.  Indo-Pak relations have been characterized by wars in 1947-48, 1965, 1971 and 1999.  Since Pakistan’s efforts using conventional military forces have been unsuccessful, Pakistan has launched a proxy war or low intensity conflict in 1989 and has supported the entry of ‘Jehadis’ – sometimes euphemistically termed Freedom Fighters – into Jammu and Kashmir (J&K).  Despite Pakistan’s cooperation with the US-led war on terror since 9/11 and despite having made repeated commitments to the US and the West, Pakistan has failed to prevent the use of its territory as a base by Islamist terrorists and other mercenaries for armed attacks on J&K.

There is an all-round recognition that war is futile and that a military path is no solution.  This holds true regardless of who sponsors the military activity.  Renewed negotiations between India and Pakistan in October 2003 resulted in both parties suggesting several confidence building measures (CBMs).  Thereafter, the SAARC meeting at Islamabad in January 2004 resulted in a joint statement which addressed the two main issues: Kashmir and Cross Border Terrorism (XBT).  Gen Musharraf also gave his explicit assurance to prevent Pakistani territory from being used for terrorism of any kind.  Continued talks in February 2004 laid out a composite dialogue from March/April–July/August 2004, including Foreign Secretary-level talks in May/June on ‘Peace and Security,’ which would include discussions about CBMs and J&K.  Further composite agenda talks in July 2004 include Siachen and economic issues.  Additionally, a number of technical and expert level talks were planned.  Finally, high-level meetings by the Foreign Secretaries and Foreign Ministers were also set for July/August 2004 to review the progress.  

Pending finalization of the long negotiation process, less thorny issues including nuclear safety, person-to-person contact, trade and economic measures and relevant CBMs could be tackled.  Currently, there seems to be a change in the mood of the Pakistani people – developments such as ‘cricket diplomacy’ and public exposure to India have created a friendly and expectant climate.  How much this development permeates upwards through the military and bureaucratic structures remains to be seen.

On the military front, the current ceasefire (from August 2003) is holding in J&K and both sides have to ensure that it continues, despite provocations and acts of violence by militants and terrorists.  XBT or infiltration has definitely decreased, but there has been no pause in violence and incidents within J&K, especially during the parliamentary elections held in April-May 2004.  The reduction of XBT is in part due to the closure of mountain passes in the winter, and thus it remains to be seen if there will be a change in the summer.  One also has to observe developments following the elections.  Thus, only in due time can an accurate assessment be made as to whether infiltration has indeed stopped.  A positive step would be for Pakistan to at least visibly dismantle the infrastructure and terrorist camps in POK rather than just shifting them within POK.  The Indian Army and paramilitary forces are operationally better prepared and deployed and only a small portion (20 km of the 580 kms) of the Border Fence remains to be completed.  The troops are better equipped with surveillance, electronic, thermal and night vision devices in order to effectively check infiltration.  India and Pakistan could consider joint patrolling along the parts of the LOC where communication road-links are open.  Once the border is peaceful, gradual reduction of force levels on both sides could be considered.  Both countries could also take steps towards defence cooperation to diffuse and lower tensions in J&K.  This could be done in the form of military exchanges, observers at exercises, port calls by naval ships, and cooperation between the coast guard.  Eventually, India and Pakistan could fight a joint war against terrorism.  In the dialogue, the Siachen problem should be prioritized since it was almost finalized previously and requires little further political effort.  Because of the harsh geographic and climatic conditions, early de-militarization in this area is definitely possible.

(This paper was presented at the conference entitled “Conflict Prevention in South Asia – What Can the EU Achieve?” in Brussels, 10-12 May 2004)