Military Operation in South Waziristan: Internal Dimensions (Part III)
07 Jul, 2004 · 1424
Razia Sultana contends that the tribal ways have to be respected if the authorities are to find a solution to the problem
Saner elements among the authorities and a huge constituency of peace-loving tribals and other citizens of Pakistan kept their fingers cross for the sustainability and durability of the Shakai agreement (24 April-11 June 2004) which would have guaranteed some kind of peace in the turbulent South Waziristan Agency for a month and a half. However, since it was unwritten, the Shakai agreement became an instrument for conflicting interpretations between the authorities and the group of tribal dissidents especially on the question of registration of the foreigners.
The failure to maintain trust between the parties to the conflict ruined the fragile peace agreement and on 11 June the Shakai agreement culminated in another military action against the militant group that harbored the foreign elements numbering around 400-600. After claiming to restore relative calm by 14 June, the authorities killed the leading dissident Nek Mohammad on 19 June which is of two conflicting consequences for Pakistan and the international world. On the local front the tribal militant group has become a permanent feature of tribal politics of vengeance and they will remain at loggerhead with the authorities – the intensity and magnitude of which is simply unimaginable at this point. At the international level, however, Pakistan has proved its credentials (to some extent) once again as a true partner in the alliance against terror, rigorously cleansing its boarder area of terrorist elements.
To understand the ground realities on the internal and external fronts and their fallout, we need to take into consideration several points:
Using the tribal areas of the North West Frontier as permanent or temporary abode by the outsiders for various politico-economic reasons under the local cultural tradition of shelter has been an ancient phenomenon. Even if it were an enemy who requested for shelter, he would be provided it the same way as would a friend. So the presence of the now “wanted” foreigners is not a unique or controversial issue with the tribals. The kind of outsiders wanted by the government to be eliminated or registered are the remnants of the Afghan Jehad. These people if not already assimilated have most of them have at least forged matrimonial affinities and become part and parcel of the tribal way of life. The authorities label them as outsiders, but for the tribals they are adopted locals. Disclosing their distinct identities or exposing them to the authorities for official scrutiny when there is complete lack of trust between the tribals and the authorities over the issue of registration of the foreign elements in the tribal area is to turn a blind eye to the local socio-political imperatives. The traditions of shelter, hospitality and vengeance must not be taken for granted as they mean as much as life and death to the tribals. And this is quite evident from their refusal to give in to military might of the state and the renewal of hostilities on 11 June.
Even the killing of Nek Mohammad has not shattered the resolve of the tribal militants to fight the authorities to the last. Haji Mohammad Umer, who has taken over after Nek Mohammad, expressed his determination to continue the latter’s mission by saying, “I am a man of destiny and am ready to pay the price for fighting Jehad. He continued, “You know our homes in Kaloosh village were demolished by the government. We now live in a tent and that is how we lived before building our home. I like the tent as a home because we can easily carry and erect it wherever we want.” People of such staunch faith in their values cannot be suppressed even if the full might of state authorities were used against them.
The best way out would be to understand the local ways of handling the matter and employ them as the first option to resolve the issue. The non-military measures that have been applied by the authorities so far such as the jirga and the lashkar, are viewed by the locals as a cover for the coercive actions which have resulted in collateral damage and the complete disruption of routine life affecting innocent local people.
As per local custom, the Shakai agreement was unwritten and the word of mouth was trusted to be just as valid as the written word. This is why local notables were not made responsible for the peaceful behavior of the foreigners and their registration. They have their own skepticism for not showing themselves up to the authorities, which however, need not be taken as amiss by the authorities. Given that local values are more sacred to the tribal people, the authorities need to take cognizance of this and sincerely find ways out accordingly, rather than to completely ignore them to the point of alienating the tribal people.