The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) adopted a resolution on 18 June 2004 calling upon Iran to accelerate its cooperation with the Agency and reveal the scope and extent of its “secret” nuclear program. The resolution among others, was sponsored by the three European powers – Britain, France and Germany – which had, ironically, in October 2003, agreed to cooperate with Iran in terms of peaceful nuclear technology assistance if it agreed to suspend its uranium enrichment activities, cap its nuclear weapon activities, and accept the “Additional Protocol” which would enhance the IAEA’s ability to inspect Iran’s nuclear resources and facilities.

The current discourse – which has led to the resolution – pivots around the following: first, the question of contamination and, more specifically, the presence of highly enriched uranium (HEU) up to the levels of 36 percent as the environmental tests indicate. Second, there is concern regarding the scope of Iran’s P2 centrifuge enrichment program and also the details regarding the import of its  components, if at all they were being brought from outside. Both issues are believed to throw some light on Iran’s external nuclear linkages along with its links to “private” networks as revealed in the aftermath of the A Q Khan episode in Pakistan.

There is yet another concern which has bogged down IAEA officials. Satellite images provided to the IAEA by US intelligence indicate that several buildings had been destroyed at the Lavizan Shiyan site close to the military complex in the suburbs of Tehran, which presumably were used by Iran for its nuclear activities. This has led to the belief that Iran may be destroying nuclear program evidence crucial to the IAEA’s investigations. The strongly-worded resolution, it is believed, is also aimed by the US, to link-up Iran’s nuclear issue for a UN Security Council action by September this year.  

Iran has reacted sharply to the recent move to the extent of hardening its own attitude vis-à-vis the IAEA. No less than Iran’s supreme religious leader, Ayatollah Khameini, rebuked the IAEA for the resolution. He also made it clear that Iran needed to have complete control over its nuclear fuel cycle including the production of nuclear fuel in order to reduce its dependence on foreign sources. Nevertheless, the Ayatollah also said that his country did not intend to come out of the nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to which it is a signatory since 1973.   However, Iran would retain the sovereign right to pursue a civilian nuclear program as permitted by the NPT. Iran has signed the “Additional Protocol” which is now pending ratification. Until then, Iran in principle has to abide by the terms of “Additional Protocol” and fully cooperate with the IAEA. The recent move, it is feared, would lead to a stalemate between Iran and the IAEA and would further complicate the on-going investigations. The question remains: what should be done?

Given Iran’s past denials about its nuclear programme and concealing of information, the international community is justified in demanding complete transparency. It cannot be disputed that Iran had failed to comply with its safeguards agreement, which is the only means of determining that country’s compliance of its NPT obligations. These violations ranged from unreported imports of uranium compounds to the failure to provide prior design information of its nuclear facilities to the IAEA. All these clearly point toward an Iran wherewithal to develop nuclear weapons. 

Nonetheless, there is also a history of Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA. Iran has signed the Additional Protocol and has also abided by its commitment of adhering to the principles of the Protocol until its ratification. Moreover, it wants to retain its right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Under these circumstances Iran cannot be asked to abrogate its entire fuel cycle. Coercion of any form would only harden its position, as has happened over the US demand to Russia that it abrogate the Bushehr reactor deal which it had signed with Iran. This particular reactor would use low enriched uranium. In so doing, Iran would have to return the spent fuel to Russia as part of the agreement and as a result, lose the possibility of extracting plutonium from it. Nonetheless, the US continues to fear that it could be used for weapons programme and hence has been persuading Russia to scrap the deal. This strategy can backfire.

At this juncture, the US, the European nations, and the IAEA need to carefully weigh their options.  Irrespective of Iran’s past nuclear deviations, it is essential to engage Iran by offering certain incentives. Such incentives can range from lifting of the sanctions imposed by the US, assistance in high technology, and an assured nuclear fuel supply for the Bushehr plant. Moreover, it should also be taken into account as to what security threats compel Iran to develop weapons, if at all it is in the process of doing so. These need to be aggressively addressed, and if possible, eliminated.