Introductory Session

Maj. Gen. Dipankar Banerjee

The aim of the conference, as the name suggests, is to look at ways and means of moving ahead and finding a lasting solution to the Kashmir imbroglio. For doing this, one needs to analyze the current situation and chalk out future plans. What is crucial is the manner in which the Kashmir issue needs to be dealt with. Should we let it simmer and resolve itself on its own or should we think seriously of a solution in the spirit of SAARC. The answer would obviously be the latter approach. We should also envisage civil society’s role in the peace process.

Gen. A M Vohra

Tracing his association with the Nimrana group, a track II diplomacy initiative established in October 1991, Gen. Vohra believes that for lasting peace one has to understand Pakistan’s expectations with regard to Kashmir. It has been established beyond doubt that a dialogue alone can lead to a lasting solution. Military solution will prove futile. Pakistan leaders accept this point of view. What is required is a ‘give and take’ process between the two disputing countries. While India can give up its claims on POK (Pakistan Occupied Kashmir), Pakistan has shown its willingness to give up its demand of implementation of the UN resolution, and calling for a plebiscite in Kashmir.

Some of the suggestions made by the speaker were:

• Hold elections in Kashmir to assess the wishes of the Kashmiris.

• Initiate a composite dialogue so that lack of progress on one issue will not hamper dialogue on other issues.

• Welcome societal inputs as it will enable climbing down from tough positions.

• Control militancy and emphasize the economy.

• Make the economy the core issue, while accepting the centrality of the Kashmir issue.

• Finally, except for Punjab, the rest of Pakistan is not really concerned about which way the solution goes. They feel the human and economic costs are too high to sustain this conflict much longer.

Session I: India, Pakistan and Kashmir

P R Chari – Indo-Pak Dialogues on Kashmir: Learning from the Past

Kashmir is a dispute in de facto terms. India’s concern for reunification of Kashmir and Pakistan’s concern for plebiscite have been overtaken by time. The Kashmir dispute has endured for 60 years without a solution anywhere in sight. Any solution has to take into consideration India and Pakistan, but also the indigenous and exogenous Kashmiris. It is impossible to reach a perfect solution and compromises need being made by all the concerned parties. The Tashkent Agreement does not mention Kashmir. The Shimla Agreement envisages the sanctity of the LOC. Article 6 of this agreement refers to a final settlement of J&K on the basis of mutual agreement. The years following the agreement saw Pakistan passing through turbulent times. Domestic politics kept the Kashmir issue on the backburner. There was no real engagement till the 90s when a high level engagement began. However, an impasse was caused by Pakistan’s insistence on the plebiscite. The centrality of Kashmir in Indo-Pak relations can be gauged from the several Kashmir related issues in the non-papers dialogue process. The Kashmir issue was thereby embedded in other Indo-Pak disputes for the first time. What prompted Musharraf to embark on his Agra trip? Was it the politics of idiosyncrasy or US pressure? The Agra summit was doomed for failure as it lacked a concrete agenda or prior groundwork. The Kashmir issue also finds mention in the recent CBM proposals, which includes, suggestions to resume a bus service linking Muzzaffarabad and Srinagar.

Recent developments have revived the possibilities of a sustained composite dialogue. Here are some important pointers:

• Accept the centrality of the Kashmir issue.

• Demilitarization of Siachen could be the key to solving the Kashmir dispute.

• A compromise solution for converting the LOC (plus or minus) into an international border is the only feasible solution to the Kashmir dispute.

• Careful preparations are required before holding any negotiations or summit as a failure worsen the situation. Negotiations should be low key but sustained.

• No solution is saleable on a stand alone mode, but should be embedded in a larger CBM process.

• The Indo-Pak dialogue is the result of a systemic need and pressure from the US, which has now become a regional power.

• India and Pakistan should find a modus vivendi to the Kashmir problem themselves, lest it be dictated by the US.

Prof. Satish Kumar – Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy: Is There a Change?

Pakistan’s Kashmir policy revolves around the following three basic postulates:

• Muslim dominated areas should go to Pakistan.

• India’s military intervention took place before signing the treaty of accession, hence is illegal.

• Plebiscite should be held in Kashmir in terms of the UN resolution calling for it.

Pakistan scholars’ writings post 9/11 show fresh thinking on the issue. There is a marked shift in Pakistan’s stand. The very fact that Pakistan ‘has set aside’ the UN resolution calling for plebiscite in Kashmir, reflects this changed perspective. Perhaps the irrelevance of the plebiscite objective has caused rethinking. ‘Kashmir is the lifeline of Pakistan’, is no longer a tenable argument. If Pakistan has survived for 56 years without Kashmir why it cannot in future? The Indus Waters Treaty will be respected come what may. Kashmir is not strategically as vital as is made out to be. Pakistan’s strategies with regard to Kashmir have not delivered. They need to be reworked. Kashmir being dubbed as another Vietnam is not correct. Since 9/11, Islamic militancy has gained prominence and Pakistan has been forced to go on the defensive. Pakistan understands that India is a military and industrial power. Only a decisive military defeat could change India’s Kashmir policy, which is now impossible with both countries going nuclear. The change in Musharraf’s tone and tenor on the Kashmir issue from time to time displays his pragmatism in balancing the need for resolving the Kashmir crisis along with pandering to his domestic constituency. Both sides have ‘compulsions’ that needs to be taken into cognizance. As Musharraf has stated, “There can be no unilateral give and take”. There should be room for flexibility. Some compromises will have to be made by both parties to explore the meeting ground. Surrender of territory will not be viable for both the sides. Softening of borders, might be.  What, however, needs to be realised is that arriving at a permanent solution is a process rather than an event.  The process is more important than a predetermined solution.

Salman Haidar – Taking the Indian and Pakistani Proposals Forward On Kashmir

Kashmir is a long standing problem with enormous complexities, kept alive by compulsions on both sides – India and Pakistan. There is a need for initiating a narrow and intense dialogue on the issue to reach an amicable solution. A composite dialogue that envisages multi track, multi speed processes, should aim at such a solution. Interaction by delegates during the non paper discussions identified a number of issues. However, progress was not uniform on all these issues. There have been ups and downs. It is only now that the dialogue tracks can be identified. The procedural aspects are largely settled, enabling deeper engagement. Two notable developments have taken place post 1997. They are: i) Role of the US is seen in a more positive light in India, ii) People demanding a negotiated settlement of the dispute.

Notions of dialogue are different on both sides. For Pakistan, it tantamounts to altering the status quo; for India, it means maintaining the status quo, especially territorial status quo. Measures catering to the diverse populations of both the sides are needed. They should have multiple interpretations, encompassing populist and elite perspectives. No broad brush solution will prove effective. Only incremental steps should be employed. The contours of the compromise solution are not yet visible but that should not discourage either side. Sustained engagement is what is important. Prospects are fair, but it is a hard path requiring forbearance on both sides. 

Discussion

• All the participants advised upon a cautious approach while dealing with Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. India should learn from past experiences and think about the availability of military options in the changed circumstances.

• Participants insisted that India should go for talks only after doing its homework. Even in the recent talks, while Pakistan showed the diplomatic maturity by forgoing UN resolution, India did not make any serious concessions. 

• Pakistan’s military is entrenched within the country and it has convinced the common masses that sustainable peace and stability is only possible within the country under military rule. As military rule is antithetical to the relations with India and committed to continuation of a hard-line policy on Kashmir, India should not trust the Pakistani military blindly. Some participants went to the extent of saying that Pakistan’s word cannot be taken seriously as most previous agreements were violated by them. Still, the participants believed that engagement is the best available option for India. India should continue with the ceasefire.

• The need to address the concerns of the Kashmiri people from both sides of the divide was also highlighted. As India is successfully pushing the democratic process in the Indian part of Kashmir and no attempts have been made by Pakistan to co-opt Pakistan-Occupied-Kashmir (POK) into the body politik of Pakistan, addressing their concerns like starting the Srinagar - Muzaffarabad bus service, can create a favourable public opinion for India.

• Raising her voice against human rights violations, Rita Manchanda argued that their respective national interests are more important for India and Pakistan than the concerns of Kashmiris. Hence the question of territorial adjustment is insisted upon, but the issues concerning the Kashmiris like demilitarisation of the state and integrating the militants are neglected by the establishment of both the countries.    

• Prem Shankar Jha, who visited Pakistan after the SAARC summit, pointed out that the comprehensive statement issued shows the establishment and common people appreciate the deteriorating economic conditions in Pakistan and the fact that its sustained dispute with India will not allow Pakistan to come out of its economic mess. He also insisted that there is an immense difference of perceptions on Kashmir between the masses in India, Pakistan and Kashmir and their establishments. How to address their concerns is the real challenge to solve this problem.

• The moderate position taken by extremist leaders like Fazal-ul-Rahman of Muttaheda Qaumi Movement (MQM) on India’s peace initiative and the constitutional place carved out for himself by Gen Musharraff without playing the Kashmir card are considered as two significant developments within Pakistan. 

• On the US role in Pakistan, there are varying perceptions among scholars. While some consider it as merely tactical, for others it is more strategic one. India has to think about this increasing US presence in South Asia.   

• On the question on the Swaran Singh – Bhutto talks in 1963, speakers said they were bound to fail because of the sense of insecurity and the demand for acquiring the rest of Kashmir by Pakistan which was unacceptable to India. From the Indian point of view, the 1963 talks should be considered a success, since India had withstood International pressure to resolve the Kashmir problem.   

• The discussion ended on a positive note by noting that the change in Indo-Pak relations and Pakistan’s altered terrorism policy. Converting a compromise or modified Line of Control into an International border was considered a viable solution to the Kashmir problem.  Increasing people-to people contact was one of the ways to reach this solution.

Session II: New Delhi and Srinagar

Prof. Riyaz Punjabi: Vohra and Advani Initiatives: Taking Them Forward

Prof Punjabi began with the admission that since it was not known what transpired during the talks, it would be difficult to analyse them.

Pakistan seemed to be cracking down on jehadi elements on its soil and Musharraf appeared to be serious about this issue. However, he had many problems on his hands. One, there were clashes between Sunnis and Ismailis in the Northern Territories. Two, how would Pakistan dealt with the Islamic fundamentalists in Kashmir that drew their inspiration from Pakistan? Prof. Punjabi predicted that the pro-liberation groups would become increasingly active in Kashmir. Political movements would begin on both sides that were not fundamentalist in nature but geared towards independence and freedom.

What were the Kashmiri perceptions on autonomy? Prof. Punjabi noted that it was still taboo to discuss autonomy and decentralization. It was time, therefore, that Vohra suggested greater devolution of powers to the district level in Jammu and Kashmir, so as to ensure political, economic, and social participation by the people. Jammu and Kashmir, today, was like a private limited company. Planning was limited to a few bureaucrats and politicians. There was also a nexus between the bureaucrats and the terrorists. It was time to break this nexus, and bring about greater accountability in the state. Currently, there was a perception that one could get away with anything in Kashmir.

Kashmir was a grand loya jirga of groups and associations of traders, fruit growers and farmers. These were active social groups and there was a need for the Centre to establish a rapport with these groups who were willing to talk about other issues. Prof. Punjabi criticized the political parties for retaining their old ways of functioning and compared them also to jirgas. At the national level they had to reach a consensus to view the Kashmir situation as a national problem, and move beyond electoral compulsions.

There was also a need to go back to the panchayati institutions, revive and integrate them into the administrative system. A bottom up approach had to be adopted for institutional reforms.

Dr. Saifuddin Soz: Autonomy, Decentralization and Governance

Dr. Soz in reply to a question on what has gone wrong in Kashmir, spoke briefly about the early part of Kashmir’s history following the end of British rule. He reminded the audience of Sheikh Abdullah’s secular credentials and argued that it was Faiz Ahmed Faiz and others who had favoured joining Pakistan. Dr. Soz noted that, in his October 1947 visit to Pakistan, Sheikh Abdullah had made two demands for Kashmir to join it: one, that Kashmir would enjoy autonomy within Pakistan, and two, Jinnah should withdraw his statement that, “The fate of the people would be decided by the rulers.” When both demands were rejected he flew back to Delhi, where he noticed that Article 370 of the Indian Constitution offered possibilities for the autonomy he envisaged for Kashmir. Finally, Sheikh Abdullah achieved his aims with the Delhi Agreement of 4 July 1952.

Sheikh Abdullah was able to sell the Agreement to the Kashmiris, but Nehru failed to do so in Parliament and had to withdraw it. Gradually, even Article 370 was eroded and there was no effort made to offer true democracy to Kashmir, which was coupled with bad governance. The political situation began to get out of hand around 1987. This situation still continues and at present there is a very strong US influence visible, which Dr. Soz felt was ominous. The Americans were happy with the Pakistani military and were not really bothered about the influence of terrorist groups in our country.

A dialogue with Pakistan was not possible unless Pakistan debated Islam within itself. Pakistan had not offered a cultural context for the Kashmiris to relate to. The Indian government remained the best instrument for dealing with Kashmir but was not yet involved in a vigorous dialogue with the people of Kashmir. It appeared not to be serious about the process. Advani was not serious about talking with the APHC, perhaps because he thought he was speaking from a position of strength. The BJP’s response to the Disqualification Bill was not encouraging. The dialogue process was still fragile but the Indian government had to be serious about it.

Discussion

• There was a need to divorce the issue of autonomy from the question of the LoC.

• The Vohra initiative seems to have fallen by the wayside.

• Questions were raised about the invitations received by the APHC to visit Pakistan. Who had invited them? What had they said about going?

• If the Centre was not serious about a dialogue in Kashmir at this crucial juncture of Indo-Pak talks, did this mean that Vajpayee was not serious also about the Indo-Pak peace process? Were the talks merely for making electoral gains?

• Regional aspirations in Kashmir had to be taken into account. Sub-regions were becoming significant like Gilgit and Ladakh. There were differing interpretations of the situation emanating from Baramulla, Kupwara and Srinagar.

• There was a need to de-link the Indo-Pak dialogue from Kashmir

• Since Musharraf was taking a non-Islamic tack, but restrictions on Amanullah has been removed, it was possible that the pendulum had swung back to the situation obtaining in 1989-90.

• The contours of autonomy had broadened, and Vohra’s role in the talks had to be appreciated.

• The LoC was also an ethnic frontier and the notion of LoC+ had to be questioned. Any change in the status of the LoC would only lead to further ethno-cultural conflict.

• There was disagreement on the use of the expression “jirga” for political parties

• The APHC’s compulsions to enter into talks with the central government stemmed from the fact that the people of Kashmir wanted an end to the violence and conflict, and wanted peace with dignity. Another reason was that the elections in 2002 had adequately expressed the people’s will and therefore the APHC had to talk with the Centre. To the question of whether any importance should be accorded to the Hurriyat, it was contended that it still had its ear to the ground, though they too did not have any great strength in numbers. They represented the separatist stream and the Indian government had to talk to them

• The speakers were confident that elections at the panchayati level were not threatened by the gun as was feared. In fact, there was a feeling that the elections had been delayed.

• While there was an urgent need to depoliticize the autonomy debate, the audience was reminded that autonomy could only be implemented by the politicians.

Session – III:  Security forces and Militancy in Kashmir

Dipankar Banerjee: Counter Military Operations in Kashmir: Thus Far and the Road Ahead

Giving a brief view of the militancy in Kashmir, Maj Gen Dipankar Banerjee pointed out that insurgency had spread much beyond the valley enormously since its initial stages of militancy in 1991-92. The society is characterized more by a deeper alienation of the people and an intense militarization. A process of Islamic militarization is also simultaneously taking place. What obtains in the state today is a complex situation characterized by a public wave of disenchantment.

Banerjee said, however, that the post 26 November Ceasefire period has led to a positive atmosphere with the Indo-Pak border remaining largely peaceful. Historically, too, the border had been quite peaceful since 1996 -97 except for the Kargil Episode. He referred to the massive reorganization and restructuring of the security forces which would improve counter insurgency operations. He maintained that it was an inability of the Indian State to cope with the situation that was responsible for its deterioration; it should have been done in the early 1990s. He also reminded that greater coordination with the police made possible the successful containing of militancy in Punjab. Stressing the significance of fencing of the border, he said that it had allowed an improvement in counter-insurgency measures.

Contemplating what is likely to happen, Banerjee maintained that there was no incentive on the Indian side to violate the Ceasefire but there might be for Pakistan. Secondly, terrorist capabilities would decrease. Regarding the issue of infiltration, he maintained that it would need to be assessed after the June- July period. The level of military forces will however depend on the level of infiltration. However, even if there is a decrease in the level of infiltration, it cannot be concluded that insurgency will recede. Insurgency in India has an average twenty year cycle, going by the examples in Northeast India, which also applies to Jammu and Kashmir.

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Finally, Banerjee stressed that no military solution is possible in the case of insurgencies and maintained that peace initiatives should be coordinated with counter insurgency measures.

EN Ram Mohan: Militant Groups and Pakistan: Changing Dimensions and their Implications for Kashmir

There is a common tendency to blame Pakistan for the insurgency in Kashmir but, there are two insurgent organisations that are not accountable to Pakistan which are the Jamait-e-Ulema-e- Islam and the Harkat ul Majahiddin. Ram Mohan said that since the CIA financed the ISI with 4 billion dollars, about 30 thousand Pakistani youths have died. It was at that time that Gen Zia-Ul Haq started his policy of wounding India by a thousand cuts.

The first batch of insurgents was Kashmiris, mostly from the JKLF, who went to Pakistan. At that time, it was not very interested in them as that they did not seem motivated. From his personal experience of encounters, Ram Mohan said that the first trained and motivated groups appeared in 1991-92 in the form of Harkat ul Jihadi Islami, who, unlike the Kashmiri groups, never surrendered. In some cases, they would set on fire the house in which they were hiding rather than come out and surrender. The HUJI boys were diehards; they would say, “We will fight until Allah’s rule is spread all over the world.”  However, those trained in Afghanistan, who preferred fighting to the end, were a small number.

Ram Mohan contended that these groups will not be affected by any change in the policies of Pakistan. He also pointed out that Kashmir is a place where Islam did not come with the sword- they were all Sufis. On the future of insurgency in the event of the talks between India and Pakistan, he noted that firstly, Gen Musharraf cannot accept a solution that is unfavourable to Pakistan and second, his orders to reform the madrassas have not yet been implemented. The Jaish-e- Mohmmed will continue their infiltration without any direction from Pakistan, he maintained, and further opined that their exposure to the West has only hardened their stance.

In his concluding remarks, Ram Mohan said that Pakistan was not going to stop infiltrating the Jihadis. He also referred to the literature on counter-insurgency in the 1950s and stressed the need to learn lessons from there especially to notice the socio- economic injustices that led to insurgency. He pointed out the example of the Huk Balap in the Phillipines, an insurgency that was successfully brought to an end by good governance. We have done enormous harm, he conceded, by counter insurgency operations if out of every ten boys picked up for interrogation, three or four never returned home. He suggested that when governance improves and the state becomes people friendly, the popularity of insurgency will naturally come down.

Discussion

• The point is well taken that the administration must improve but the administration says it cannot improve if the security is in bad shape. Even the judiciary cannot function as it is threatened.

• There is no need to legislate on madrassas as President Musharraf can do much without such legislation.

• Infiltration level may go down but militancy has become a profession.

• The realization that the army is not equipped to fight insurgency led to the creation of the Rashtriya Rifles. With a different training and motivation, they are well poised now.