While deepening linkages between the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists), CPN-M, and Indian left-wing extremist groups have been a cause of concern for quite some time, recent developments have brought to the focus growing relationship of Maoists with insurgent groups operating in eastern and Northeastern part of India. On 24 March 2004, a senior Nepalese Maoist leader, believed to be second-in-command after CPN-M chairman, Pushpa Kamal Dahal, alias Prachanda was arrested near Siliguri town in West Bengal. Subsequent interrogation of Vaidya confirmed linkages between Nepalese Maoists and the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO), an insurgent group active in north Bengal and parts of Assam and the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA).

The KLO and the ULFA have been working closely with Maoists for quite some time. Apart from sharing training, financial resources and arms supply, this arrangement has provided both the groups with alternative supply and communication routes. The ULFA is believed to have established links with Maoists through members of minority community in southern Bhutan who have taken shelter in Nepal as refugees. This relationship assumed significance after the Royal Bhutanese Army launched an offensive, on 15 December 2003 to flush out the ULFA, KLO and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB). After the crackdown, a number of senior Maoist leaders reportedly met top leaders of the ULFA in north-western Bhutan and extended an invitation to set up camps in Nepal. The ULFA, in turn, agreed to train the Maoist cadres. In the past also, both the groups have shared training resources. Since then, there have been a number of reports suggesting these linkages. Media reports in the first week of April 2004 even claimed that Nepali Maoists are reported to have been jointly working with these groups to attack Bhutan’s Royal Palace. Apart from ULFA and KLO, the Gorkha Liberation Tiger Force (GLTF), operating in Darjeeling area of West Bengal, has also been maintaining close links with the Maoists. The National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) is also reported to have maintained presence in Nepal.

The Siliguri corridor serves as a meeting point of these two insurgent groups. The area, proximate to Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh, has for some time turned into a hotbed of insurgent movements. In the past, the KLO, which shared camps with ULFA in Bhutan provided logistics support as well as shelter to ULFA cadres in transit. For the Maoists, the corridor has served as a route to escape from actions of security forces in Nepal as well as to expand their activities in eastern Nepal. In fact, the documents seized from Vaidya reportedly revealed that the Maoists had spent approximately 10 million rupees to buy explosives in the year 2003 and the explosives were bought in Siliguri. In addition, the Maoists have been trying to consolidate their position among people of Nepali origin and Nepali diasporas in Nepalese dominated areas of Siliguri, Darjeeling and Sikkim. On 7 December 2003, Baburam Bhattarai claimed that they were trying to ‘organise’ approximately 10 million Nepalese in India. The Akhil Bhartiya Nepali Ekta Samaj (ABNES), a front organization of the Maoists, which is proscribed under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA), is active in Nepali dominated areas.

The situation is further complicated by a number of recent incidents, which point to the growing activities of Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) in the Siliguri corridor. And this concern has been articulated by West Bengal Government on a number of occasions. Speaking in State Legislative Assembly on 18 March 2004, West Bengal Chief Minister, Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee said militants active in north Bengal and Assam are trained in Afghanistan by the ISI. He said, “We came to learn about this from the confessions made by KLO and ULFA activists arrested in north Bengal”. There were reports about KLO self-styled ‘commander-in-chief’, Jeevan Singha, who had escaped the military action in Bhutan forces to Bangladesh, holding talks with ISI operatives there.

These developments indicate that militant groups in the subcontinent are coming together not only because of ideological affinity but for mutual benefit. The survival and growth of militant groups depend, to a great extent, on their ability to forge linkages and ensure safe haven, flow of finance and arms supply. This has serious security implications for a vast swathe of land where Nepalese Maoists and Indian left-wing extremist group have already been working for a ‘compact revolutionary zone’ extending from Andhra Pradesh and Nepal.