N. Manoharan – Election Outcome

In the recently concluded 13^th parliamentary elections in Sri Lanka, a record number of 6024 candidates participated for 225 seats. UPFA emerged as the single largest party with 105 seats, but eight short of absolute majority. Ranil Wikremasinghe’s UNP slipped to second position with 82 seats. The LTTE-backed Tamil National Alliance (TNA) got 22 seats, a near sweep in the Tamil-dominated North and East. Surprisingly, the debutant JHU garnered nine seats, encroaching upon the Sinhala hard-line votes of both the UNP and the SLFP. The JVP has strengthened itself with 40 seats by aligning with the PA. Overall, this election has thrown up a variety of views on the future of Sri Lanka, dominated by hardliners, in the parliament.

Why and under what circumstances have the people voted a different set of political forces to power? Gosnell’s four variables of political participation were used by the speaker to understand the Sri Lankan electorate’s participation in the elections. According to the first variable – Voters’ Interest – the degree of relevance of political issues for the voters and the competitive environment during the elections were examined. Peace, development and governance were the three issues that dominated the campaigning. Though interrelated, they were raised in a competitive rather than complimentary manner reflecting the Island’s fractured body politic.

The mass organisations of the alliances and the intensity of canvassing were analyzed under the second variable of Mobilization. Since most of the parties have a mass base it was easy for them to mobilize support for canvassing.

Under the third variable of Institutional Factors, the electoral system and time of voting were analyzed. Though the proportional representation system used in Sri Lanka is complicated, the Island’s voters have got used to it, except for some 400,000 new voters this time around.

On the Physical Ease variable, the situation of polling booths was not an issue except for the IDPs and voters from “uncleared areas”. For the first time in two decades the polls were held in a peaceful atmosphere.

However, there were two main hindrances for obtaining an ideal participation of the voters. First, the governmental machinery, especially the state-controlled media, was effectively used by the President for electoral advantage. There was a big question mark therefore over the informed participation of the electorate. Election violence posed the second problem. There was widespread intimidation, impersonation and rigging, especially in the north and east.

It is commonly believed that the alliance chemistry worked in favour of the UPFA. But, more detailed analysis of the past elections suggests a different interpretation. The swings in voting would have occurred irrespective of the JVP aligning with the PA. Rather than the People’s Alliance, it was the JVP which gained via the Alliance at the expense of its larger partner, the PA. The alliance factor worked only nominally for the UNF because of dissensions among the Muslim parties. Since the TNA stayed together despite the Karuna factor, it swept the Tamil-dominated areas.

Yet another factor which influenced the outcome was the projection of issues. The UNF mainly rode on the peace plank, but it failed to sense the voters’ disappointment at not gaining much as the dividends of peace. It also failed to project its economic achievements since December 2001. On the other hand, the UPFA projected the issue of economic development as its first priority. UNF’s peace plans were dubbed a “sell out” to the LTTE. The monk-dominated JHU projected an entirely different issue – good governance. Both the dominant parties were blamed for the crisis confronting the country. Setting up dharmarajya on the lines of the Buddha’s ideals was eulogized. The middle class voters fell in line with this perception.

P. Sahadevan – Impact on the Peace Process

Given the verdict, what has emerged is a negative picture; there are more problems than solutions. Indeed, the peace process is irreversible and the people do not want war. But there are numerous challenges to peace in the coming days. How these challenges will be met depends on the types and nature of the actors that will emerge shortly in the government. The present government is a minority one. The CWC is uncertain about getting the much needed eight seats. It is common knowledge that the LTTE-backed TNA is averse to the Chandrika-led government. So, what is left is the JHU, which is against the peace process. Even if it accepts the process, it is known for its opposition to autonomy and any change in the basic structure of the polity.

Even UPFA is a divided house, unlike in 1994 when most of its constituents were liberal democrats.  The JVP, which is a major constituent of the present government, is against any kind of devolution. Norwegian mediation is also not acceptable to it. Overall, the alliance is full of contradictions. The Parliament is another bundle of lethal contradictions. One-third of its members are hardliners, Sinhala or Tamil. In this situation, it is difficult to pursue the peace process. Furthermore, the recent split in the LTTE has cast doubts on the concept of a traditional Tamil homeland.

The next few months are going to be crucial. Much exploration of the various options available has to be done. Creating an entirely new process will be costly. There are issues of rehabilitation, resettlement and reconstruction that require priority. The controversial question of high security zones has to be looked into. Then there is the much debated and criticized Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) proposals presented by the LTTE. At the same time, the coalition has to be managed without any dissensions. Substantive negotiations are still quite far away. The options left to Chandrika are minimal, although she might seek international support.

Discussion

·         The present coalition does not have any moral principles. Individual antagonisms are dominating its politics. There is no short-term solution in sight. The LTTE is very clear on its agenda of separatism. The peace process is a futile exercise. Even if it is attempted it cannot be taken forward very much.

·         Chandrika Kumaratunga has set in motion a process for constitutional change. But this exercise will not be easy given the lack of a two-thirds majority in this Parliament. Referendum could be an option, but there are other problems here, given its linkages with the ethnic question.

·         There are deeper ramifications of the Karuna split, which has weakened the LTTE in its aftermath. The rebel is sitting pretty with the Sri Lankan armed forces for whom he is a mine of information on the LTTE. But it is worth enquiring who was behind his rebellion, why they did not support him when there was an LTTE operation launched against him and so on. Karuna was let down by the Sri Lankan government at a crucial juncture, and thus an effective opportunity for countering the LTTE has been lost.

·         The only silver lining is the $4.5 billion carrot offered by the international community. Hence, it is essential for the government to show some progress on the peace front to get the aid. The present choice before the government is to keep the ceasefire agreement going. At the same time, the President has to be cautious in her moves on the ethnic question.

·         India has of late, become too finicky about not interfering in its neighborhood. In the case of Sri Lanka, it is doing a number of things behind the scenes. But the real question is whether New Delhi could play a meaningful role without addressing the problem of the LTTE. The history of India’s involvement could not be forgotten and an objective assessment of the ground reality had to be made before any moves to get involved.

·         India also has no leverage on any actors in the Island. It has no direct role to play either militarily or politically. It could exercise pressure on the main political parties to deliver, but not beyond a limit. The option of defence cooperation is not valid any more. Hence, it is pertinent to keep India’s options open and help those countries that are taking the risk of involving themselves in the Island’s affairs. India’s biggest contribution to help the situation in Sri Lanka has been not to press for Prabhakaran’s extradition in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination case.