What are the likely implications for India of the MNNA status to Pakistan, especially the ongoing Indo-Pak rapprochement? What are its likely implications for Pakistan? Finally, would there be any implications for the US in granting this status to Pakistan?

What does the grant of MNNA status mean? Granting this status to Pakistan will create a psychological impact – both positive and negative, but one cannot exaggerate its significance. What have countries granted MNNA status in the last few years gained? What have Argentina, Philippines, Bahrain and Thailand achieved ever since gaining this new status?

What are the American interests in Pakistan at this juncture that persuaded them to grant MNNA status to Pakistan? No doubt, President Bush’s compulsions to capture Osama bin Laden is a primary objective. This cannot be done unless Pakistan goes full throttle to capture him. Gen. Musharraf has been hesitant, as it would jeopardize his own plans. If he has to shed his uniform by the end of this year, he would need the support of his troops. He also needs the support of the MMA, so that the Parliament could function with less problems. With the jihadis after his life, he would not like to antagonize the tribes of the FATA and engage them in an open and full-scale conflict.

The American objective thus seems to be strengthening Gen Musharraf’s position inside the Army. There has been a lot of resentment in the Army on why should Musharraf do so much for the US. Their argument is valid – American interests in Pakistan have never been consistent; Pakistan will get back to square one once bin Laden is captured; India is enjoying a special status in the American scheme of things with the Kashmir issue having been put on the back burner; and the jihadi policy is in total disarray. What has Pakistan received in return from the US?

For the US, it is essential that General Musharraf stays on in power and commands the loyalty from his troops. If there is another coup or a divide or an attempt on Musharraf’s life either entirely from inside or partially with ‘internal’ assistance, it would be the US whose interests would be primarily at stake. No doubt, the US would be able to influence the next in line either by threats or concessions, but this would take time, which Bush cannot afford.

It is also possible that the US wishes to exploit Pakistan and secure its interests in West Asia. With the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan sinking deeper into the morass, two of Bush’s major foreign policy initiatives are in disarray. Pakistan’s assistance is crucial in Afghanistan, to control the al Qaeda-Taliban network and targeting the latter’s safe havens in the FATA regions. Additionally, it would be of immense help, if Pakistan assists the US in Iraq, either politically or militarily or both.

What would be the implications of the MNNA status for Pakistan and Indo-Pak rapprochement? First, US support to Musharraf is inversely proportional to the return of democracy in Pakistan; hence the first major casualty within Pakistan would be the return of moderate and secular political parties. Musharraf is in fact, likely to continue his policy against the efforts of the PML (N) and PPP from creating a political space for themselves. The religious parties, now united under the MMA are likely to fill this space, as there is little scope for the pro-Musharraf PML expanding its political reach.

Second, the anti-American sentiments inside Pakistan will increase. Musharraf’s actions are likely to be seen through the American prism. While moderate sections may agree with some of Musharraf’s decisions, the extremists would interpret them as toeing the American line. Unfortunately, the voices of the latter are likely to be heard in those areas which produce hatred and violence. The pressure from NWFP and other MMA constituencies are likely to increase, if Pakistani actions are seen as influenced by the US. The radical and alienated elements would get more radicalized and alienated

Third, would the Indo-Pak rapprochement be affected? Were the recent statements by Musharraf in which he threatened to withdraw from negotiations if there was no progress on Kashmir due to confidence created by conferral of MNNA status? Was his aggressive posture in the India Today conclave due to this factor? Or are these statements only rhetoric meant for the domestic audience, so that he does not appear sold out on vital issues relating to Pakistan? The implications of MNNA status on Indo-Pak rapprochement would depend on how Pakistan responds to the earlier and new peace proposals. It is too early to comment on that process.