Gen. Banerjee began by saying that Nepal was in a crisis mode. Its democratic structure had weakened and lost legitimacy in the eyes of the people. The politician’s propensity for self-aggrandizement and corruption has deprived it of popular support. The Maoist movement that started in February 1996 and escalated in to violence soon after, now seriously challenged the stability of the kingdom.  In eight years of insurgency, 9,000 people had been killed with about 75 percent of this occurring in the last two years. The third pillar in the kingdom, constitutional monarchy under the present ruler appears stable and is critical but is at best an interim solution. The 40 point charter of the Maoists in 1996 remains their political manifesto. It could be divided under three heads. The first part covered issues of nationalism of which the first five were directed against India. Therefore, any thinking that they sympathized with India and hoped for support from New Delhi should be ruled out.  The next set of issues concerned public welfare. The third part referred to people’s living condition and developmental issues.

The Royal Nepal Army (RNA) was neither prepared nor equipped to deal with the insurgency and cannot be expected to be ready soon. It was untrained, ill-equipped and needed an urgent overhaul of its tactical doctrines and operational concepts. Moreover even under the King, effective political direction seemed to be lacking. In the initial stages there were some doubts as to whom they were accountable. Today it has been clearly settled in favour of the monarchy.  Commenting on the state of insurgency, Gen. Banerjee noted that the Royal Government really controlled only the district headquarters. The basic unit of governance in Nepal remained the Village Developmental Council (VDC). Of the 3900 VDCs, many did not have any headmen and the remainder were largely non-functioning. The police force with a strength of 40 to 50,000 was in a pathetic shape and ineffective. An armed police force of 15,000 was raised five years ago and had yet to find its feet. The RNA with a current strength of about 57,000 needed to be redeployed and reorganized. There was currently a proposal to increase its strength to about 70,000 and the demand for further increase will continue.

The US was very active in the country and this must be seen as a positive step at least for now. It had responded strongly with arms supplies, military equipment including helicopters and with training. Even though Maoists do not to threaten US interests presently, there is a concern that a Maoist insurgency in this part of the world could potentially destabilize a larger region.  Some $30 to $40 million in military equipment had been supplied till now and even more in the form of multilateral aid both direct and indirect. The US approach to the insurgency favoured stronger military response, which may not be entirely appropriate at this stage. The US military presence was unpopular and is being exploited by the Maoists in their propaganda. By contrast India has supplied perhaps substantially more arms than the US, but has maintained a relatively low profile. Its engagement in training the Nepalese armed forces remained high and its equipment was much appreciated by the RNA.  Gen. Banerjee suggested that the Indian approach to counter insurgency, putting civic actions and developmental issues ahead of military operations and focusing on winning hearts and minds, was more appropriate to the situation in Nepal, particularly at this stage.

Within India there appeared to be differing views in dealing with the situation. One section seemed to feel that New Delhi needed to keep its options open, since the Maoists appeared to have support among the masses. This view, right or wrong, concerned the Nepalese authorities and has them worried. The larger view appropriately held that the authorities in Nepal needed to be backed up firmly with appropriate military and political support. It would like to see a constitutional monarchy existing in harmony with effective democratic governance, which focused on development and security for all its peoples. Such a process would of course have to be evolved by the Nepalese themselves. There was no need for India to be unduly concerned about foreign presence of the US, since its long-term influence was likely to be limited and in the near term it was fully complementary to Indian interests. The bottom line was that the Maoist insurgency had to be defeated, particularly before it adversely affected neighbouring parts of India.  Talking about the level of Chinese involvement, Gen. Banerjee noted that China had strictly kept itself away from any involvement in the movement. This was entirely in tune with its present foreign policy and concerns of the possible fall-out of the insurgency on Tibet. China was concerned about increasing US presence in Nepal as well as in other parts of Asia.

By way of conclusion, Gen. Banerjee assessed the relative strengths of the three principal actors in the current political situation in Nepal. The Maoists were winning and had time on their side if they played their cards well. However, their limitations were lack of advanced weaponry, absence of sanctuaries and outside help. Till these changed the insurgency could be dealt with though at certain levels of counter violence. The political parties were the weakest link. They were disunited, faction-ridden, disparate and corrupt, led by old and tired leaders. Though generally opposed to the King’s assumption of direct power, they cannot come together to fashion an opposition to the palace. The King, who is the third actor, is held in high respect by the people as the reincarnation of the Hindu God, but the monarchy has been weakened following the regicide. The King appears to accept that his executive authority will be challenged, he considers himself in his own words, as a “standby generator”, to be switched off when main power (political parties) returned. There appears to be no alternative to the King in this current crisis, though his continuing in power will prove a depreciating asset.

Discussion

The discussion that followed the presentation elicited many interesting opinions.

·         The King was confident of solving the issue while ascending the thrown what democracy could not do. However, opinion was expressed that the situation in Nepal was messy and that the King had only added to it. He was determined to play a proactive role in politics and governance of the country though he was embattled from all sides. The RNA was with him as there was no other choice. Moreover, the King’s foreign policy options appeared to be too ambiguous.

·         There was no clear winner in sight as yet in the situation. Maoists were engaged purely in terrorism. The top brass of the insurgents appeared not in full control of the rank and file. They recruited members by force and 30 per cent of the cadre was children under fifteen years. Maoists were aware that they could not achieve their objective of “liberating” Nepal due to their limitations particularly in weapons availability. But, they had started looking for weapons from foreign sources utilizing the huge sum of money looted over time. As a consequence, their capabilities could go up. The apprehension over the network of Maoist groups (CCOMPOSA) in South Asia may be somewhat exaggerated particularly as this was loosely knit and the constituents did not all agree with each other on many issues.

·         The only way out at present seemed to be to revive the political process through fresh elections. Though the atmosphere was hardly conducive for a free and secure conduct of the electoral process, the risk may be worth taking.

·         India was not sufficiently responsive to the situation created by the Maoists in the country and its possible fall-out in India. The adjacent parts of India were among the worse governed in the country and would not be able to withstand the adverse consequences. It was vital to pre-empt it and ensure it did not spread. The Special Services Bureau (SSB) had been tasked to protect the border and it had a big task on its hands. But, the need of the hour was to develop effective intelligence coordination, support Nepal’s counter-insurgency efforts, ensure coordination between the various security services in the country and enlist the active support of the state governments. Most important, New Delhi had to evolve a proper long term strategy and ensure that adequate effort and resources were devoted to it to ensure success.  Else, the future stability of the region and indeed the prosperity and development of India would be at stake.