President Musharraf’s speech at the India Today Conclave was unsettling and threatens the Indo-Pak peace process. Three points were made by him that were disconcerting. These are: the core issue is Kashmir, militancy in Kashmir is a freedom struggle and atrocities are committed by Indian security forces in Jammu and Kashmir. What was especially misleading was his assertion that the joint statement signed by him and Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in Islamabad on 6 January 2004 had Kashmir as the core issue. This deliberate mendacity drew a reaction from the Indian government who denounced what the Pakistani president had said. He had only repeated the speech by which he tried to seduce the Indian press in Agra.

He was perhaps intimidated by those asking questions. “You solve the core issue or face a spurt in militancy”.  Greater maturity in the context of confidence building measures, people-to-people interaction and the bonhomie generated by the cricket  ‘offensive’ would have been better.  These may be the compulsions of survival politics but before we give the benefit of doubt to president Musharraf, we should examine the Pakistani game plan and understand the US perspective on the dispute in a potentially unstable nuclear region.

The US has always been supportive of the Pakistani military because of Afghanistan, the Central Asian states, Russia, and China, provided Pakistan delivers on the jehadis. Terrorism cannot be wished away and will take considerable time to eradicate.  The US is aware of this protracted process and would continue to support Pakistan for a long time. We should not have any illusions about this. We should also be convinced that it is in US’s strategic interest to keep this region on the boil.  The US has now conferred a “major non-NATO ally” status on Pakistan. The US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, ostensibly on a visit to “plug the nuclear loopholes” in the region, made this dramatic announcement on 18 March 2004 in Islamabad without any indication to the Indian government while in New Delhi. This makes Pakistan eligible for priority delivery of defense material and stockpiling of military hardware. Apparently, this expresses US’s appreciation of Pakistan’s military operations in the almost impenetrable tribal areas to flush out the terrorists and to ‘punish’ India for not sending troops to Iraq.  The US action has major implications for the entire region as also Indo-US relations. Instead of chiding Pakistan for its nuclear proliferation, it has joined hands with it in an unholy alliance. 

Pakistan’s strategy of annexing Jammu and Kashmir by force has been a non-starter and it started a proxy war to “bleed India” in 1988-89. When this failed, Pakistan ran out of options. The only alternative left was to ‘internationalize’ the issue. 9/11 came as a God-sent opportunity. Buoyed by US support, and elevated now to a new status, Pakistan feels it can continue to be intransigent with India. When there is a general expectation of peace in the sub-continent, Musharraf’s speech and the US action force us to review the entire issue. Notwithstanding the restoration of air, rail and road links between the two countries and the resumption of cricketing ties, we must analyze our options again.

India and Pakistan must realize that no external power will serve their interest, but only promote its own. Secondly, public opinion in favor of a rapprochement may be difficult to obtain. The Indian offer of peace came out of a genuine desire for development of the impoverished region, which can only accrue from a harmonious environment. The Kashmir issue is complex, and can only be addressed after other irritants are removed. Two options are being talked about, based on the assumption that conversion of the LoC into an international border is not acceptable. One is the Jhelum plan and the other is the Neelam plan. The Jhelum plan stipulates giving of the Srinagar valley to Pakistan, which may also not be averse to an independent Jammu and Kashmir. The Neelam plan, which is an Indian response to the Jhelum plan, envisages shifting the line of control to the West and North along the Neelam River and grant of independence to the Northern Areas. This may be as difficult for Pakistan as the Jhelum plan is for India.

Our step-by-step approach is infinitely more sensible than a swift military-type decision. Musharraf needs to realize, particularly after two attempts on his life, that his rigidity will only strengthen terrorism in Pakistan.