On 9 February 2004, Pakistan successfully test-fired Shaheen-II, its longest range nuclear-capable ballistic missile, amidst an intense debate on nuclear non-proliferation. The test indicates Pakistan's resolve to maintain a nuclear deterrent as the corner stone of its security policy. Shaheen-II demonstrates Islamabad's determination to upgrade its deterrent despite the latest disclosures of its nuclear proliferation.

Shaheen-II, earlier known as Hatf-VI, means death. Indian and American analysts believe that the missile is based on a similar Chinese version though some Indian space experts opine that this two-stage missile has been indigenously developed, suggesting a high level of technological expertise. The essential features of the missile system include the following:

Shaheen-II weighs 26 tonnes and has a potential range of 2,500 km restricted to 2,000 km so as not to cross Pakistan's declared territorial sea-limits.

It exceeds the 1,500 km range of the Ghauri-II, previously Pakistan's longest-range missile.

In contrast to the Ghauri-II missile, which is based on liquid propellant technology, the Shaheen-II is based on solid propulsion technology, which is safer for missiles.

The indigenously built surface-to-surface missile system can carry different warheads, including nuclear warheads, with a payload of 1000 kg.

The solid propellant missile has been reverse engineered from the Chinese M-9, M-11 and M-18 missile. The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) began procuring the technology in the early 1990s.

The missile is a strategic match to India's Agni-II, a two-stage solid propellant missile, with a range of over 2,000 km.

The Shaheen-II missile places most areas of India within striking distance from Pakistan.

The test-firing of Shaheen-II is of importance to Pakistan. For the first time, the separation of the first and second stages of the Shaheen missile system was successfully carried out. Shaheen-II, a more modern missile, has a greater range than Ghauri-II covering a distance of 1,800 km in just 15 minutes. Islamabad has thereby provided more teeth to its nuclear deterrent.

The triumph of Shaheen-II is aimed at two audiences: the world outside, especially the US, and the population in Pakistan. Earlier, in March 2004, US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, reiterated that A. Q. Khan had perpetrated the worst nuclear proliferation, and that the US had not let him off the hook. This makes it clear that Washington may impose further pressure on Islamabad to reveal its nuclear weapons programme. The IAEA might also ask Pakistan for inspections of its nuclear installations. Several UN reports claim that the international community is not convinced by the Pakistani explanation that Khan alone was involved in nuclear transfers and that the military establishment is innocent. Given this background, the test-firing of Shaheen-II is a signal that Pakistan would not succumb to American pressure but retain its nuclear deterrent against all odds.

The testing of Shaheen-II is also a reassurance to the critics of President Pervez Musharraf that Pakistan would not roll back its nuclear programme despite the sordid Khan affair. Shaheen-II has stopped criticism from domestic opposition that the Americans had the Musharraf-Jamali government over a barrel. Describing the missile test as a demonstration of a full-speed roll forward of its nuclear programme, Pakistan has quelled such speculations.

Implications for India

The testing of Shaheen-II came within a week of India deciding to buy the Israeli Phalcon air-borne radar system. Although Islamabad has pledged to New Delhi that its test has no adverse implications for the peace process, India cannot risk lowering its guard. The Shaheen-II test does not really shift the balance of power in favour of Pakistan as India is constantly modernizing its strategic capabilities. India is busy preparing for test-firing its 3,500-4,000 km range nuclear capable Agni-III missile which will give New Delhi an edge over Islamabad in the missile arena. Though Agni-III is China-specific, it will help India to strengthen its nuclear deterrent further to protect its value targets, especially after the Kargil war and the attack on Parliament, from any belligerent nation.

Nuclear weaponization by India and Pakistan has made South Asia a volatile and dangerous region. Strengthening India-Pakistan bilateral relations based on nuclear restraint can guarantee a more secure South Asia than stockpiling nuclear weapons. It is imperative that Pakistan makes serious efforts to make the world feel safe about its Shaheen-II, tested amidst revelations of Islamabad's nuclear technology transfers to various countries. India and Pakistan have got back to the negotiating table for restoring peace and normalcy in the region. Missile tests should not be allowed to debilitate that process.