The latest rebellion in the higher levels of the LTTE brings to the fore its undemocratic nature. The rift was over, now deposed, LTTE commander of Amparai and Batticaloa, “Col” Karuna Amman’s letter to the LTTE chief seeking operational autonomy in the east on grounds of discrimination of eastern cadres by the north-dominated leadership. But, Karuna’s calling has been dubbed as “the action of a single individual running contrary to the aspirations of the Tamil people at the instigation of malicious elements.” Consequently, was discharged and relieved of all the responsibilities. A new commander, Ramesh, was appointed in his place. But, with Karuna refusing to give up his command, the volatile east is tense with the possibility of bloody factional fighting arising. It is hard to dismiss Karuna’s allegations given his track record as one of the trusted lieutenants of Prabhakaran. He had won many decisive campaigns, including the Elephant Pass battle, and still controls nearly 40 percent of the total 15,000-strong force.

The latest rebellion has exploded two myths about the LTTE:

Myth 1 – That the LTTE strives to uphold equality. The caste and regional differences among Sri Lankan Tamils is common knowledge. The Batticaloa Tamils have always resented the domination of Jaffna Tamils. With the intensification of ethnic conflict these differences were temporarily dissipated. Now, with the longest ever peace since 1983, their differences have come to the fore. However, none thought that LTTE, which claims to fight for “absolute equality”, would copycat its society. Now the cat is out of the bag.

Myth 2 – That ruthless discipline is the hallmark of the LTTE. There have been dissensions and desertions since its formation in 1972. But this is the first time a vertical split has occurred. The organisation might overcome the present situation by silencing the critics but, unless it addresses the problems raised by the dissenters, it would lead to another autonomous movement in the post settlement period.

Some people have dismissed this as “yet another rift without consequences”. Nothing happened when second-in-command Mahattaya and Prabhakaran fell apart. What will happen now? Karuna was a regional commander. Mahattaya’s problem was of a personal issue; what has now come to the fore is more of a public nature. Most importantly, Karuna could stoke the ethnic loyalties of the eastern Tamils. There have been many anti-LTTE demonstrations in the eastern towns supporting Karuna, proving that this is not “imaginary regionalism”. Witnessing the ground situation the LTTE leadership offered an “amnesty” to the dissidents. There are also moves from the civil society for reconciliation. But, it is, perhaps, too late.

As far as impact is concerned, firstly, the electoral calculations of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) have got a jolt. It is going to be difficult for the Alliance to make a “clean sweep” in the northeast. If the dissenters are successful in mobilizing the eastern Tamils, then the TNA is left with only Vanni and Jaffna. Even in Jaffna the Alliance has to compete with the Anandasangare faction of the TULF and other militant-turned political parties like the EPDP and EPRLF (Varathar). Secondly, the present scenario has caused more confusion in the already complex peace process exercise. Karuna was an active participant on the LTTE team during the now-stalled Norway-facilitated negotiations with the government.  In future negotiations it would be difficult for the LTTE to play the “sole representative” card if the entire east throws its weight behind Karuna faction. Moreover, if the polarity between the eastern and northern Tamils increases, the demand for a permanent merger of the northern and eastern provinces as the basis for settlement would be unsustainable. Thirdly, in case of war, the LTTE would find it difficult to get new recruits, who were mostly coming from the eastern region. Karuna was not only a skillful recruiter but also a capable military strategist and fighter with 17 years experience. The organisation would lose the services of Karuna and his supporting military commanders, apart from a large number of his cadres. If the Karuna-faction chooses to join, directly or indirectly, the Sri Lankan armed forces, the LTTE’s fighting capacity would further reduce. But the LTTE may not take chances by sparing “traitor” Karuna’s life.