The Six-Party Talks held in Beijing from 25-28 February 2004 provided the best diplomatic route to resolve the seventeen month-old nuclear impasse in the Korean Peninsula. Hosted by China, the negotiations involved the United States, Japan, Russia, the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). They offered an opportunity for the denuclearization of Pyongyang and enhancing the prospects for peace in Northeast Asia.

The second round of the Six-Party Talks was a follow-up of the first round held in Beijing from 27-29 August 2003 to proceed towards the denuclearization of Pyongyang. The second round of talks began on 25 February on a positive note with the delegates deciding to settle the issue peacefully through dialogue. All the parties pledged to discuss “detailed goals” and “the first phase measures” and explore “ways to continue the talk process.” The DPRK delegation led by Deputy Foreign Minister Kim Kye-gwan agreed to adhere to the principles negotiated and display flexibility during the dialogue process. Assistant Secretary of State, James Kelly, heading the US delegation indicated his willingness to seek common grounds with Pyongyang to unravel the nuclear predicament. Notwithstanding their differences, the first day of the talks ended with the delegates reaching consensus that a denuclearized Korean Peninsula was conducive to peace and stability in Northeast Asia.

On 26 February, talks reached a critical phase when North Korea indicated its willingness to freeze its nuclear weapons programmes as part of the first phase measures for a nuclear free Korean Peninsula. Pyongyang proposed stopping its nuclear activities in exchange for energy aid, security assurances and removal of DPRK from the US list of “axis of evil” countries. Washington, however, insisted on a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantling of DPRK’s nuclear programme before granting any compensation. The parleys took a hostile turn when Pyongyang refused to abandon its peaceful nuclear programme and reiterated its denial that it was pursuing uranium enrichment for making nuclear weapons. Matters reached a deadlock. To resolve the impasse, South Korea proposed a three-phase plan. Pyongyang would pledge to dismantle its nuclear weapons and the other countries would meet its security concerns. The second phase would focus on implementation and the third would address other outstanding issues. Though China and Russia endorsed the proposal, U.S. and Japan refrained from joining the aid programme. The second plenary session thus did little to disentangle the seventeen-month old nuclear standoff in the Korean Peninsula.

The third plenary session on 27 February was marked by narrowing of differences between the U.S. and DPRK. The six nations reached consensus on setting up working groups and fixed the date for the next round of talks. The parleys were extended to 28 February. Washington remained rigid on a total dismantling of North Korea’s atomic programme while Pyongyang refused to accede to this modality as a precondition for assistance. This stalemate doomed the second round of talks in Beijing like the first round in August 2003. The talks ended with the parties drafting a joint declaration calling for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and agreeing to hold another senior meeting at the end of June 2004.

Much hope was pinned on the talks to end the nuclear stalemate. Though the talks were useful and constructive, it failed to resolve the nuclear crisis. A deadlock had emerged when Washington confronted Pyongyang about its clandestine uranium enrichment programme in October 2002. Pyongyang dismissed the IAEA inspectors, withdrew from the NPT and reactivated a nuclear reactor in violation of the 1994 Agreed Framework. Pyongyang was also reportedly shifting spent fuel rods to a reprocessing facility to separate plutonium.

There is clear and compelling evidence that DPRK’s nuclear programme is coming of age. The recent disclosure of a Pakistani-centred proliferation mafia transferring nuclear technology to Pyongyang makes the situation even more complex and dangerous. Moreover, given Pyongyang’s shaky economy, it could be motivated to sell nuclear technology to other states and terrorist groups for money. DPRK considers nuclear weapons as essential for its security. Threatened by superior US military forces stationed in South Korea the DPRK believes that only nuclear weapons can guarantee its regime survival. However, Pyongyang has indicated willingness in the Six-Party parleys to cap its nuclear weapons programme in return for security and sovereignty. Washington must act swiftly to defuse the nuclear stalemate in Pyongyang. Delay would only give time to DPRK to increase its nuclear capabilities. A solution may be evolved if the U.S. and DPRK work together with a pragmatic approach to ensure a stable Northeast Asia.