The US in South Asia: Assistance or Assertion?
27 Feb, 2004 · 1322
Madhavi Bhasin comments on the nature of increasing American involvement in South Asia through its guardianship of Pakistan’s nuclear assets
The major military danger facing the United States in the post-Soviet world is not a particular country but rather a trend – nuclear proliferation. These words of Michael Mandelbaum about a decade ago still holds good. The US guided by this policy has now found its way into South Asia in a novel fashion. The US is asserting its presence and role in South Asia on the pretext of assisting the peace process. Pakistani nuclear material and technology control will henceforth be the joint responsibility of a sovereign state, Pakistan and a superpower, the US. The new development which has not received as much media publicity as the forthcoming Indo-Pak cricket series, is a serious one with manifold ramifications for South Asia.
Pakistan should be congratulated for its attempt to appease America by bargaining away a large chunk of its sovereignty. On the one hand, President Musharaff’s speech to the Ulema on 18 February 2004, claims to prepare Pakistan for a major role in world politics and on the other hand, under the garb of proving a true ally in the anti-terrorist campaign Pakistan is allowing US involvement for ensuring the safety of its nuclear know-how. This reflects the level of operational sophistication reached by terrorist networks in Pakistan. External assistance is required to protect national assets from the self-created hydra. Moreover, Pakistan, weary of talking about nuclear capabilities with India, considered a regional hegemon, has no hesitation in allowing a global hegemon to cross the national nuclear fence. President Musharraf has already begun to shape domestic opinion to the essential requirement of Pakistan playing a junior associate to America in the global anti-terror war. This is perhaps the first time that a third world country has so intensely downplayed domestic politics in relation to international commitments. Musharraf is slightly mistaken in believing that America can keep him in power for as long as he wishes, and hence internal opinion should toe the superpower line. Accommodating and balancing demands form both sides is the key to his survival; else the imbalance could crush his dreams and end his reign.
For India, US involvement in nuclear security of a South Asian state, which also happens to be a ‘difficult’ neighbour implies vast challenges. Some may welcome this development on the ground that it will prevent terrorists from gaining access to nuclear items. But this benefit will come with heavy costs. American pressure on India to talk and make peace with Pakistan will increase, which will serve as fodder for domestic political consumption in Pakistan .The more India compromises, the easier will it be for the Pakistani establishment to sell this idea of an American guard, to both its people and its opponents.
America may even go a step further and demand a similar undertaking by India to ensure lasting peace in South Asia. Under no circumstances will India accept such a proposal, but the rejection can strain the much-nourished Indo-American cord of goodwill and understanding. India has viewed with suspicion any closeness between Pakistan and America, and this new intimacy may create major concerns. The challenge for India is to fulfill its traditional notion of a superpower-free South Asia without antagonizing its new ‘half ally’, America.
For the Bush administration taking up yet another ‘guardianship’ is a challenging opportunity. US-Pakistan alliance in the anti-terror war had received a setback after the recent discovery of Pakistan indulging in nuclear proliferation. With this newly assumed responsibility, the US has clarified that its choice of ally was not a mistake and that a South Asian Islamic nation is genuinely interested in the America design for world peace. Concerns about nuclear proliferation in South Asia were very high among the P5, thus a direct involvement and active role in the South Asian nuclear scene now available to America is being enthusiastically welcomed. Proxy guardianship could serve as a viable option to deal with friendly and strategically important states that behave ‘waywardly’. America has attempted to gain a long term entry into Pakistani nuclear and strategic plans, going beyond President Musharaff or any other individual.
In the final analysis one can say America will follow, as always, a course that best serves its national interests and the same is expected of India and Pakistan. The very survival of Pakistan has apparently prompted President Mushraff to take this decision but an equally important rationale is his own survival in power. American blessings might achieve this goal, but it will be a surrogate survival and not a natural and evolutionary one. India, on her part, should avoid using Pakistan as a compass to determine the direction of Indo-US relations. At the same time the outcome of American strategy in South Asia requires attention of the South Block.
This is the closest encounter of India, Pakistan and America in South Asia. Maximum benefits will be gathered by the side, which will absorb changes and condition them to its advantage. America has taken its guard in South Asia. It is now for regional states to do the same.