Panelists:

Dr Rajesh Rajagopalan Research Fellow, Observer Research Foundation Rear Adm Raja Menon Rear Admiral (Retd), Indian Navy Prof PR Chari Research Professor, IPCS

 

Revelations of nuclear proliferation by Pakistan’s eminent scientist AQ Khan has brought forth some uneasy questions. How could this have happened without the knowledge of the Pakistani government, as Gen Musharraf claims? Is this an incident of proliferation by an individual, or is the state involved? Has Indian security been jeopardized by these incidents of proliferation? And, most importantly, what are their implications for the global non-proliferation regime? The panel discussion held by IPCS has attempted to answer these questions, and shed light on other related concerns.

Rajesh Rajagopalan

Has the non-proliferation regime weakened? No.  The strength of the regime, or for that matter any regime, is revealed by the support it receives from its stronger members. In the case of the non-proliferation regime, this support can be gauged from the response of the stronger members to developments in the nuclear realm. Their outcry following the 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, Iraq’s attempts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, recent admissions by Libya and Iran to trying to procure nuclear weapons and their efforts to contain North Korea, are a clear demonstration of their support for the non-proliferation regime, which has lent strength to the regime, despite these proliferation attempts.

On the question of whether Pakistan would cease its proliferation activities, Rajesh answered in the negative. According to him, the networks still existed. Proliferation might be suspended for a while, but is bound to be resumed after global attention has shifted elsewhere. This can only be prevented if the networks are disbanded.

Rajesh also felt that India would end up paying a price for Pakistan’s escapades. Dual-use technology transfers would now become difficult with the possibility of more stringent measures being imposed for such transfers, which would harm Indian interests.

Raja Menon

State to state transfer of nuclear technology, Raja argued, has existed ever since the invention of the bomb and the latest proliferation is not new. The disconcerting fact is that this has implications for India. Right through the 1980s and early 1990s, Indian security was degraded by continuous Chinese proliferation to Pakistan. The situation obtaining now is no different.  The world’s sensitivity to India’s security concerns vis-à-vis proliferation in its neighborhood is also similar marked by apathy.  Indian reaction to the previous proliferation was only displayed through inaction. Raja felt that this inaction was determined by the global security milieu India was placed in. Can India do something different now?

Trying to draw a line between state-to-state proliferation and proliferation by individuals like AQ Khan, Raja maintained that the Pakistan state cannot be absolved of its responsibility. While conceding that the state may not be involved in Libya, he firmly believed in its involvement in the case of North Korea. There was ample evidence that the Pakistan Government, its Army and the Atomic Energy Commission were equally involved and therefore responsible for the proliferation.

Where are the weak links in Pakistan’s nuclear safety measures? Raja was convinced that nuclear weapons in the hands of the military were safe. However, it was the process before the actual handing over of nuclear weapons that enabled proliferation. That apart, two sets of production facilities – uranium-based and plutonium-based – are operating in tandem. While the bomb tested in Chagai in 1998 was uranium-based, the delivery systems, like the Nodong missiles, use plutonium-based weapons. Dismantling the second set of production facilities would result in robust non-proliferation measures being emplaced.

Another important point raised by him was the total absence of effective legal measures in Pakistan, or for that matter in India, to curb nuclear proliferation. The only Act under which Khan could probably have been charged would be the Official Secrets Act.

PR Chari

How effective is the non-proliferation regime? Likening the regime to a three-legged stool, Chari provided a brief assessment of the NPT, the IAEA and the NSG. The NPT has been successful in slowing down nuclear proliferation. This was evident from the fact that there are still only eight nuclear weapon states. On the flip side, the NPT has not stifled the nuclear ambitions of many countries. Unsuspected countries like Malaysia have been implicated in the recent disclosures, revealing that the NPT has not been very successful. In Chari’s assessment, the NPT lends itself to a half-full and half-empty glass analogy, wherein its success or failure depends on the viewer. Commenting on the IAEA, Chari felt that the agency was addressing only one facet of the issue – regulatory aspects – while turning a blind eye to the development of nuclear technology. India has been demanding that the IAEA fulfill its developmental responsibilities, but this is not likely to find any support now.. The the NSG’s performance has also  been indifferent despite its having stringent regulations in place, as the actions of its members are  largely driven by commercial greed.

Commenting on the Indian official reaction to the current situation, Chari agreed that its low-key response was correct. These issues would feature  in the forthcoming Indo-Pak meetings between their Foreign Secretaries and the on-going Indo-US dilaogue.

Chari was convinced that lack of accountability coupled with high degree of secrecy/low levels of transparency in the Indian nuclear, intelligence and security establishments could also lead to corruption and misuse of authority. It was not surprising that the incident involving AQ Khan occurred in Pakistan. Can a similar incident happen in India? If there is any uncertainty here, establishing an oversight mechanism would in order.

Discussion

The discussion that followed was centered around two themes – implications of the proliferation for the NPT regime and for India.

Implications for the NPT regime

• What is most important for the sustenance of the NPT regime is the support that strong states give to the NPT regime.

• Despite A. Q. Khan’s proliferation activities, the NPT regime is going strong and this will continue. The violations of the norms of the NPT regime have only made it more robust.

• In future, all types of technology transfers will be stringently regulated.

• The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will conduct more intrusive inspections and devote more attention to the regulatory at the expense of the  developmental aspects of nuclear energy.

• Control over the transfer of sensitive nuclear technology is a leit motif of  US policies

• United States has not punished Pakistan for its non-proliferation activities.

• State to state proliferation has been a continuous affair. India has not, till date, protested to China about its proliferation of nuclear technology to Pakistan.

• President George Bush’s quartet offer is based on India capping its nuclear programme.

• A.Q. Khan’s revelations provide some credibility to Osama bin Laden’s statement that he has 20 nuclear weapons.  

• Illegal transfer of nuclear technology to Iran, Libya and supporters of terrorists neutralizes our conventional superiority.

• How will the tactical fusion bombs contemplated in American defence strategy going to be fit in the new NPT regime?

• The Bush administration has done everything to weaken the NPT. They have designed and developed complex weapons system and discriminatory strategic doctrines? Who are they to tell us that we need a new regime?

• Tactical fusion weapons and bunker busters pose serious dangerous to the international community.

• The scope for changes within the NPT regime exists and this has to be looked into.

• America was waiting for a politically appropriate moment to gain access into Pakistan’s nuclear programme. This  is an important issue that will help President Bush in his re-election.

Implications for India

• India will have to make compromises to import of civilian nuclear technology from abroad.

• Pakistan will not necessarily stop its proliferation activities. There is a nuclear black market operating in the international circuit. Islamabad can resume its non-proliferation activities through this network.

• Will India embark on a vigorous nuclear weapons programme and radically increase its nuclear weapons expenditure?

• In Pakistan there is no accountability regarding storing, stockpiling and upgrading fissile materials. This is a messy situation that seriously concerns India’s security.

• Lack of accountability and total secrecy will provide opportunities to proliferators to indulge in illegal trade.

• India’s intelligence services have to be improved. The Indian Government had no information that 30 M-11 missiles were unloaded at the Karachi dockyards.

• The fact that the Pakistani military establishment was unaware of the illicit transfer of nuclear technology is utterly inconceivable.

• At what level of minimum deterrence will India agree to cap its nuclear weapons programme under a new NPT regime?

• Is it feasible to junk the NPT and draw up a new NPT? The additional Protocol to the NPT can make India and Pakistan an exception to its provisions. But Israel will remain a problem. It will refuse to abide by it. Revamping the NPT will then be a trouble.

• Without signing the NPT how can India sign the Additional Protocol?

• Pakistan is shielding its ruling system viz. its army, which is fine by the US.  It is primarily for this reason that the US is proposing an Additional Protocol to the IAEA safeguards.

• The basic perceptions regarding South Asia have changed. The effort earlier was to convince India that it should roll back its nuclear programme so that Pakistan caps its nuclear aspirations. Now the pressure is on Islamabad to reverse its nuclear programme.

• The Indian government must think seriously about the real use for its nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons can only deter nuclear weapons and cannot serve any other purpose.