Speakers:

Lt. Gen. A M Vohra Prof. Satish Kumar

 

Lt. Gen. A M Vohra and Prof. Satish Kumar, members of the Indian Neemrana Group visited Pakistan recently to participate in the 22^nd meeting of the group. Lt. Gen. Vohra began the discussion with his introduction on the Neemrana initiative started in 1991. There is a perceptible change on the other side to sustain a process between the two countries and to find a solution to Kashmir which is acceptable both sides.

 

The current round started in November 2003 and Pakistan was keen on quiet negotiations. The Indians emphasized on the jihadi infrastructure in Pakistan, while Pakistanis emphasized on a mutually acceptable solution on Kashmir. India wanted a composite dialogue while Pakistan wanted ‘linked’ talks.

 

Gen. Musharraf, though has been seen by the Pakistanis as soft towards India and been opposed over his support to the US, he has complete control over his Army. All his corps commanders are supportive of his efforts and any rift inside the Army can be ruled out.

 

Gen. Musharraf has been behaving like a sensible politician and has succeeded in getting the support for the peace process. The political parties and even the students support his efforts towards peace with India.

 

Both sides are committed to the peace process, though there is an anxiety over the possibility of a terrorist attack derailing it.

 

Any solution to Kashmir cannot evolve all of a sudden. If civil society in Pakistan is ready for softer solutions, then the government of Pakistan would find it easier to climb down. Pakistan encourages talks with the Hurriyat.

 

Siachen conflict is an issue that could be solved. A cease-fire and cessation of hostilities is essential to build the peace process. SAFTA would also contribute to the peace process. People to people contact should also be improved.

 

On the negative side, both leaders are vulnerable – personally and politically. There are a number of attacks on Gen. Musharraf and Atal Behari Vajpayee is facing general elections.

 

Prof. Satish Kumar, who visited Pakistan recently along with Lt. Gen. Vohra, started his remarks with commenting on the mindset of the bureaucracy, both in India and Pakistan. Though there is a change, at the lower level much needs to be done.

 

What has led the Pakistanis to change their mind towards India? Is it tactical? It is essential to factor in the American pressure on Pakistan on this change. To a large extent, the Indo-Pak joint statement of January 2004 was dictated by the US.

 

No doubt there is a change in Pakistan’s attitude. In his January address to the Parliament, he considered terrorism as the main threat that is eating Pakistani society. But how durable is this change? There is also a belief that Brajesh Mishra succeeded in getting the better out of Taiq Aziz in getting the joint statement. Pakistan insists on ‘give and take’ on Kashmir. Pakistan believes by leaving away the UN Security Council resolutions it has given something. What could India give in return?

 

While most of the parties are supporting the peace process, PML-N is the only party which is opposing it instead of claiming credit for initiating this process. The militant groups have been asked to lay low for sometime by the military and ISI. The funding has been switched off.

 

Questions, Comments and Discussion

 

• Pakistan was and is a confused nation. It really does not understand what it wants in Kashmir. Its position appears to be full of contradictions. Besides its position on seems to be ‘all take and no give’.

 

• The American pressure on Pakistan on Indo-Pak peace process may not be eternal.

 

• The problem of a rift inside Pakistan is difficult to gauge from the outside. One cannot know unless it comes out in the open. The assassination attempts on Gen Musharraf and the conspiracy behind them have deep roots and should be seen in a larger context.

 

• If Pakistan is under US pressure to negotiate with India, then the efforts from it are not genuine and are tied up with external pressure. In that case, how long would the desire to improve relations with India stay and how far would it take the peace process?

 

• Setting aside the UNSC resolutions by Pakistan does not mean setting aside the Kashmir issue. There is no evidence of the militant camps being destroyed. Now the militants are lying low. But how long would they continue to do so?

 

• All bureaucracies remain conservative and remain the same. The hawks inside it are only buying some time to strike back.

 

• There is a lot of anxiety that the peace process may be derailed by terrorist attacks. Guarding against such events can the pace of the peace dialogue process be quickened?

 

• With elections approaching the peace process was expected to slow down for a while. Though Pakistan expects to hasten the dialogue, they are also aware that pace cannot be a gallop. Any solution on Kashmir cannot be sudden.

 

• If the Pakistani Army prevents the emergence of any solution to the Kashmir problem simply because of the fact that they can pursue their anti-India policy, is it feasible to continue negotiations in this background?

 

• Pakistani Army would not be foolish to presume that India will relinquish its claim over the Kashmir Valley. Besides, the US in its fight against global terrorism will inevitably impose tremendous pressure on General Musharraf. The Army will have no choice but to yield to this pressure. Negotiating a dialogue with Islamabad will then become easier.

 

• A peculiar situation is emerging within Pakistan. The Pakistani people feel that its economic condition is such that unless bailed out by the US, it will come to a standstill. At the same time, the Pakistani Foreign Service is also very pessimistic about the country’s economy. There is lot skepticism as to whether the peace process will last in such a pessimistic scenario.

 

• Optimism can prevail only if business connection between the civil societies of both India and Pakistan can be successfully forged. Economic factor is very important in facilitating the peace process. The SAFTA has been agreed. How far it will be beneficial is yet to be seen.

 

• Unlike India, Pakistan has shown no flexibility towards the resolution of the Kashmir issue.

 

• In contrast to October 2002 when Musharraf was not willing to initiate talks with India on the Kashmir problem, there has been a change in the top level. Musharraf is now keener on resuming talks with India. The US should also play its part to facilitate this process.

 

• Can the intractable problem on the LOC be done away with?

 

• The LOC can be softened. Both India and the Pakistan are aware of this. Besides, the Indian Government is in dialogue with the Hurriyat so as to find a way out to soften the LOC.

 

• When a particular phenomenon starts undergoing change, it will be gradual and it may be difficult to discern the change. Gen. Musharraf is trying hard to keep militancy under check. There is a definite change at the top level of both sides. India and Pakistan have a vision which has tremendous similarity. It is important to realize this vision for mutual strategic benefits.