The States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention have met at regular intervals to review its operation in 1980, 1986, 1991, 2001-02, and more recently, in 2003. These review conferences are configured around Final Declarations that take the form of a commentary on each article of the Convention. They are important for updating the Convention by expanding its scope and relevance, and for establishing procedures under which the Convention might actually be implemented.

With the failure of the Fifth Review Conference (RevCon) in 2001 to agree on the future of the Ad Hoc group, or even a procedural report, leave alone a final declaration, the future of the BTWC seemed bleak. The Ad Hoc group was one of the bodies in which attempts were made to strengthen the convention outside the Review Conferences. This started with the Verification Experts (VEREX) group, which looked at the possibilities for verifying the Convention in 1992 and 1993 from a scientific and technical standpoint. The VEREX reported to a Special Conference of the states parties in 1994 which mandated an Ad Hoc group to negotiate a legally binding instrument viz. the BWC Protocol, to supplement the BTWC. The Ad Hoc group adopted a well balanced, compromise Draft Protocol in its final session, but the United States refused to accept it, instead it produced a draft wording of Article XII (Review) that terminated the Ad Hoc group and its mandate. The RevCon was thereafter adjourned to 2002.

The Fifth RevCon reconvened on 11November, 2002, and created a new multilateral process designed to “promote common understanding and effective action”.  Following the U.S. rejection of the BTWC protocol, several governments sought ways to enforce Treaty compliance, and this new framework generously included American interests.  It is a regulated framework, where no voting is allowed, and no legally binding agreements can be drafted within this new scheme. The five clusters of topics fully address the key issues that George Bush read in his Statement on Strengthening the International Regime against Biological Weapons in November 2001. The new agenda seeks to prevent the US or any other state from scuppering negotiations in future, whilst strengthening the BTWC regime through a process of consensus. As Nicholas Sims of the LSE points out, “The single most important feature of the new process is that it holds the United States within a multilateral framework”.  

Under this new process, the States Parties have decided to hold three annual meetings, a week in duration, each year between 2003 and 2006, wherein these five clusters of topics are to be discussed, two in 2003 (national measures including the enacting of penal legislation; and national mechanisms to establish and maintain the security and oversight of pathogenic microorganisms and toxins), another two in 2004 (enhancing international capabilities to counter the alleged use of bioweapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease; and strengthening and broadening national and international institutional efforts and existing mechanisms to counter infectious diseases affecting humans, animals, and plants) and one in 2005 (the content, promulgation, and adoption of codes of conduct for scientists).

The Meeting of Experts (18-29 August 2003) addressed two topics in detail; the adoption of necessary national measures to implement the prohibitions set out in the Convention, including the enactment of penal legislation (18-22 August); and national mechanisms to establish and maintain the security and oversight of pathogenic microorganisms and toxins (25-29 August). Eighty three states parties participated in this meeting of experts, which concluded with the presentation of 66 working papers. As part of this new approach, the political and technical elements were separated, and the task of translating the “common understanding”, and advice of the experts into “effective action” was left to the states parties to the Convention.  The next session of the meeting of experts is scheduled for 19-30July, 2004.

Following this, the States Parties to the BTWC Meeting, (10-14 November 2003) agreed in Geneva to:

Review and enact or update national legal, including regulatory and penal measures, to ensure effective implementation of the prohibitions in the Convention, which enhance the effective security of pathogens and toxins, and

Affirmed the positive effects of legal and technical assistance and cooperation between states parties, while expressing the need for comprehensive and concrete national measures to secure pathogen collections and control of their use for peaceful purposes. There was a general recognition of the value of biosecurity measures and procedures.

While the road ahead for the BTWC is difficult, one hopes that the new approach and recent developments will reap dividends at the Sixth Review Conference that commences in 2006. Time enough, perhaps, for the States Parties to launch serious efforts to fulfill their obligations to strengthen and implement the Convention.