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Amb Dilip Mehta

Presenting a brief backdrop, Dilip Mehta, former ambassador to the Kingdom of Bhutan pointed out that militancy peaked in the country in September 1996, which led to high pressure on Bhutan by India for military action against militant camps in the country. The King asked for more time and laid down a few conditions. First, there must be no unilateral action by India and no action by the Indian Army on Bhutan?s soil. The King did not want a joint action either. He preferred a peaceful solution and wanted to tour the whole country as a first step to that goal. The National Assembly would discuss the matter and the Royal Bhutan Army had to be imparted military training in jungle warfare. The Government of India too appreciated the contention that any unilateral action by India could be considered an invasion.

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Among the factors that delayed a military action is the fact that Bhutan was economically dependent for trade particularly on Assam and West Bengal. Moreover the militants had won the sympathies of the local population by subsidizing its economy and were welcomed by some of them.

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However a belief prevailed in Delhi that the King was procrastinating even after equipment were provided and necessary training imparted to the RBA. The possibility of destabilizing the monarchy was a matter as serious for India as for Bhutan. This particular fear decided policy. Peaceful overtures having failed, military action was ultimately resorted to. This has ultimately vindicated the King?s strategy. The King has always described India as Bhutan?s closest ally.

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Prof. Mahendra P. Lama

Prof. Lama focused his presentation on the democratic transition of Bhutan and the impending political issues after the recent counter insurgency operations. Referring to the zone comprising North East India, Bangladesh and Bhutan, he said that the region had emerged as a diabolic vortex of militant activities.

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Regarding the launch of military operations, it was important to note that Bhutan had never faced such a situation before, Prof. Lama maintained. The fundamental questions are: why military action now, and why not in the initial stages? What are the ramifications now that the operations have been completed?

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As for the first question, Bhutan feared retributions and retaliations from militant organizations. This fear was reflected in the debates in the Tshogdu, the National Assembly of the Kingdom. Prof. Lama also referred to the suspicion that the delayed action could have been a bargaining chip on the part of Bhutan. There are two reasons for this possibility: first, Bhutan wanted India to discourage the pro-democracy movement in Bhutan; and secondly it also wanted India to maintain a neutral stand on the issue of Bhutanese refugees in Nepal.

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As to the second question, four different but interrelated factors were responsible for the action. First there was tremendous pressure on Bhutan from the states of Assam and West Bengal. When no such plea worked, the scene at the state Assemblies in these states echoed the complaint that the Centre was not heeding to their demands as they did not belong to the NDA. Bhutanese monarch?s visit to New Delhi in September 2003 was another occasion when India upped the pressure on Bhutan. More importantly there was a big factor played by local issues within Bhutan. During the period, the structure of the National assembly changed and open discussions started taking place on the issue. A detached position of the King was visible during the period. The preparations of the ?local volunteers? also got under way. As recently as July 2003, however, the opinion in the Assembly was that ?military action would bring about unimaginable miseries?about 6000 lives would be endangered...? Finally, the emergence of the Maoist Bhutan Party was a matter of serious concern for the Kingdom. The party has as its objective the demolition of the monarchy in Bhutan. All these factors combined weighed in favour of the inevitability of military action.

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In the second part of this talk, Prof. Lama analysed the political changes taking place inside Bhutan today. Most important in this regard were the changes brought about by the monarchy itself. It must be pointed out that the refugees issue exposed Bhutan to the outside world. It was in this backdrop that the King introduced three important changes through a royal edict:

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1. All cabinet ministers were to be elected by the people.

2. The National Assembly was to determine the powers of the ministers.

3. A vote of no confidence could be passed against the king.

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Interestingly however the attitude of the Assembly was in favour of the continuation of the monarchy, and the shared opinion was that elections could result in divisive politics, partiality, corruption etc.

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The major challenge that faces Bhutan today, as Prof. Lama saw it, is the question of the sustainability of these changes. He pointed out in this regard the private sector is fast emerging in the Bhutanese society and there is a basis for NGO activity in the country. More crucially, awareness is growing among the members of the National Assembly. The changes imply that Bhutan is opening up, and has become accessible to the outside world. Prof. Lama sees these changes as positive.

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Prof. Lama concluded with three open questions of vital importance to Indo-Bhutan relations:

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1. How would India keep its constituency intact in Bhutan?

2. How would India react to Bhutan?s growing concerns of ?total reliance? on India as far as national resources are concerned? and

3. How would India react to the question of Bhutanese refugees?

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Discussion

In the short discussion that ensued, the following points were raised:

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• It was pointed out that although the BSF and the CRPF were doubtful of the success of the RBA?s military operations, the army was never in doubt.

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• The ?nuisance? created by the KLO by cooperating with the Communists was largely responsible for the timing of the military operations.

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• The role of active diplomacy now to follow-up on these developments on the part of India was stressed. The issue of militant camps should be taken up seriously with Bangladesh. Else, in future militants might be able sneak back to Southern Bhutan.

• The ?remarkable resilience? shown by Bhutan to adapt to new challenges was appreciated. The ?maturity? of the strategy of the King was also taken note of.

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• The SAFTA has reaffirmed that economics can integrate the region more than anything else. The imbalances in trade in South Asia have to be properly addressed to eliminate discontents.

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• There was a disagreement as to the role that India should play regarding the issue of Bhutanese refugees in Nepal, although Prof. Lama advocated an active Indian role.