Integration with India: Impossibility

What are the possible solutions in Pakistani perceptions to the Kashmiri conflict? First, there is a unanimous approval in Pakistan that India will not be able to integrate Kashmiris into the Indian state. Pakistan considers that “India’s use of force might have succeeded against Punjabi secessionists since the Indian Punjab unlike Kashmir is not a disputed territory.” Besides the use of force, in Pakistan’s perception “Indian efforts to pacify Kashmiri demands and to divide the Kashmiri opposition by offers of autonomy, such as reviving Article 370, have failed because the Kashmiris do not trust such offers.” The 2002 elections, in their perceptions “might have been necessary to form a representative government to run the affairs of the state, they did not legitimize India’s rule and cannot be a substitute for resolving the dispute.”

The underlying assumption of Pakistan on India-Kashmir relations is that India has failed to integrate Kashmir and would never be succeed in the future. No doubt, India has failed to integrate the Kashmiris (care need to be taken to differentiate between Kashmir and Kashmiris) politically and emotionally into the national mainstream. But where Pakistan’s perceptions on the integration and existence aspects of Kashmiris into mainstream politics are taking in the voices of Srinagar as representative of entire Kashmir. No doubt, the Hurriyat represents a section of Kashmiri opinion, but in no way the Hurriyat could be called as the sole spokesman for Kashmir. Not only is the Hurriyat divided; even the component parties are deeply divided among themselves. Second, like that of the Hurriyat, Srinagar also represent a section of Kashmiri opinion and do not speak for the entire Kashmir. While majority in and around Srinagar would not like to be part of India politically and emotionally, the same cannot be said about the same outside Srinagar. Majority of the Kashmiris (other than the Srinagaris) may not want to be a part India emotionally, but would be willing to live with it politically as long as the governments in the State and the Center are able to provide them good governance. This is why in the 2002 elections, there was less than ten percent polling in Srinagar outside it (except Sopore) it was more than 40 percent.

Independence: A Lip Service

Would Pakistan agree to Kashmir becoming an independent entity? The report is again candid. It says: Although Islamabad pays lip service to the right of Kashmiris to determine their own future, its official policy rejects a possible “third option” of independence. In Islamabad’s view, an independent Kashmir is not acceptable because it would undermine Pakistan’s interests.

General Musharraf’s statement to abandon the UN resolutions should be seen through this perception. The UN resolution basically demands for a plebiscite. And a plebiscite in Kashmir would be in the interest of neither Pakistan nor India. Kashmiris, if given an opportunity to express their will, no doubt would opt for independence. Is an independent Kashmir in the interests of Pakistan? General Musharraf’s statement only reflects the real interests and not any flexibility from Pakistan’s side.

The report makes an important and interesting observation on Kashmir and independence. It says: At the very most, Pakistan might accept an option of independence for only the Kashmir Valley and some Muslim majority areas of Jammu, through for example, a regional referendum held under US auspices. This in fact would be the bargaining position of Pakistan in any of future dialogue with India.

Pakistan’s Kashmir policy is simple. The Valley should not be with India. It does not matter whether it joins Pakistan or not. It is based on the simple dictum: It may not be for me but never should it be for you. Plebiscite, self determination, plight of Kashmiris and suppression of their voices are only a bogus cover for this underlying objective.

LoC as Border: Not Acceptable

India’s bargaining position invariably revolves around converting the LoC into international border. It would never be acceptable for Pakistan, for it consider the status quo as the problem. And they are right. How can the problem be a solution? India obviously needs to move ahead. But how far can India go ahead?

From an Indian perspective, maximum autonomy to both Kashmirs with a soft border could be an option that could be sincerely explored. Surprisingly, the report suggests that for some Pakistani analysts support this compromise. This means, there does exist a constituency that this could be a way out. This solution would result in all the three parties compromising to an extent without too much. India could keep its part of Kashmir politically; Kashmiris would get autonomy and could move along the border which would be soft without any problem; and Pakistan could retain its part of Kashmir with getting autonomy for Kashmir.

But the problem is, the report says, it would be not be acceptable to the military. If this is something that could be acceptable to the people of Pakistan or sold to them, then India should seriously pursue this option along with another set of proposals to remove the fear of Pakistani military. A series of CBMs on conventional and nuclear issues apart from Kashmir would help starting this process. Even if it means a regional arms control – conventional and nuclear, it is worth pursuing.