The International Crisis Group brought out a series of reports in Kashmir from different perspectives. The ICG should be commended especially for its report expressing Pakistan’s perceptions titled Kashmir: the View from Islamabad (ICG Asia Report 68, December 2003). From an Indian perspective, it is very important to know how Pakistan sees the conflict. The report should be commended for it is very objective and outspoken. The candid report, perhaps, should be considered the best and the most dispassionate on the conflict, written from the other side of the border, explaining their perceptions, problems and prescriptions.

What does Pakistan want in Kashmir? What are the objectives –stated and underlying? Why is Kashmir important for Pakistan? How far would it go to resolve or not to resolve the conflict? It is essential to understand Pakistan’s Kashmir policy, if India is to reach any understanding with the former.

Who runs Pakistan’s Kashmir policy?

The report is candid and makes no pretension on who runs Pakistan’s Kashmir policy. It says: The military high command and the military’s intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, dominate policy on Kashmir. The civil bureaucracy, represented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is primarily responsible for implementing Kashmir policy at the diplomatic level…..In the event of any difference between civil and military bureaucracies over the direction or execution of foreign policy, the military and ISI points of view are likely to prevail.

Who decides Pakistan’s Kashmir policy within the military? There have been a lot of arguments, especially in India on rogue and extremist elements inside Army who pursue their own objectives in Kashmir. It is even believed that more than the military it is the ISI which pursues Pakistan’s Kashmir policy, independent even of the Army. How far are these assertions true?

The report should be congratulated whole heartedly for looking into this delicate but important issue. The report observes: ISI is particularly important in the context of Kashmir. While the military high command decides the directions of Kashmir policy, the ISI creates and directs Pakistan’s public relations campaign both domestically and internationally…Under the military rule, the ISI has remained fully subordinated to government.

Can the ISI act independently of Pakistani military on Kashmir? Is ISI a rogue agency? Many in India believe or would like to believe so, as to serve their interests and assumptions. The report on this vital issue observes that since the ISI is composed of serving military officials “who are inducted into the agency from all over the armed forces for a fixed tenure,” they are “an integral part of the regular officer corps, and their promotions, indeed their professional survival depends on their ability to obey orders, there is no incentive to flout the military chain of command.”

No doubt, ISI play a significant role in instigating instability in India; however, its role has been over emphasized in India for political purposes. ISI, especially during the BJP rule has become a scapegoat for each and every problem of governance. In fact, ISI officers should thank the BJP for promoting their cause in Pakistan!

Is Kashmir important for internal Factors?

The report says yes. Inside Pakistan, “Kashmir issue is used for diverse purposes, ranging from nation building to regime legitimacy.” In other words, Kashmir serves as a mobilizing factor for political purposes. This internal aspect, which is unfortunately true, raises further crucial questions. If Kashmir is important for the nation building process of Pakistan, can then India expect a solution until that process is finished? True, Pakistan’s focus was not constant in the past, and the issue gained or lost momentum depending on the domestic and external factors, as the report mentions, but since 1989, there has never been a let down.

Second, the report mentions, “when domestic political and socio-economic needs have taken over precedence over foreign policy issues, as they have under civilian government, political leaders have demonstrated flexibility in dealings with India.” A cursory analysis of Kashmir’s importance in Indo-Pak relations during 1995-98 would reveal the truth in the report’s assertion. During this period, the internal politics was so complicated with Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif totally occupying the political space, coupled with corruption charges, Kashmir never figured in the 1997 elections, the last truly democratic elections held in Pakistan. Even after Sharif’s landslide victory, Pakistan was fighting internally on social, economic and political issues; and to a large extent Kashmir was almost forgotten. It is thus no coincidence that militancy came down in Kashmir during this period.

What are the Costs?

The report is highly objective in analyzing the costs of Pakistan’s Kashmir policy in social, economic and political terms. The costs are high and unaffordable. It says from 1995 to 1997 “public expenditure on education was 2.7 percent of GDP while defence expenditure averaged 5.2 percent. In 1998 defence expenditure accounted for 4.8 percent of GDP, public expenditure on health only 0.9 percent. In 1998-1999, 35 percent of households were living below the poverty line, a significant increase since 1990-91 when the figure was 21 percent.” The report also looks into the economic costs of Pakistan’s nuclear programme and the adverse impact on external economic relations.