Bhutan?s Offensive against the Terrorists
28 Dec, 2003 · 1258
Anand Kumar says internal security compulsions have led Bhutan to launch military operations against Indian insurgent organisations camped in southern Bhutan
Some insurgent organisations have been operating in northeast India from their camps and hideouts in Bhutan for over twelve years now. But no body seriously thought that Bhutan, a Buddhist country with a small army of about 6000 would go for military action against the heavily armed, militant groups in its southern part. Bhutan had issued unsuccessful warnings to the terrorist groups to vacate its territory peacefully. As a result, it kept repeatedly extending the deadline. Though terrorists dismantled some of their camps after the end of one such deadline on 31 December 2001 they established new ones and merged some of the dismantled camps with them.
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The 81st assembly session of Bhutan, held from 28 June to 18 August 2003, mandated its government to hold one more round of talks with the militant groups to make one last attempt at persuading them to leave the country. The resolution clearly empowered the Royal Bhutan Army to take necessary actions in case the talks failed. However, many believed at that time that it was another way of buying time by Bhutan.?
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Three terrorist groups, United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) and Kamatapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) were operating from Bhutan against whom the present ?Operation All Clear? is being conducted. Altogether these groups had nearly 30 camps spread across the southern districts of Bhutan and the strength of terrorists was estimated to be over 3000.
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The presence of terrorists has been causing damage to the Indo-Bhutan ties, which is excellent otherwise. India has been persuading Bhutan to take action against these groups since 1998. During the recent visit of King of Bhutan to India, the issue of presence of terrorists in its territory figured prominently. The Bhutanese king then stated that he had written to all the three terrorist groups to vacate its territory peacefully. The terrorists were also hampering economic activities in Bhutan besides affecting its trade and commerce. Work at large industries such as the Dungsum Cement Project was suspended. Educational institutions in terrorist-infested areas were closed down. Trade, agriculture production and other commercial activities in several districts of the country were disrupted. Ordinary citizens were not feeling free to even travel across the country. Many became victims of threats, coercion and extortion. Unprovoked attacks by the militants against Bhutanese nationals inside the country, as well as those traveling through Indian state of Assam resulted in loss of innocent lives.
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Dialogue was the preferred option of Bhutan to solve this problem. But after several round of talks spanning over six years, it had become almost certain that the militants had no intention of leaving the soil of Bhutan. Some ULFA leaders even said that the leaving of Bhutan was as good as bidding goodbye to their cause for which they were not ready. Bhutan wanted to remove a major irritant in its relationship with India though it faced serious threats from the militants. The amount of risk taken by Bhutan to uproot the terrorists from its territory has only increased the importance of its action.
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?The virtual illegal occupation of southern Bhutan by the terrorists posed a serious challenge to its sovereignty. The state had actually started withdrawing from these areas by closing down various institutions and commercial places. These activities of insurgents angered even ordinary Bhutanese people. Across the country, people started holding meetings, raising voluntary militia force to assist the government and collecting funds. In fact to check this government had to issue explicit orders banning all such activities. Citizens were told that the government would inform them in case their help was needed.
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When the second prince of Bhutan returned home leaving his studies incomplete, it was a strong indication that this time things would be different. Probably the militants groups had also sensed the trouble and had started shifting their top leadership to Bangladesh. And once the militant groups ignored the 13 December ultimatum of Bhutan in its national daily Kuensel, it was left with no option but to resort to military action. Non-action would have meant that the writ of the state does not run on its territory. Hence, to restore its sovereignty and to create a general environment of goodwill, Bhutan has struck on militants forcing them to retreat.