When the Royal Bhutan Army (RBA) and the Royal Bhutan Guards (RBG) rained 81 mm mortars on the well-fortified camps of the Indian separatist militants in the kingdom?s southern jungles and launched a full-scale assault on the morning of December 15 to oust them from the country, the rebel rank and file were not only caught off-guard, but were taken by utter surprise.

 

For, according to official Bhutanese statements during the past week or more of the battle?the first the nation?s army has faced in 138 years since the Anglo-Bhutanese war of 1865?rebels of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), National Democratic Front of Boroland (NDFB) and the Kamatapur Liberation Organization (KLO) have been operating out of 30 camps inside Bhutan for the past 12 years. Thimphu has said that at the time its Army launched the military offensive, the rebel strength was in excess of 3,000 heavily armed fighters.

 

During exclusive conversations with this writer by the eighth day of the RBA crackdown, several ULFA rebels who had fled the kingdom and surrendered before the Indian Army and the police in adjoining Assam said they could never imagine that the Bhutanese could actually attack them. ?We had such good relations with the Bhutanese authorities. Even the security chief of the southern Bhutan district of Samdrup Jhongkar used to visit our camps often. Moreover, our senior leaders had never given us any indication of an impending attack,? said a surrendered ULFA rebel Subhash Kalita alias Palash Kalita, currently at a safe house in the northern Assam district of Darrang.

 

ULFA?s detained publicity chief Mithinga Daimary alias Dipak Kachari, currently in police custody in Assam, also said his group was surprised by the Bhutanese assault.

 

The rebels may have all along taken the Bhutanese for granted, and, therefore, surprised by the military offensive against them. But, there were near clear signs of King Jigme Singye Wangchuck?s direct action against the Indian militants coming. Thimphu has admitted to holding talks with the ULFA and the NDFB for the past six years in a bid to persuade these rebels, as also those of the KLO, to pull out from the kingdom in a peaceful manner. The last such rounds of talks were held in October-November. Bhutan?s foreign secretary Aum Neten Zangmo told this writer the KLO did not respond to their invitation while the ULFA and the NDFB were represented by only middle level leaders.

 

Bhutanese authorities have now claimed that they had given a clear enough hint to the ULFA leaders during their meeting held on November 22 and 23 of the possible turn of events. ULFA?s foreign secretary Shasha Choudhury and another political wing leader Asanta Baghphukan were told by the Bhutanese that if they were able to get their commander-in-chief Paresh Barua to take part in the ?exit-talks? by December 15, Thimphu could extend the deadline for the rebels? withdrawal from the kingdom to December 31. If the Bhutanese account is to be believed, the ULFA should have realized that the deadline for a possible direct action was actually December 15. According to Zangmo, the ULFA leaders had stated during the last meeting that it would not be possible for them to leave the kingdom immediately. But, King Wangchuck could wait no more.

 

The timing of the assault certainly needs to be examined. The Bhutanese are now citing the mandate of the 81st session of the National Assembly to the royal government to try and persuade the rebels to leave the kingdom ?one last time? or expel them by using military force. But, that has been the National Assembly?s directive for several years now. This makes it pertinent to try and zero in on the possible trigger factor for the operations at this stage. And that makes it necessary to look at the relatively smaller and rag-tag group, the KLO, and its affiliations and linkages more than that of the ULFA or the NDFB to come up with an answer.

 

Both the Indian and Bhutanese security establishments were stung by news of the launching of the Bhutan Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist-Maoist) on April 22, 2003, the 133rd birth anniversary of Lenin. Pamphlets widely circulated by this new group in the Bhutanese refugee camps in Nepal and in areas inside Bhutan itself revealed that the new party?s objective was to ?smash the monarchy? and establish a ?true and new democracy? in Bhutan. Both New Delhi and Thimphu were quick to put the KLO under the scanner. Security agencies soon came to the conclusion the KLO is active and has pockets of influence in the strategic North Bengal areas of West Bengal and could act as a bridge between the Maoists guerrillas in Nepal and the newly emerging Maoist force in Bhutan. Besides, Indian intelligence agencies are aware of the fact that the KLO had provided sanctuary to fleeing Maoist rebels from Nepal, that the outfit has acted as a link between the Maoists and the radical left-wing activists in Bihar and that it received help from the Maoists in setting up a number of explosive units in North Bengal.

 

In the final analysis, Bhutan?s emerging Maoist threat could be the key factor although intense pressure from New Delhi to oust the Indian insurgents as well as the threat the rebels? presence posed to Bhutan?s own sovereignty and development could be the other factors that may have made the King shake off his long dilemma and act decisively.