The Indian proposals to Pakistan of October 2003 have led to considerable speculation as to its motivations. Such speculation ignores the underlying reality in the attitudes of Pakistan’s Establishment towards India.

This reality has three distinct elements; one, India’s democratic secularism frightens the religious and military groups in Pakistan; two, India’s non-acceptance of the two-nation theory is a threat to Pakistan’s integrity and well-being; three, their conviction that their safety lies in the destruction of India. Such a reality has made it impossible for the Pakistani leadership till now to settle with India. The Indian demand that Pakistan must end its cross border terrorism before a dialogue can commence between the two is a tactic to force Pakistan to review this credo.

The proposals of 22 October fall within this framework. They are all of an administrative nature whose acceptance will lead to enhanced people-to-people contact. No political issue is directly covered. Discussions on the administrative measures, thus, do not breach the Indian position of no political dialogue without end of cross border terrorism.

The purist could still argue that a dialogue of any kind is a dialogue after all and the Indian position has shifted. While the force of such an argument is undeniable, whether or not there is a shift should be judged with reference to the reality referred to above. No signal indicates a change. The essence of the Indian stand remains unmodified by the October offer.

What then, has changed, to lead India to make these proposals? Three factors seem relevant.

One, the American presence in the subcontinent and the awareness that American interests in the region should be used to promote one’s own. Though the US wants stability in the subcontinent to pursue its war against terrorism, it has been reluctant to equate India’s struggle against Pakistan’s terrorism with its own crusade against international terrorism. The October proposals provide an indicator to the US that India is equally interested in the stability of the subcontinent but to go beyond a limited window of opportunities, terrorism has to be subjected to one uniform calculus. The Indian emphasis is that terrorism against India hurts American interests as well. Events indicate that American perceptions are changing to accommodate the Indian view. American pressure on Pakistan to terminate cross-border terrorism can be expected to increase significantly as the need for a more realistic view becomes paramount. There are reasons to believe that different lobbies are at work in Washington to compel the US to identify more publicly the dangerous cores of religion-based ideologies.

Second, broadening the Indian vision of its own destiny and of its place in a new world order. India wants to be a pole in a multi-polar world with strategic boundaries stretching much beyond the national frontiers. The thrust of Indian foreign policy today is to forge friendship, economic and trade ties with as many countries as possible, whether they be in East or Central Asia, Africa or South America. The expanding horizons of India in a relative sense de-emphasize the importance of Pakistan and require the former to get out of the restricting gravitational pull of the latter.

Third, the need for distinguishing between the Pakistani power elite comprising the military and the religious right and the people of Pakistan to whom the Indian political leadership has no direct access.. This elite wants to keep interaction highly limited but not the media, intellectuals, professionals, leaders of Industry and commerce and people with relatives in India. The average Pakistani has little interest in political issues bedeviling the India-Pakistan relationship. India seeks to reach and influence this constituency. The confidence building measures contained in the October propositions are addressed to the common man in Pakistan, since he is the one most likely to be benefited by relaxations.

Pakistan has accepted all the twelve Indian proposals in principle, with major modifications with regard to only one, the Srinagar-Muzzaffarabad bus service, which is somewhat politically sensitive. The quickness of acceptance suggests that the US pressure is at work. Just recently, Pakistan has felt compelled to ban three new mutants of already banned terrorist organizations. This is another piece of evidence that Indian interests are being served by American policies in Pakistan. The pace may be slow but the thrust is obvious. India, therefore, loses nothing by an initiative which conforms to American desire for stability in the region.