Prof. Kalim Bahadur

Prof. Bahadur declared that the Pakistani response to India’s CBMs was more in the nature of a rebuff. Any number of CBMs could not interest Pakistan as the core issue for it was Kashmir. Noting Pakistan’s insistence that those traveling from Kashmir to POK had to use UN documents, he related that a Kashmiri member of Parliament had recently traveled to Pakistan on an Indian passport. If, as Pakistan claimed, Prime Minister Jamali had offered the CBMs much earlier and if, as the Pakistani Information and Broadcasting Minister had stated, the Indian proposals were made under American pressure, why was there opposition to them.

In Prof. Bahadur’s opinion Pakistan did not want Kashmir, it was enmity toward India that was driving it. While received wisdom informed that it was economics that determines politics, in Pakistan’s case it was the other way round. Nevertheless, despite the negative Pakistani response, it was necessary for India to continue the process.

Mr. P R Chari

Mr. Chari began by noting that the BJP-led NDA government’s style of functioning seemed predicated on the suddenness of its policy statements, calculated perhaps to derive political advantage by the surprise element. Despite saying that there would be no talks with Pakistan unless it ended cross-border terrorism, the government had announced the present set of CBMs.

Mr. Chari divided the proposals into four subsets. The first subset included those proposals that seemed designed to “ambush” Pakistan such as those on overflights and the bus service between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad, where Pakistan could not easily accept. The second subset of proposals was unexceptional, such as hotlines, resumption of sporting links, free medical treatment for children and so on, that both sides could easily implement. The third set of CBMs required further consideration and could not be implemented without further negotiations to work out the technicalities. In this group he included the offers for starting or reviving road links and rail links, and not arresting fishermen in recognized zones. The final subset related to Kashmir. The announcement of Mr. L K Advani as the interlocutor would give more credibility to the talks with the Hurriyat. At the same time, as one who has said that it was possible to only decentralize power and not give autonomy to Kashmir, Mr. Advani’s choice would not yield much to the Hurriyat. If the idea was to marginalize Mr. Geelani, the government was probably making a mistake, Mr. Chari felt.

There seemed to be some hope in the process of CBMs between the two countries, since Pakistan had not immediately brought up the issue of Kashmir nor did India bring up the matter of cross-border terrorism. But what was the true purpose of the CBMs? Was it just a game of one-upmanship or was there any genuine content? Mr. Chari believed that the present government could not go very far in the direction of good relations with Pakistan owing to the BJP’s politics of antagonism to Pakistan in the external sphere and Muslims in the internal sphere. On the Pakistani side, Gen. Musharraf too had to balance the American pressure and the Islamist elements in the country.

American pressure has now become a given in South Asia with the US becoming a regional presence in the Indian subcontinent. The Council on Foreign Relations’ recent report too seemed to imply the same, and therefore wanted the US to play a more pro-active role in resolving the Kashmir issue.

Dr. Rajesh Kadian

Dr. Kadian provided the view prevalent in Washington. He pointed out that the US declaration of the war on terror was one that catered to its own concerns and not to those of other nations such as India. India’s hopes in this regard were misplaced.

Pakistan continued to remain a frontline state for the US because of the close personal ties that Generals Powell and Zinni enjoyed with Gen. Musharraf. Also in the immediate aftermath of the war against terror, the US was taken in by the hope of receiving intelligence inputs from Pakistan’s ISI on Afghanistan. This turned out to be a false hope as the Pakistanis reneged on the deal. There was also the considerable influence of the Pakistani expat community in the US. In fact, Pakistani-origin American citizens were members of the Pakistani Parliament.

For the US, Kashmir continued to be disputed territory and a nuclear flashpoint. And for these reasons also, US presence and influence in the South Asian region will continue.

Discussion

The present CBM proposals have generated some apprehensions, given the timing and motives of the Indian government, that they are only propaganda at the diplomatic level and one-upmanship by the BJP at the political level. India should formulate its CBMs in a judicious manner taking into account what are acceptable or unacceptable to Pakistan. Restoration of sporting contacts and rise in the strength in the Indian mission could send positive signals.

·                     The US has considerable strategic interests in the South Asian region and is bound to gain more leverage, given the ambivalence of India in addressing conflict resolution. The US is not interested in any solution to the Kashmir problem but, at the same time does not want any flare up in the situation.

·                     US tactical support to Pakistan will continue till its operations against the Al-Qaeda are over. War against terror is a misnomer for terrorism is a phenomenon, war against a phenomenon is not possible.

·                     The CBM process is linked to the political goals and dynamics of a country. Pakistani military has a stake in the governance of Pakistan and hence will not accommodate civilians beyond a point. Their relevance in the political enterprise of Pakistan would be eroded if the dispute pertaining to Jammu and Kashmir is resolved.

·                     The conflict concerning J & K involves the sentiments of its people; so there is a need to build up the satisfaction level of the public despite the diverse interests of the major parties and the outcome of their negotiations. No credible groundwork has been done in this regard. Both states are apprehensive about building domestic support for the CBMs.

·                     India should pursue its counter terrorism measures simultaneously along with offering CBMs, lest its approach be perceived as a sign of weakness or attempts at buying time. The present CBMs are not intended to be a stepping stone to dialogue and the time is not opportune for the political leadership in India to take the initiative to return again with no tangible gains.

·                     Both countries are on a losing wicket if the present stalemate continues, so the move by Pakistan to seek an international presence on the LOC in J & K could be construed as an attempt to seek permanence of the LOC to convert it into an International Boundary over the long run. In this scenario the aspirations of the people of J & K would remain unfulfilled if a move to integrate the populace of J & K with India and that of POK with Pakistan was suggested.

·                     India wants to assume a broader goal for itself and wants to get out of the South Asian straitjacket given the eastward expansion of the NATO, the recent developments in Afghanistan, its look east policy and improvement in its relations with China.

·                     India should undermine the present military junta in Pakistan given their use of the Kashmir issue as the source of opposition to India. The Islamisation process in Pakistan presents a hurdle to India’s foreign policy.

·                     There is a need for self introspection given the prevalence of the dispute for the past 56 years.  India should view the issue from the perspective of its national interests; given the national consensus on J & K, there is no scope for any substantial deviation.

·                     An element of trust should form the basis for the pursuit of the CBMs and states should refrain from indulging in scoring debating points and pursue conflict avoiding measures.