Iran’s Nuclear Crisis: Cooperation or Confrontation?
22 Oct, 2003 · 1185
Niraj Kumar says that the Nuclear crisis in Iran is headed the confrontationist way and speculates on the likely future scenario
The September 12 decision of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to serve an ultimatum to Iran regarding its ‘alleged’ nuclear weapons development programme has precipitated another crisis in West Asia. This crisis assumes significance on four counts: firstly, US failure to find WMD in Iraq; secondly, Iran is the only powerful nation unwilling to join the US Camp in West Asia; thirdly, US had earlier classified Iran under ‘Axis of Evil’; and lastly, the emergence of Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) unveiled by President Bush in May 2003.
The Iranian nuclear programme came under suspicion after IAEA inspectors found traces of highly enriched uranium that experts claim can be used to manufacture nuclear weapons, at its nuclear facility in Natanz, in Central Iran. In its report IAEA also claims that Iran was conducting tests, which experts feel make little sense unless it was pursuing nuclear weapons. This made Mohammed El Baradei, IAEA chief, to urge Iran to come clean on the suspicion against its nuclear programme. In his statement dated September 8, he said, “Iran has been showing increased cooperation, but it needs to accelerate it and provide the agency with the accurate list of all imported equipment and components, and also the dates of acquisition and place of origin. He further, warned Iran against any effort to hand over information piecemeal or inconsistent with that given earlier.
Responding to above accusations, Iran declared that its nuclear programme is for peaceful purpose and its primary objective is to generate electricity and not nuclear weapons as suggested by IAEA and US. It also argues that traces of highly enriched uranium at one of its nuclear facility are not due to its attempt to develop a nuclear weapon, but it was contaminated by the previous owner. However, this Iranian contention is refuted by many countries including the US. They say that Iran does not need to develop nuclear energy as it has enough oil and gas reserves to meet its future energy requirements and an active nuclear capability can always spin off know how for atomic weapons.
This international crisis also has its implication on Iranian domestic politics. It generated a fierce debate between the hardliners and reformists within the government of President Mohammad Khatami. The hardliners advance their case for nuclear weapons on three premises. First, Iran needs nuclear weapons to deter Israel, which is believed to posses undeclared nuclear weapons. Second, the presence of nuclear weapons will help neutralise US military threat, which is evident as the occupying force in neighbouring Iraq and Afghanistan. Third, the possession of nuclear (Islamic) bomb by Pakistan first, has enhanced its stature and is a matter of concern for Iran, with its ambitions to be a leader of the Islamic world. However, quite surprisingly, it is Pakistan that is under suspicion for providing the know how for Iranian nuclear weapons programme. The reformists, on the other hand believe that the bottom line for Iran should be salvaging its peaceful nuclear programme.
The debate can continue within Iran, but the IAEA and the US is convinced that the Iranian nuclear programme has no civilian use as claimed by Iran, but is conceived to develop atomic weapons. Accordingly, the October 31 deadline was served on Iran with the approval of resolution submitted by Australia, Canada and Japan stating that “Iran should provide accelerated cooperation with the agency in its effort to clear up Tehran’s nuclear marks.” The resolution was passed without voting as the Iranian delegation walked out of the meeting.
Furthermore, Iran has been asked to sign the Additional Protocol to facilitate IAEA inspectors to more closely monitor Iran’s nuclear programme under the NPT, to which Iran is a signatory. In case of any non-compliance, the Iranian case would be forwarded to the UN Security Council, which is empowered to initiate further action- military or economic sanctions against Iran.
Iran warned that any such attempt to impose a deadline will only prolong nuclear tensions. Reacting to the passage of the resolution, the chief of the Iranian delegation, Ali Akbar Salehi said, “unfortunately the sponsors of the draft disregarded multilateralism and failed to understand the Iranian reservations to it and Iran has no choice but to review the level of engagement with the agency.” Further reiterating this position, the Iranian foreign Minister Kemal Kharrazi added, “Naturally we should now decide about our cooperation with the IAEA.” Similar were the sentiments of Hashemi Rafsanjani, a senior religious leader in an address in Tehran.
The rigid and unrelenting positions adopted by both sides, Iran and the IAEA supported by the US, limits options for a solution to the problem. Iran’s compliance with the IAEA resolution can save the situation but will severely restrict Iranian desire to emerge as a power in the region. On the contrary, if Iran takes the North Korean position of not negotiating with the IAEA and withdraws from the NPT with due notice, the US will have to depend on economic sanctions to contain Iran considering its current preoccupation in Iraq and Afghanistan.