Introducing the speakers, the Chair suggested the recent developments in US-Israel-India relations including the first ever visit of the Prime Minister of Israel, Ariel Sharon to India have raised several issues. What is the nature of this relationship and can it in any sense be called a triangle? How do bilateral relations between these countries impact on the region and particularly on India’s neighbours? Where are India’s relations heading in the near future? And finally, where do India’s national interests lie?

India will always need to balance its relations with Israel with the Muslim world in the region, particularly in order to ensure energy security. On the other hand, linking up with the much stronger Jewish lobby in the USA has the potential to pay us enormous dividends as well as Israel’s support to our defence industries for our defence capabilities. How does India balance these relationships to optimize its external advantages?  

Dr PR Kumaraswami

Dr Kumaraswami contended that stronger US-Israel-India relations had a natural logic.. The current phase of Indo-Israeli cooperation can be traced to the Durban Summit in September 2001, where India opposed the attempt to characterize Zionism as racism. India has always been obsessed with some sort of axis for or against it. While the Israeli Deputy Prime Minister on his recent visit to India stated that “an axis in the abstract sense exists between the US, Israel and India”, the Americans have been tactful in stressing the importance of bilateral relations while denying the existence of any axis.

For the US, Israel is also part of its domestic political scene with the America-Israel Public Action (AIPAC), being one of the strongest lobbies in the US. The American support for Israel extends its political, economic and military spheres. In the political arena, this was recently witnessed by the American veto on the Security Council resolution on the Israeli threat to Arafat and never pressing the Israelis to give more than they themselves have been willing to offer in the peace process. Dr Kumaraswami however, also stressed that it has not been all smooth sailing for the Israelis in their relations with the Americans. He pointed out the example of the US sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia in the 1970s despite Israeli opposition. He also pointed out that the changing nature of American-Israeli defence ties and the decline of Sino-Israeli military contact since the end of the Cold War is due to American opposition. Thus, it was not merely the Jewish factor that brought them together.

Coming to the question of an axis between the three nations, the speaker failed to see a purpose as several differences existed between them. India did not agree with the US characterization of Iran as part of the “axis of evil,” and did not share either the American or Israeli concern with Iran’s nuclear weapons programme. Similarly, the Americans did not seem to accept India’s view of Pakistan as a terrorist state and had serious differences on the issue of non-proliferation.

While ignoring the US factor led to the stalling of the Sino-Israeli relationship in the defence sector, India and Israel were keen to avoid a similar mistake in their relationship.

Lt Col Behram Sahukar

Col Sahukar pointed out that the alliance if it existed was a loosely-knit alliance. It was not directed against the Islamic nations. An emphasis on India as a bulwark against China, he pointed out was likely to be detrimental to India’s long term interests. On the question of military transfers to India, there were fears for Israel on the one hand that they could eventually find their way to Iran and for India on the on the other hand, that American sales to Israel were finding their way to China. The sale to India, of the Arrow ABM system coupled with the Green Pine radar, could accelerate the arms race in the subcontinent, noted the speaker.

Col Sahukar also outlined several areas of differences and limitations in the relationships among the three nations. He observed that the American administration was upset with India’s refusal to send troops to Iraq.. The Israelis meanwhile objected to India’s personality-based support in the Palestinian issue, even though they understood the Indian compulsions regarding its policy towards the Arab world.  Also, the Indian diaspora in Israel was far too small and had little influence on policy. The Indian lobby in the US, too, was not very effective.. As far as India was concerned, the American action on Pakistani support to terrorism was far from satisfactory. Trilateral relations must progress on a bilateral level said the speaker and there was plenty of scope particularly in the defence sector in terms of tactics, technology and training.

Amb Eric Gonsalves

Amb Gonsalves noted at the outset that the question was not really one of a triangle or an axis as about a strategic relationship between the three countries. He noted that the relationship between the US and Israel had evolved from being one that displayed only the American commitment to the existence of Israel to one that agreed with the concept of pre-emptive action. Similarly, the American relationships with Iraq, the Taliban and Saudi Arabia had changed over the years.

Indian foreign policy has often been characterized by knee-jerk reactions and with regard to Israel, anything that was anti-Israel was once considered good. Israeli foreign policy, on the other hand has been more pragmatic, particularly in its relations with Turkey and Iran under the shah. After 9/11 India, pronounced itself part of an axis which just cannot be. A large part of the developments on the bilateral plane simply cannot be transferred to a trilateral level.

As far as the AIPAC was concerned, it would help India only where Israeli interests in West Asia were concerned. Amb Gonsalves used the concept of the “theatre of action” to locate India’s role. India must play a more active role in the South Asian theatre where it has been ignoring constituencies of support even in Pakistan. He noted that it was important for India not to lose its stake in Iran and to build its stake in Iraq.

Amb Gonsalves considered the military relations between the three countries important and which needed to be intensified, even though the occasional setbacks needed to be factored in. Unilateral action, he noted was not as “unseemly” as India pretended it to be.

Discussion

·         Fascination with alliances has been rejuvenated, but unevenness prevails given a limited Israeli market for India and the problems of Indian foreign policy in generating any tangible returns, whereas Israeli interests are guided by commercial considerations and not by strategic concerns.

 

·         India should overcome its dilemma of Israel’s recent dalliance with Pakistan and should be guided by national interests. Cooperation with Israel assumes significance for procurements of military hardware and transfer of critical technology especially avionics and intelligence gathering.

 

·         US support for democracy is questionable given its track record of support to dictatorial regimes at different points of time. Presently Pakistan is being projected as a role model for the middle-east in terms of a modern Muslim state.

 

·         National interests should gain precedence in the present era. India should discard the experience of 1960’s and 1980’s. Indo-Israeli axis has the potential to influence the US to take action amenable to India vis-à-vis Pakistan. Cooperation needed to counter growing Chinese threats especially in missile defense.

 

·         The common agenda of battling terrorism is marked by different concerns in terms of identification of the adversary. India’s concern is Pakistan centric with regard to terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir, United States is concerned with tackling North Korea, Iran and Iraq.

 

·         There is need to avoid falling into the trap of typecasting Israel which results in two dichotomous image of Israel as a vassal of US influence or Israel as a role model to counter terrorism.

 

·         Projection of Israel as a role model could generate an adverse impact, given the high rate of civilian causalities in its anti terrorist operations clubbed with anti minority (Muslim) hysteria. India needs to tread cautiously as it does not share the concerns of the US and Israel in the philosophical discourse on the clash of civilizations. Bilateral relations with both the states should not be stretched beyond a limit lest; India is viewed as an adversary to the Islamic world.

 

·         India is light years away from the western strategic concerns as it does not qualify as a strategic ally, in short it means containing radical Islam and in a larger sense means a place for India in the international security community which is not the case. So India should adhere to bilateralism governed by strategic gains.

 

·         US cooperation with India is guided by short term goals, primarily seeking Indian bases for training its troops, joint exercises with Indian armed forces in Ladakh and Jammu & Kashmir has not yielded any tangible gains for India, as it remains non-committal about technology transfer.

 

·         US role remains vital for India’s long term concerns, mainly for India’s energy security, with US controlling Oil supplies in the Middle-east there is possibility of a greater role and influence of the US in OPEC.

 

·         India should avoid getting involved in juridical debates about sending troops to Iraq and should perform the role of a responsible middle level power in the ongoing Iraq crisis.

 

·         There is a need to assess the importance of the Jewish lobby, with the rise of neo-conservatives in the US politics. The contradiction in the views of the Indian lobby and Indian government needs to be sorted out. 

 

·         India is not in position to risk the political costs Israel undertakes, due to lack of political will and its inability to withstand the political consequences of the military actions.

 

·         Recent visit of Israeli premier has not produced any tangible gains and was marked more by symbolism.

 

·         There is a greater need to promote transparency in India’s domestic constituency by taking note of legitimate democratic opinion while formulating foreign policies. India’s obsessive concern with Pakistan could distort its foreign policy in the long run.