The attack on the life of Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister Chandrababu Naidu using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) has once again brought into focus the lethality of these devises and their use by the Naxalites. The security lapse is glaring, particularly because the state has an efficient couter-Naxalite security squad called the Greyhounds, which other states are trying to emulate.

The IEDs used by the Naxalites, commonly referred to as landmines, are crude devices where the explosive – gelatin sticks – along with pieces of metal, shrapnels and an electronic detonator are packed within a container – usually metal buckets, milk cans or metal pipes. Detonation is through an electric switch, to which the electronic detonator’s lead wires are fixed. In this particular incident, a camera flash was used to trigger the blast.

The media has rightly highlighted the security lapse but for the wrong reasons. It reported that the jammer vehicle that usually accompanies the Chief Minister was not available for this particular itinerary. A jammer blocks all signals emanating from devices like remote controls and cell phones. With two antennas fixed on either side of the vehicle, the jammer is effective for a radius of about 100 meters. What has not been understood is that the presence of the jammer vehicle would not have stopped this blast. The jammer is effective only for sophisticated electronic detonations using wireless remote triggers, like the ones used by the militants in Kashmir. When the trigger is mechanical, like in this case where the lead wires of the detonator were connected to a camera flash, jammers are of no use.

So, where was the security lapse? First, the Naxalites use gelatin sticks as the primary explosive in their IEDs. Unlike RDX, which is more lethal and a small quantity is sufficient for creating maximum damage, gelatin needs to be used in larger quantities for a similar effect. In this particular incident, nine devices were simultaneously used and it is suspected that each of these devices was emplaced in metal sheet boxes on the side of the road. The police have further recovered eight live bombs in the area. While seven of these devices weighed 15 kgs each, the eighth weighed 30 kgs. The Chief Minister’s current tour was a much publicized annual event and all precautions ought to have been taken. How did the police search parties miss such huge quantities of explosives? The recovered devices must have been a backup plan in case the first series were prematurely detonated or did not produce the desired effect. In this incident, the vehicle was blown up in the air and it landed on its sides. The rear portion, particularly the rear seat where the VIPs usually sit, was totaled; the Chief Minister who sat in the front escaped with minor injuries and fractures while his colleague who sat in the rear seat has been severely injured and has slipped into coma.

Second, to trigger the device, the perpetrators must have been in the vicinity ­Ã¢â‚¬â€œ at least within eyesight, because they would have required a clear line of view to spot the vehicle and trigger the device just when the Chief Minister’s car passed the exact spot. How did the police not detect such suspicious movement of people in the vicinity of the Chief Minister’s route? Moreover, shrubs in a two hundred square yards area had been pruned down to about two feet at the spot where the incident took place. How did the search squad miss out such an obvious alteration in the topography? The Northeast insurgents usually resort to IEDs to incapacitate the first vehicle in a convoy and attack the rest of the convoy. It is only fortunate that the less sophisticated Naxalites decided to scoot after viewing a satisfactory result of their first series of blasts and not wait for triggering the second series. The possible damage of these second series of blasts would have been devastating as the security entourage would have been crippled of critical response and rescue time.

Third, the incident happened at a district which is not the traditional stronghold of the Naxalites. That the Naxalites could plan and execute this incident there exposes the inadequacies of the state intelligence apparatus in not appropriately assessing the threat.

What needs to be done? The state government must invite the Naxalites, who had walked out earlier, for a fresh round of talks. The intermediaries need to be objective instead of blindly supporting the Naxalites. It might be useful to engage the Naxalites directly in talks rather than avail of the services of intermediaries. Encounters can be stopped only when the Naxalites give up fighting and express sincerity in negotiations. In a democracy, all aggrieved parties need to use democratic channels to express their grievances. Resorting to bullets rather than ballots has not resolved the problem in the last many decades. Maybe it is time the Naxalites give up their no-gain path and resort to alternatives.