An official delegation from South Korea called on the IPCS and had a dialogue with the Director, Maj Gen Dipankar Banerjee and a group of IPCS scholars on 11 September 2003.

Mr. Chung Sang-ki initiated the dialogue by stating that his country’s stand on the North Korean crisis was based on restraint and with the aim of developing a sustained dialogue with North Korea to diffuse the crisis peacefully. He said that the recently concluded 6-nation dialogue with North Korea, of which South Korea was an integral part, was a modest attempt in that direction. The dialogue’s main goal was to get North Korea to the negotiating table, which it achieved despite heavy odds. There is at present no agreement on holding the next round of talks, but it was always visualized that the process will be long and difficult.

There continue to be major differences between the views expressed by the US and North Korea.  In Seoul’s assessment, the second round of talks seem likely some time in November this year. The APEC meeting, scheduled to be held in Bangkok from 20-21 October 2003, will provide a forum for the leaders of the nations involved in the dialogue process with North Korea to interact and exchange views regarding ways to diffuse the situation. The November meeting will aim to achieve two objectives:

·         Enable denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula;

·         Provide adequate security guarantees and economic incentives to North Korea to roll back its nuclear programme.

The biggest bottleneck at arriving at a viable solution to the Korean crisis was the rigid positions held by North Korea and the USA. Enabling them to arrive at a middle path was the goal of South Korea. Japan was also involved in assisting the process. He said that it would be appreciated if India too played a proactive role in mobilizing international opinion to defuse the Korean crisis.

Gen. Dipankar Banerjee mentioned that, there needs to be greater flexibility within the dialogue to allow for bilateral discussions. He believed that the US-North Korean differences could be bridged through sustained engagement assuaging the concerns of all sides. Some sort of security assurances may well have to be provided to Pyongyang to ensure that it gave up its nuclear ambitions.

On Sino-India relations, Banerjee opined that there has been steady but incremental improvement since December 1988. However, demarcation of the Sino-Indian border continues to be a contentious issue. The September 1993 agreement to delineate the Line of Actual Control (LAC) was a major step in that direction. Trade and commerce was another area where the two countries needed to improve their performance. President Jiang Zemin’s November 1996 visit and subsequent signing of the confidence building measures between the two countries stabilized the Sino-Indian relations to a great extent. India’s nuclear test in 1998 led to a lull in the relationship, which lasted barely a year. India wanted to develop its own strategic weapons capability keeping in mind China’s defence and strategic weapons modernization plans and its large strategic weapons arsenal. But, India’s capability does not target any nation and instead is essentially peaceful, for India’s own defence and is not threatening to any other country as India firmly believes in the “no first use” policy in regard to nuclear weapons. The recent visit of the Defence Minister, George Fernandes to China followed by the Prime Minister of India have given the much-needed fillip to Sino-Indian relations, especially on the issue of Line of Actual Control (LAC) and trade.

Direct land route for trade has been opened in the wake of greater economic cooperation. Much work is still required on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and it was decided at Beijing that this would be raised to the political level for speeding up an agreement. Concerns remain in India of course over China’s economic policy, its role in the non-proliferation regime and above all Beijing’s nuclear cooperation with Pakistan. Tracing the China-Pakistan relations to 1955 Bandung Conference and the subsequent 1962 Sino-India War, Gen. Banerjee was of the opinion that China saw Pakistan not only as a means of containing India but also as a gateway to West Asia and the Islamic World. Responding to a question as to how India sought to balance the Sino-Pak nexus, Gen. Banerjee said that India wishes to improve relations with China on a one to one basis.

On India-Russia relations, Gen. Banerjee stated that Krushchev and Bulganin’s visit in 1956 marked the beginning of a robust India-Russia relations. The two countries share a long history of military cooperation restricted to a supply relationship dating back to 1961. However, this cannot be called a strategic relationship. Areas in which the two countries have a convergence of views are, in the desirability of global multipolarity and the smooth functioning of the United Nations. When questioned on the trilateral partnership between Russia, India and China, Banerjee said that this was primarily a view from Russia led by its then Premier Andrei Primakov. The idea was premature. This was not an era of alliances. Strategic alliance has never been an Indian policy, with India maintaining a neutral position in international affairs from the perspective of its own interests. Bilateral cooperative arrangements have been developed as required. Besides, China has consistently down played the possibility of a trilateral relationship.

Speaking of India-US relations, the General stated that cooperation in economic and technological matters have always been good between India and US since the 1950s. It was in the international relations arena that the two countries did not always see eye to eye, particularly during the Cold War. It was the Cold War dynamics that were largely responsible for this. Since the Cold war ended, a reorientation of India-US relations began as early as the late 1980s, with the initiation of strategic dialogues between the two countries in 1989.

The nuclear tests by India in 1998 marked a brief downswing in relations. At this time the Jaswant Singh-Strobe Talbott round of discussions begun and misunderstandings have since been cleared up. President Clinton’s visit to India in the spring of 2000 marked another turning point, this time of greatly improved relations.

Currently the major beneficiary has been the military to military cooperation, that encompasses strategic dialogue, discussions over arms purchases, technology exchanges and joint military to military exercises. In the military area, the Indian armed forces have high expertise in counter insurgency operations, high altitude warfare, UN Peacekeeping Operations and in protecting sea lanes of communication in India’s vicinity. The US Armed Forces are of course among the most advanced in the world and India can benefit a lot through interaction with it.

The procedures and arrangements for exercising this cooperation has been worked out in great detail and now follows periodical meetings at different levels.

A positive development has been the US acceptance of India’s role, which hitherto was confined to South Asia, to Middle East and Southeast Asia. Despite all the progress, stumbling block remains to be the support over Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). India feels that US support to counter-terrorism over the J&K is inadequate. US reluctance to link India’s war in J&K to its global war on terrorism has not been well understood in India.

Responding to a query on the probability of India sending troops to Iraq if requested by the US and under UN supervision, Banerjee said that the issue was politically sensitive and will require a strong and viable UN mandate for an approval from India. He stated the Iraq issue to be a challenge to US diplomacy in general and the Bush regime in particular, which is facing its lowest popularity rating since the 9/11(below 50%). The General agreed that India’s contribution of about 20,000 troops to the ongoing reconstruction process in Iraq could be a crucial contribution to peace in Iraq as well as to India-US relations.  

Finally, tracing the trajectory of India-Japan relations, General Banerjee said that India never faced the adverse effects of Japan’s militarism like other East and Southeast Asian countries. Hence there is no inherent or historic hostility with Japan. Instead India has looked to Japan through much of the 20^th Century with admiration, particularly over its economic success, which it hopes to emulate. On the flip side, Japan has never extended its foreign policy objectives to South Asia nor has it been adequately generous with its ODI (Overseas Development Investment) in the region. This has led to what may be termed as a low intensity engagement with countries of South Asia. On the whole, India-Japan relations have been cordial and friendly. There continue to be scope to deepen this in future. India will also look forward to develop stronger relations with the ROK, not only in trade and commerce but in a comprehensive way.