News reports emanating recently from Washington and New Delhi suggest that the two nations are trying to anchor a new security system for Asia-Pacific democracies and call it the ‘Asian Nato’ or NAATO, standing for the North American-Asia Treaty Organisation.

The idea may have been floated as a trial balloon by interested parties, but assumes significance in the light of US defense establishment thinking in terms of a tectonic shift in the deployment of US troops from Okinawa to other areas of mainland Japan. This shift could also possibly cover, Australia and New Zealand, new basing facilities in Singapore and re-modeling and re-furbishing the old US bases in Subic Bay and Clarke Airbase in the Philippines. From the US perspective, a strategic shift in its defense plans and priorities towards the Asia-Pacific region will suit it perfectly at a time when US is feeling the increasing heat and vocal opposition to the decade long stationing up of some 28,000 US military personnel in Okinawa, and some 37,000 US troops in the demilitarized zone separating South and North Korea.

In view of the growing partnership between the US and India, which some commentators describe as ‘natural allies’, several analysts and policy makers are hoping to of strengthen their political, economic and military ties by forging a loose, formal alliance with countries like India, Singapore, Malaysia, Japan, Australia, South Korea, the Philippines, to defend democratic values and act as a bulwark against international terrorism. Implied in this logic is the aim to exclude authoritarian (e.g., China) or religious (e.g., Pakistan) regimes. In other words, the ‘Asian Nato’ does not envisage an open door policy regarding enlargement as occurred with the original NATO, created on 4 April 1949 with North Atlantic and West European alliance partner countries. It was further expanded in time with the addition of select ex-Soviet bloc countries after the end of the Cold War.

Several impediments remain though, if the idea of an ‘Asian Nato’ is to fly. Firstly, what will be the reaction of China, the most populous country on earth with significant strategic and economic presence in the Asia-Pacific region? Will it acquiesce to a US-facilitated, hegemonic alliance and will it view the development of this grouping as a window of vulnerability for its international prestige and stature, necessitating a hostile and perhaps irrational reaction?

Secondly, will a nuclear Pakistan accept this proposal? In the preliminary discussions in various think tanks, Pakistanis has not been considered a possible member of this exclusive club. How will Pakistan react to such a strategic development of enormous importance in its backyard?  Will it move closer to China and forge a more formal military alliance as a counter bargaining chip, thus raising the stakes? Will Pakistan let loose the jehadi and the fundamentalist elements that are under its control, de facto or de jure?

Thirdly, on the face of it, an ‘Asian Nato’ may seem to cater to collective security, but still will appear less than universal or even quasi-universal, which makes the concept of crisis- management and peace-keeping a redundant exercise. What is necessary is to have a robust dialogue across a wide spectrum to look at the pros and cons of having this regional arrangement to ensure that it provides more and not less security and regional stability in to the Asia-Pacific region.

Alternatively, each of these countries in the Asia-Pacific region with an active relationship with United States may choose to chart independent, strategic partnerships with the United States while keeping its national and regional interests in mind. Thus, an ‘Asian Nato’, if and when, it fructifies may attract less suspicion and distrust by either China or Pakistan. India, on her part, will be well advised to keep its immediate and medium-term interests in mind while pursuing a more beneficial, proactive relationship with the United States.