Recent Developments in the Hurriyat Conference – I
13 Sep, 2003 · 1134
Anirudh Suri looks at the latest happenings in the APHC in a series of three articles
The flurry of activity that was sparked off in Kashmir after the elections last year has definitely had a serious impact on the political, if not the economic, situation in Kashmir. Among the most affected groups, literally reeling under the impact of the elections is the umbrella organization of 25 different organizations, the All Parties’ Hurriyat Conference (APHC). The APHC has long been claiming to be the real representative of the Kashmiri people and recently split to form a parallel group under the leadership of separatist leader, Syed Ali Shah Geelani.
The period leading to the Kashmir elections was tumultuous, preceded by the assassination of Abdul Ghani Lone, a senior leader of the Hurriyat, which was a grim reminder of the strength and presence of the forces working to disrupt any steps towards bringing about normalcy in the State. The death of Lone did not come as a shock, as this was the expected outcome for a leader who had become a moderate voice in recent years, and was suspected of being in league with the Indian Government. This is a cardinal sin in Kashmir. Lone’s assassination brought to the fore the internal differences, bickering and increasingly divergent ideologies within the Hurriyat fold.
Matters got worse when Sajjad Lone, son of the slain leader, publicly accused another senior Hurriyat leader, the staunchly pro-Pak veteran, Syed Ali Shah Geelani of being behind the killing of his father. Geelani, Sajjad claimed, wanted to have Lone killed as he favored a pro-talks and pro-election stand. Geelani apparently was afraid that Lone might steer the Hurriyat into a direction that Geelani’s supporters from across the border would not have liked.
The gravity of the situation can be gauged from rumors that when Geelani did go to Lone’s house to express his condolences on the death of Lone, whom he publicly continued to call his ‘brother’, Lone’s sons refused to let Geelani enter the house and asked him to leave. At this, one of Geelani’s aides at his side lashed out at Sajjad himself but was restrained by Geelani, who was ultimately forced to return from the doorstep of his dead friend, or ‘brother’, as Geelani put it.
The issue did not end here. Sajjad did not want to let Geelani off the hook. He raised a hue and cry about Geelani’s alleged involvement in his father’s murder, publicly condemning him. This period before the elections was rife with another rumor: that the Hurriyat would finally bow in to the pressure and enter the electoral fray. There had been repeated assurances from the Indian leaders, under pressure from the international community, that the elections would be free and fair. Now was the best time for the Hurriyat to prove its representative character. The Hurriyat also felt the ground slipping from under its feet, as the Kashmiris were getting fed up of the Hurriyat and its ambivalent policies. The elections could have been used by the Hurriyat to seek popular support.
However, the assassination of Lone also served as a grim reminder that the forces controlling many of the Hurriyat elements from across the border would not allow it to adopt a moderate stand. Inviting the ire of Pakistan was also something the Hurriyat wanted to avoid. Ultimately, the Hurriyat decided to stay away from the elections, ostensibly to show the people of Kashmir that it was not power hungry and would strive to lead the people’s struggle. Some major leaders of the Hurriyat, like Yasin Malik of the JKLF defined the problem as being: “They [Indian Government] ask us to fight in elections, but that would mean that we are fighting the elections as Indians, which we refuse to accept”. Thus, participating in elections run by the Election Commission of India is at odds with their leaders’ ideologies, premised on their concept of a distinct Kashmiri identity. Another ploy that the Hurriyat employed was its constitution of an Independent Election Commission, comprising three individuals whom the Hurriyat trusted. This included the well known human rights activist, Tapan Bose, who heads the South Asia Forum for Human Rights based in Kathmandu.
The complications in the Hurriyat’s stand on elections did not end there. Sajjad Lone, witnessing a major sympathy wave particularly in North Kashmir on account of his father’s murder, was keen to capitalize on the support from the people. He realized that his father’s party, the People’s Conference, whose command Sajjad had taken over, could easily sweep the elections. However, the Hurriyat’s decision to boycott the elections hampered his plans. Sajjad nevertheless went ahead and put up proxy candidates; a decision which was to become a major contention with the Hurriyat, especially, after the elections in Kashmir were seen to be largely free and fair.