Limitations of Military Power

    The problems of post-war stabilization in Iraq must not be allowed to obscure the potential of military power in circumstances of overwhelming superiority. Iraq was overwhelmed in a mere 22 days from 19 March to 9 April 2003; such was the military and technological superiority of the USA. This then is the potential of military power.

    Conversely, an analysis of the situation in South Asia last year during the period 18 December 2001 to 16 October 2002, the duration of Operation Parakram, establishes the limitations of military power.  For middle-order countries like India and Pakistan where the conventional superiority of India over Pakistan is only marginal, the option of war is not available as it would be inconclusive. For them, the Clauzewitzian dictum that war is a continuation of politics by other means is not valid. It is not possible for them, nor advisable, to achieve overwhelming superiority. Such measures would only lead to an unaffordable arms race which would further divert their limited resources from crucial economic and social objectives without bettering the end objective of achieving overwhelming superiority.

    The armed forces of middle-order states have the basic role of deterrence: preventing war. This is an important role and requires that the armed forces are well-manned, well- armed and well-trained for deterrence to be credible.

Operation Parakram

    The continuous proxy war in J&K and acts of terrorism by the ISI supported Pakistani terrorist organizations came to a head in the attack on the Indian Parliament on 13 December 2001. This was preceded by a similar attack on the J&K Assembly.  India ordered general mobilization of its armed forces on 18 December 2001, who were told to prepare for a war with Pakistan. India and Pakistan remained mobilized until October 2002 until India declared a ‘strategic redeployment’ on 16 October 2002.

    “Operation Parakram”    has been and will continue to be analyzed. One or two books have come out and more will follow. This is as it should be. Some analyses suggest that in January and in June 2002, India almost went to war. It is observed that initially the offensive was to be across the LoC in J&K. Subsequently it was decided to conduct the offensive in the desert with the ‘strike’ corps. Ultimately, the offensive plans were shelved and there was a stand down. Others have opined that mobilization of the armed forces by India was an act of coercive diplomacy though purists in this field question the use of this phrase in respect of “Operation Parakram”.

    The December 2001 mobilization was brought to an end in October 2002. “Operation Parakram”    came to a close without going to war because of the intrinsic limitations of military power of middle-order nations whose superiority is marginal. Analysts observe that India’s initial plan of an offensive across the LoC in J&K was given up because Pakistan strengthened POK with “layered” Defence. Fighting in the mountains, is in any case, slow, laborious and prevents full utilization of the weapon systems of an army in the way of armour and to some extent even artillery. Be that as it may, little can be gained in the mountains or in the plains if one’s superiority is marginal. That this is so is inherent in the analyses which refer to India being poised in June 2001 with its three strike corps in the Thar Desert for crossing the border. However, one particular analysis claims that India’s bold move would have drawn in Pakistan’s Army Reserve North and Army Reserve South 1 and 2 corps respectively, to meet the Indian threat; the ensuing battle of attrition would end to Indian’s advantage: hardly a worthwhile objective to take the country to war.

Punitive Strikes

    It is frustrating for the Indian people as well as the armed forces to let Pakistan get away with “bleeding India” in J&K and by its terrorist attacks elsewhere. Marginal superiority can-not bring it a worth while victory in war. However, it permits conducting punitive operations to punish intrusions and terrorist acts which Pakistan refuses to stop even in the present state of increased and responsive people-to-people contacts. Punitive action by the air force and by Special Forces is within the scope of existing force levels and may have to be resorted to. These will invite retaliatory strikes short of a war. However, this course of action that both can take, may drive home the futility of anything other than negotiations to achieve a solution for our differences.