Training camps of Indian militant outfits from the North-East on Bhutanese soil continue to remain a security concern for the authorities in India. The United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) that are active in Assam, and Kamtapur Liberation Organization (KLO), active in parts of Assam and West Bengal together have more than 30 camps in the jungles of Samdrup Jongkhar district and in its vicinity. However, Bhutan maintains that the number of ULFA camps has been reduced to six  and that the NDFB has only three camps. India and Bhutan both agree that the camps exist and the militants are a security threat.

 

Regrettably, despite repeated assurances by the Bhutan Government that it would not allow its soil to be used for anti-India activities, the government there has not succeeded in achieving anything concrete in this regard. Recent reports from Bhutan still point out the uncertainty that prevails among the policymakers there. The Kuensel in one of its reports on July 4 has recorded a statement of the Bhutanese Prime Minister Lyonpo Kinzang Dorji in the course of his presentation of the annual Government report for the year 2003: ?The government will, therefore, follow the National Assembly resolution and make a last attempt to get the ULFA to remove its headquarter through peaceful means. If not, we will be left with no choice but to resort to the last option which is military action.? Earlier reports had even indicated that the militants were asked by the government there to vacate the territory by June 30. However, the militants seem to have defied this warning with impunity. In fact, Bhutan?s Foreign Secretary, Ugyen Tshering, was quoted in The Sentinel, a Guwahati-based daily, on July 2, as saying that the Government had not prescribed any timeframe for the militant outfits there to leave. He said, "We are committed to a peaceful resolution of the problem, and have not shut our doors to anything which can ensure that. But, the response from the ULFA and NDFB rebels have been less than encouraging. We want their immediate withdrawal, but we never set any deadline for the withdrawal process."

 

Bhutan has not been able to act decisively against the Indian militants until now, despite official statements. For one, if the militants do not leave through persuasion, Bhutan would have difficulty in flushing them out using force, as the militants are believed to be better armed and trained. Further, the country also does not seem to be willing to rely solely on Indian co-operation in this regard because they fear backlash by ULFA and other militants against the ethnic Bhutanese within its territory and also those living in the border areas in India and Nepal. Moreover, Bhutan may also want to avoid any reaction from its other neighbour, China. In addition, a few top-ranking Bhutanese officials are also alleged to have close links with the ULFA. For instance, Security-in-Charge and Military Adviser to King Jigme Wangchuk, Brigadier V. Namgel and a senior official in the Foreign Affairs Ministry, Wangchuk Dorji were alleged to have actively helped ULFA in arms procurement and ?fund? collection during the late 1990s. Finally, the underground economy that operates on both sides of the border also remains an impediment because the vested interests that it serves would attempt to thwart any action against the outfits.

 

Among the three outfits ? ULFA, NDFB and KLO, the ULFA has the largest number (approximately 2,000 cadres) present in Bhutan. The outfit was also the first to set up camps there during 1990s when the Indian security forces launched Operation Bajrang against it. Subsequently, the outfit facilitated entry of its allies the NDFB and the KLO. The militants use the camps for their hit-and-run strikes against infrastructure, civilian population and security forces in India. The Union Government of India and the Assam State Government, have both reiterated on more than one occasion that to contain subversive activities against India effectively, the militants? camps in Bhutan would have to be destroyed. Unlike Bangladesh, Bhutan does not deny presence of Indian militants and that shows its willingness to address Indian security concerns. It however lacks professionally trained security personnel and other logistics, including military hardware. But under Article Six of the 1949 Treaty between India and Bhutan, India has expressed its willingness to help in this regard. This would also apply in the case of Bhutanese plans to raise an indigenous militia to tackle the Indian militants. Alternatively, a joint operation of the kind executed by Indian and Myanmar security forces against Indian militants in Myanmar code-named Operation Golden Bird in 1995 can also be envisaged, if the militants fail to respond to persuasion.