Peacekeeping in Iraq: India Chooses to play safe

11 Aug, 2003    ·   1089

Anand Kumar examines India’s decision on peacekeeping in Iraq


After months of agonizing debate regarding participation in the stabilization force operating in Iraq, India has finally decided not to participate in this force. Its immediate aim was to restore law and order. Once this was achieved it would to create some sort of a functioning democracy to substitute in place of the overthrown regime of Saddam Hussain.

 

The war against Saddam’s regime was declared some months back. But the collapse of this regime has also resulted in widespread lawlessness in the country. Saddam may have been a tyrant, but the war against him also lacked any moral justification after the US and British forces failed to recover any weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq. Some even termed this as blatant aggression.

 

As the UN was treated with scant regard before the war, its role has been minimal in its aftermath. The deteriorating situation in Iraq caught both the US and Britain by surprise. When they went into Iraq they thought they would either capture or kill Saddam and recover large stocks of WMD. Neither happened. The war succeeded in removing the regime which has led to the present lawlessness and attacks on the US and British troops. It also has the potential of degenerating into guerrilla warfare if the foreign forces stay there for long.

 

This new situation has created problems for not only the US and Britain but also for other countries, including India. The US and Britain now want them to join in the ‘Stabilization Force’. The best way for them to get out of the present quagmire is to make the armed forces presence in Iraq multi-lateral. This will ease the pressure on their forces and legitimize their intervention. To achieve this purpose, a massive diplomatic effort has been launched which is still continuing.

 

The US is not likely to get personnel from its European allies as a large number of their troops are already engaged in Balkans and Afghanistan, hence its need for support from the developing world. Collin Powell recently visited Bangladesh with this end in view. President Bush tried to get a commitment from the Pakistani President, Pervez Musharraf, during his visit to Camp David.

 

Pressure was exerted on India to be part of this force or even lead a section of it. In the unipolar world India has been trying hard to come closer to the US, and get its support against the cross-border terrorism sponsored by Pakistan. However, the somersault by Pakistan after September 11 has put a spanner in the works and US support has become only verbal. India also hoped to benefit from a share in the impending reconstruction work.

 

Thus, India has found itself in a difficult situation in the aftermath of Iraq war. The situation is more or less same in the other South Asian countries, hence, participation in the Iraq ‘stabilization’ had unclear benefits for India. Its diplomatic advantages would have been neutralized if Pakistan had also chosen to be part of the multi-national force. But the disadvantages of participation were very clear. If the operation results in casualties of Indian soldiers, the ruling coalition would pay a heavy price at the forthcoming domestic elections. The issue was bound to be exploited by the opposition parties.

 

In a tricky situation like this, the government had to choose between possible diplomatic advantage and possible political costs domestically if the operation went wrong. India has the example of Sri Lanka before itself when it sent its Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF), which suffered heavy losses in men and material and achieved very little. In fact, it resulted in the assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.

 

On the other hand, the US fears a repeat of Somalia in Iraq. In Somalia public opinion turned hostile against the operation after American soldiers were killed and their corpses were dragged in the streets. Hence, to distribute risks, it wants to bring in countries like India, which refused to participate in the stabilization force, citing absence of a clear-cut UN mandate. But to maintain amicable bilateral Indo-US ties, it has offered to participate in the logistics.

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