(Article Review: Stephen Cohen, "The Jihadist threat to Pakistan," The Washington Quarterly, Summer 2003, 26;3, pp.7-25.)

Cohen addresses another important fear, which plagues both India and the US. How far is the military under the control of the fundamentalists? Many in India have wrongly perceived the Pakistani Army as being 'fundamentalist.' These misperceptions could be dangerous and it is vital to correctly assess the threat. Many in India make casual references to a rogue bearded Pakistani army official using a nuclear weapon against India.

No one better than Cohen can analyze the Pakistani Army. (He is author of the Pakistan Army, the most authoritative book on the subject) According to him, "Pakistan army officers are guided by professional military norms, not religious ones. They wish to keep the army free of sectarianism (especially Sunni-Shia disputes) and do not want to see the army turned into a vehicle of religious propagation." Cohen also addresses a second fear, again, common in Indian and American strategic community that the Pakistan Army at the top level is not under fundamentalist influence, but at the lower level it is. Cohen rightly says, "There is no evidence that the army is currently seething with Islamic radicalism, that an Islamic cabal is in a position to seize power in a coup, or that the lower ranks of the officer corps are any more 'Islamic' than would be expected in a society that has seen the steady rise of Islamic sentiments."

What should be the strategies for dealing with them, especially as Cohen brilliantly puts it, "the generals cannot govern Pakistan, but they will not let anyone else govern it"?

Cohen believes that, "US policy must deal not only with the tactical problem of retaining Musharraf's support but also with problems that will arise several years from now after Musharraf is gone." This policy includes:

First, the US should encourage "further revival of democracy in Pakistan." How would the US encourage the revival of democracy in Pakistan, if it believes that the army would be the best bet for keeping the Islamic forces at bay? As long as the American interests remain in Afghanistan, it is dubious, whether there would be any change in the present US policy of supporting Musharraf and paying only lip service to democracy in Pakistan. Should American interests decline in Afghanistan, why would it bother about Pakistan? The military could, of course, succeed in selling the "nuclear weapons coming into the possession of fundamentalists" fear to the US administration and keep their interest alive in Pakistan. This strategy may work towards continued American support towards the military.

Second, Cohen asserts, "The United States must actively go beyond mere lip service to promote a peace process" between India and Pakistan. This according to him, "(1) would address a major cause taken up by the radical Islamists and many moderate Pakistanis; (2) it could be the basis for an effective ban on the external operations of radical Islamists; (3) it would make the army less central to Pakistan's future; and (4) it would also be in India's interest in the long run." Precisely for these reason, India should also take an extra step forward and engage in serious negotiations with Pakistan. If the US is willing to facilitate such negotiations, India should welcome this rather than sticking to its sterile jingoism of "we are against any third party mediation."

Neither the military nor the radical forces in Pakistan, unfortunately, would favor a solution: In one of Robert Ludlum's novel, the hero, a spy, is asked a question - What kind of people are you? He answers we are the ones who try our best to create a world in which we are not needed. Will American pressure be enough for the military and jihadi forces in Pakistan to sign their political death and request for a wreath?

As Cohen puts it, "for the United States, Pakistan is both part of the problem and part of the solution. Pakistan is an ally in the war against terrorism, yet at the same time, a potential base of Islamic radicalism." He concludes, "Washington has no option but to work with Pakistan in the short run, cajoling Islamabad to stop its support for radical Islamic groups that have operated in Afghanistan, India and other countries."

Washington may have no option but to work with Pakistan, but does that mean it has no better strategy other the present one to work with Pakistan? The US can pressurize the military by political and economic means to revive democracy in Pakistan. The revival of its democratic forces would mitigate the political hold of the radical groups and, in the long run, with better governance and education, it could attack the support base of the jihadi forces, by providing an alternative. That is a long-term strategy that the US administration has never bothered about. The immediate strategy is only to consolidate the gains made in Afghanistan and to further consolidate them.