The US has made a definitive statement regarding its overall approach/intentions towards Pakistan. The red carpet treatment meted out to General Musharraf, including the visit to Camp David is lost on no one. It became obvious that the renewal of the past partnership between Pakistan and the US since September 2001 is an ongoing process. Is Pakistan satisfied with the aid package received from the US for the support it has provided to the US coalition in its “war against terrorism”? It is pertinent to analyze here whether General Musharraf garnered any real gains from his visit to the United States.

Clearly, the US leadership continues to rely on General Musharraf. He was welcomed by the US amidst protests within Pakistan that he had no legal or constitutional right to represent it. General Musharraf’s success lies in projecting himself as a progressive leader who could bring reforms into Pakistani society. The US has well-defined interests in sustaining its relationship with Pakistan. This would explain the US near-silence about the onslaught on democracy by the General. However the US has stepped up pressure on President Musharraf to set his house in order. The $3 billion US aid package for Pakistan is contingent upon an annual review of Pakistan’s cooperation or progress in the war on terrorism, control of spread of nuclear weapons, and steps taken towards democracy.

The US is cognizant of the massive agitation against the Legal Framework Order in Pakistan. However, going by the US National Security Strategy Report of September 2002, US concurrence with General Musharraf’s disregard for democratic norms would diminish as and when the US goal of defeating terrorism is attained. While General Musharraf earned kudos for his government’s efforts to apprehend terrorists, the US continues to be worried about the resurgence of the Taliban and threats to the Karzai government. The duplicity of the Pakistan government is probably not lost on the US government; hence, the linking of the aid package to progress on terrorism. While Pakistan continues to deny that joint operations are being conducted by the US and Pakistan armies on the border with Afghanistan, this operation began within days of the first meeting of a tripartite commission in Islamabad attended by top officials from the three countries.

Some Pakistani observers feel that the $3 billion economic package spread out over a five year period will lead to investor confidence, but its disbursement is linked to strict conditionalities tied to it. While $1.5 billion is available for defence requirements, including the purchase of spare-parts and upgradation of existing F-16s, it is believed that if Pakistan chooses to use a part of the package to pay back its outstanding bilateral debt of $1.8 billion to the US there will be little left to spend on economic development. The package is negligible, compared to the services rendered to the US in terms of land and air facilities and other logistic support to fight terrorism. The aid would enable purchase of essential military items, but President Bush has clarified that this package would not include supply of F-16s. The delivery of F-16s to Pakistan has been a festering wound between Pakistan and the US since 1990 when Washington refused to deliver 28 F-16s due to its concerns with Pakistan’s nuclear programme.

The F-16s have been offered as incentives to Pakistan to make it stop its nuclear and missile programmes. However, as the offer did not result in any decline in Pakistan’s proliferation activities, the deal did not materialize. The importance of strengthening the Pakistani Air Force has been stressed; but it now has to look to China and France. French weapons are expensive, and Pakistan increasingly considers Chinese weapons as not being of competitive quality. Consequently, Prime Minister Jamali recently expressed the view that Pakistan would not depend on any one country to fulfill its security and defence needs.

While the outcome of General Musharraf’s visit has caused disappointment in Pakistan, it is seen by some to have bolstered his image abroad. Doubts remain about the reception he would be accorded at home as comparisons continue to be made with Zia’s package in the 1980s and the refrain continues that Pakistan is being made use of by the US without adequate compensation. Even with the existing differences, the strategic interests of the two countries are likely to take the relationship forward. This will ultimately depend on how much pressure the US puts on Pakistan for getting concrete results on the ground related to the establishment of a functioning democracy, ending religious extremism in and stemming from Pakistan, as well as progress on nuclear non-proliferation. This is not easily attained. US-Pakistan relations therefore are likely to remain deeply troubled in the coming years.