Operation Sarp Vinash at Surankote brought into light the existence of a fully functional transit camp with arms and ammunition, communication equipment and large stores of ration that could sustain 500 men for at least 15 days. Surankote, on a positive note, can be hailed a success for preventing a Kargil-like situation through alert patrolling and anti-terrorist operations. At the same time, it can be criticized as an intelligence failure. The fact that it went undetected for a long period speaks volumes of the inefficiency of intelligence agencies.  The questions on which the discussion was premised were: Was Surankote an intelligence failure on the lines of Kargil; was it a case of no knowledge and no action or was there information available about the activities taking place in Surankote but action was deferred to a more opportune time. If so, what were the reasons for postponement of action, and what propelled India to take action. Finally, what are the measures to avoid future Surankote like situations?

The round table witnessed several points of view on these questions. Some of the important points made and issues raised were as follows.

·         There was a general consensus that intelligence agencies were in bad odour worldwide. Examples of the waning reputation of Britain’s premier intelligence agency MI6, and the American Office of Special Plans were cited in this context. Providing inaccurate information was accepted as the reason for their dwindling reputation. Both these agencies were held responsible for deliberately providing misinformation about Iraq’s possession of WMDs. The practice of ‘cherry-picking’ was blamed for such lapses. Only those facts are picked out from the vast pool of information available that suits preconceived policy objectives, leading to erroneous understanding of the problem at hand. Moreover, there was no coordination among the various intelligence agencies as all of them are embroiled in one upmanship.

 

·         According to Gen. Sood, nobody had a clue about the activities in Surankote, as there was inadequate presence of Indian army personnel. Post Operation Parakram this area gained prominence. The General stressed the need for logistic support to sustain operations like Sarp Vinash. Mention of the construction of 3 helipads brought into focus the fact that helicopter gunships were used during the Operations. Monitoring and blocking the entry and exit routes of militants and stationing of permanent troops for sanitizing the area were suggested. The need for mobility of security forces in the theatre of action was stressed.

 

·         Mr. K K Mitra reiterated the limitations of intelligence, which cannot see and hear everything. He lamented the fact that despite Kargil and the Subramanyam Committee recommendations there has been no systemic change in the manner gathering information. The National Technical Facility Organization (NTFO), an apex and centralized agency, is yet to see the light of the day. The case for complimenting human intelligence with technical intelligence was made. There is a pressing need for effective use of electronic surveillance to survey movements in remote terrain. This requires the creation of electronic assets along with the coordination of various defence/intelligence agencies. According to Mr. Mitra, Pakistan will not stop training, supporting and financing infiltrators. Hence India cannot afford to lower its guard in regard to border management.   

 

·         Air Marshall Patney was of the opinion that this is an imperfect world that there are no monies for everything. Hence, while using the limited resources available, a choice will have to be made between a stopgap arrangements or overhauling the system completely. In other words, the choice is between a fire-fighting approach or creating a fire lanes approach. While lauding the efforts of the defence personnel, he focused attention on the fact that that Musharaff might no longer require cross-border terrorism to destabilize India. Air Marshall Patney suggested ‘guerilla action in reverse’ to salvage the situation. Displaying faith in human intelligence, he said that humans could overcome mechanical and technical limitations. He recommended the use of gunships in the entire gamut of conflict. Finally, the lack of accountability was blamed for most of the problems faced. At the end of Kargil, organizational problems were looked into but the accountability aspect was completely ignored. Organizations need to have accountability and commitment.

 

·         Gen B S Mallik brought to the attention of the participants the gross lack of civic governance in and around the Surankote area, which, according to him, was responsible for the Surankote activities going undetected all these years. Stressing the need for a joint command, he said that the decoupling of the security structure into Operations and Analysis would result in a dichotomy that is detrimental to the cause of securing the nation. The General also focused attention on the acute shortage of basic amenities like lack of bulletproof vests, communication equipment, and night vision devices. This places our jawans at a disadvantage, as they have to live in a hostile terrain with inadequate facilities/gear.  With the help of statistics (US lost 156 men in Iraq, while India sacrificed 527 in the Kargil operation), he emphasized the lack of value for human life in the country.

 

·         Air Commodore Prashant Dikshit threw light on the complimentary and supplementary manner in which intelligence works. According to him a major lacunae was the lack of lateral level dialogue and knowledge sharing among the various intelligence agencies.

 

·         Sonika Gupta reiterated the need for greater accountability, especially among the procurement agencies, as this impinged on the life of the jawans. Raising concern over the unacceptably large loss of life, she said that losing young officers is not only demoralizing but also detrimental to morale. By paying scant respect for the safety of its personnel, India has brought the situation to such a pass that bright young men are shying away from a career in the armed forces, resulting in a 25% shortage of young officers.  Another issue raised by her was regarding the timing of Operation Sarp Vinash. She wondered if the coincidence with the peace initiative was a calculated move intended to send across any message.    

 

·         Col. Sahukar argued that the size of the cache shows that the build-up occurred over a period of time. Blaming weak transborder intelligence for the lapse he stressed the need to remedy it at the earliest. He suggested the use of the Air Force as a force multiplier in operations of this nature.

In the concluding part of the discussion some of the important points that found mention were:

• Winning the support of local population, for counter-insurgency operations most of who are transient and buyable like the Bakerwals.

• Strengthening the local police and civic governance.

• Increase human intelligence in the area. Support it with electronic assets.

• Improve all-weather fighting capability of the forces.

• Since it is difficult to gather pinpoint information in such operations, a policy of ‘seek and destroy’ must be followed.