In his opening remarks, the Chair put forth four points to be focused upon in the discussion. The first was the nature and rationale behind Vajpayee's offer of peace. He pointed out the suddenness of the offer, given the prevalent 'no talks till cross-border terrorism ends' stance of the Indian government and the qualified nature of the Prime Minister's statement which links peace talks to the stoppage of cross-border terrorism and the destruction of the terrorist infrastructure by Pakistan. He suggested the following possible explanations for Vajpayee's peace offer:

(a) An attempt to unfreeze the tense situation and, perhaps, to throw Pakistan off balance.

(b) A result of confusions within the Government; of taking one step forward and retracting another, evident since the Lahore and Agra Summits.

(c) A calibrated response, which, by linking dialogue to a stop in cross-border terrorism and the dismantling of jehadi infrastructure, is calculated to bring international pressure to bear on Pakistan on these issues with border confrontation having proved to be ineffective in obtaining these goals.

(d) An outcome of American pressure.

(e) Vajpayee's desire to be remembered as a man of peace in history.

The second focal point raised by the Chair was to examine the compulsions that Pakistan has in dealing with India. He pointed out the deeply divided nature of the Pakistani polity, Pakistan's need to balance US pressure against that from the jehadis and the primacy of the Army in Pakistan's polity with seeking some moderation in Kashmir policy, the contradictions of fighting terrorism in the west and promoting it in the east, and the dawning realization in Pakistan that its Kashmir policy has run its course.

Third, to examine the BJP-led NDA Government's compulsions in dealing with Pakistan. He pointed out that the NDA has to balance the pressure of the hardliners in the Sangh Parivar with the need for going along with the moderate Vajpayee line, balancing secular elements in the NDA with the more muscular BJP Hindutva line, and the compulsions of framing policy against the backdrop of upcoming elections to four major states and the national elections next year when the BJP will have to decide between adopting the Gujarat line and a moderate line to woo the electorate.

The last point put forth by the Chair was concerning American compulsions in dealing with India and Pakistan. He observed that post-Iraq, the US was interested in undertaking political engineering in the Gulf and in pursuing its non-proliferation agenda in which South Asia, especially Pakistan, figures prominently. Questioning whether Pakistan will remain vital to US interests forever, he observed that the contradictions within Pakistan are becoming more and more apparent and disconcerting. He also posed for comment whether the US will favor India in the larger game of stabilizing Asia ' an euphemism for containing China, further observing that with its physical presence in Pakistan and Afghanistan, the US has become a regional power in South Asia.

Discussion

The following key points were highlighted in the discussion

• Though given the colour of spontaneity, Vajpayee's offer of peace was a qualified and calibrated statement after a meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security, linking the offer of talks to Pakistan stopping cross-border terrorism and dismantling the terrorist infrastructure within its territory.

• The peace offer marks a definite policy shift.

• It was also observed that Vajpayee's offer could be due to a number of possible reasons which included the unfreezing of bilateral tensions; to wriggle out of a policy dead end heralded by the 'no talks till cross-border terrorism ends' stand, and to regain the ability to tell US that we have been reasonable; and because Vajpayee wants to be remembered as a man of peace.

• The offer was made in Srinagar as a gesture of support for Mufti's 'Healing Touch' policy, and is India's way of addressing the international community and the Kashmiris, viz. to make the point that it is ready to go the extra mile required to seek for peace.

• The offer could also be aimed at preempting Pakistan, which is taking up the Presidency of the UNSC, from bringing Kashmir onto the Security Council agenda.

• Regarding Pakistani compulsions, it was observed that the Pakistani media is plugging for a change in their Kashmir policy which has reached a dead end, and there is a feeling in Pakistan that it is next on the US agenda after Iraq.

• The Pakistani Army, which holds the real power, is associated with hard line Kashmir policy; hence Pakistan cannot make concessions on Kashmir.

• Pakistan should not be given the benefit of the doubt by questioning Musharraf's control over the jehadi elements and cross-border terrorism.

• The democratization of Pakistan has led to fundamentalists coming to power, but weakening their influence is crucial to move towards a solution.

• Pakistan is fearful of direct US intervention on non-proliferation.

• On Indian compulsions, it was observed that its addiction to multilateral regimes was commendable, but unrealistic; however, the US figures prominently in Government of India's perceptions, and policy initiatives need to be taken in the context of Indo-US relations.

• That the Indian polity is divided on Kashmir, but India has no cards to give away on Kashmir in the search for a bilateral agreement with Pakistan.

• On the US compulsions or interests in South Asia, it was observed that regional stability is a primary US goal, and that nuclear risk reduction is the core of US interests/compulsions. The US favored the status quo on Kashmir, and the conversion of the LoC into an international border.