Speaker: Mr. TCA Rangachari
JS,
East Asia
, Ministry of External Affairs
Mr. Rangachari, who accompanied the President, Mr. KR Narayanan on his visit to
China
, presented a brief summary of the visit placing it in the perspective of the triangular relationship between
China
,
India
and the
United States
.
The Visit
The invitation to the President visit was extended in 1996 following the Chinese President’s visit to
India
. Formal invitations were received in 1997, but since then domestic political conditions had not been conducive for the visit.
Being a ceremonial visit, neither side expected it to resolve problems. The tempo of the visit was set by Mr. KR Narayanan’s familiarity with China as he was posted in China and subsequently visited it a number of times, and is held in high esteem by the Chinese. In addition to substantive meetings – both open and closed door – with Chinese President, Jiang Zemin, Mr. Narayanan also held meetings with other top level Chinese leaders. They included, Vice Premier Qian Qichen, Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan, former Prime Minister Li Peng, Premier Zhu Rongji, Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference Li Ruihan, and Vice President Hu Jintao. Mr. Narayanan also paid a visit to
Dalian
to see the economic and technical developments there. His visit also included
Kunming
, capital of the
Yunnan
Province
, where, he visited the Kunming Academy of Sciences. Cooperation between North East India and South West China was a point of discussion.
Issues that were discussed during the visit were:
International Terrorism
The Chinese reaffirmed their concern regarding international terrorism; however, they remained noncommittal with regard to making a public statement. This was despite President Jiang Zemin’s public declaration in
Turkey
against international terrorism in April this year. Their apprehensions seemed to arise from sending a wrong signal to
Pakistan
on Sino-Indian concerns on terrorism, since
India
’s anxieties on terrorism is relates to
Pakistan
.
Security Council seat
The Chinese response remained non-committal on
India
’s candidature for permanent seat on the UN Security Council.
Border dispute
There was no change in their stand that time and patience are required to solve the problems left behind by history. Mr. Narayanan, while accepting the complexity of the problem left over by history, expressed concern with it continuing unresolved for future generations.
Dalai Lama and Karmapa
The Chinese commended
India
on the prudent handling of the Karmapa issue, and seemed satisfied with the Indian position that Dalai Lama was a religious leader and not a political one. They were also reassured that the Karmapa would not be permitted to indulge in political activities.
In addition to these issues, the talks also focussed on economic and public sector reforms, globalisation, liberalisation and information technology.
The Triangular Relationship
Sino-US and
India
The 1969-70 Ussuri clashes led to important changes in Chinese threat perceptions, following which they actively sought a partner to stand up against the
Soviet Union
. While the period witnessed Sino-Indian clashes it brought together
China
and US; the
US
, because of its concerns in
Vietnam
, wanted a balance of forces against
Soviet Union
in the region. Relations with
India
remained lukewarm, after finding the
US
as an ally. In 1971, during the liberation of
Bangladesh
, Kissinger, suggested that
China
play an active role and even launch a military offensive against
India
if there be need.
China
, however, did not consider the suggestion favourably, for logistic reasons if not diplomatic reasons; the Himalayan passes to
India
were snowed and their own military were in total disarray. However,
China
did not recognize
Bangladesh
until three years later and until then called it “Manchuguo” – the puppet state of
Japan
in
Manchuria
the 1930s.
Indo-US and
China
China
views with concern the growing Indo-US relationship and is apprehensive that
India
might be used in its attempt to ‘contain’
China
.
Clinton
’s visit to
India
was also seen in this light. Though
China
is not viewed as a threat, there are several differences in the Sino-US relationship, especially concerning non-proliferation, US National Missile Defence and Theatre Missile Defence Systems, the theft of US nuclear secrets, and issues concerning Sino-US trade. The rapprochement in Indo-US relations serves as a warning to
China
, which has adopted a ‘wait and watch’ policy to proceed further with Sino-Indian relations.
The ‘brahminical’ approach adopted by
India
in the realm of foreign policy has become an impediment for
India
, as it leaves no room for negotiations. While both
Pakistan
and
China
employ a cost-benefit approach to their dialogue with the
US
,
India
, stuck on high moral grounds, is unable to proceed further without retracing what has been done or said.
Discussions
The discussions that ensued focused on the following issues:
Dalai Lama & Karmapa
On this issue, the speaker said that there was no alternative to providing asylum to the Dalai Lama in 1959. Concerning Karmapa, there was acknowledgement by China that India had handled the issue prudently. The speaker pointed out that India’s reaction was reticent, and there were much less media attention and public statements on the issue. This had proved to be a sagacious move.
Tibet
About
Tibet
, the Chinese perception of
India
has moved away from that of blind suspicion to acknowledgement of its role. There still exists a certain level of apprehension and India should ensure that this does not become a fixation. Mr. Rangachari pointed out that India’s concerns with Tibet should be focussed on the Tibetan refugee problem which, logistics apart, is also creating internal security problems in Himachal Pradesh. That these Tibetans do not have refugee status, and that the Chinese Government refers to them as citizens and not refugees, should be taken into consideration. In the light of increased Buddhist activity, including organised religious associations in China, the presence of the Dalai Lama in India and India’s position on Tibet gains salience.
Line of Actual Control and the Border
The border issue is by far the most important unsettled issue between
India
and
China
, especially since
China
’s border problems with other countries have either been settled or are in the process of being settled. There is “by and large” a consensus on the LAC and detailed marking or mapping has not been possible because there has been no exchange of maps exhibiting stated positions. However, the border issue, notwithstanding its importance, has not bogged down cooperation between the two countries, like that of India and Pakistan, which is commendable.
Terrorism
China
’s concern on terrorism was in consonance with
India
’s, and they harbour no illusion regarding the source of the problem in the Xiangiang province; the 10-km border with
Pakistan
has been subsequently fenced. Despite publicly raising its concern on international terrorism at the Shanghai Five meeting and recently in Turkey, China is reluctant to share the same platform with India while condemning terrorism, as this might upset their equation with Pakistan.
Indian Weapons Development
It has been the declared position of the Chinese that they are not affected by Indian weapons development. They explain this position by saying that they are much ahead of India, and it will take years for India to match up with Chinese capabilities. The extent to which this is their true perception is unknown and that they have some worry cannot be ruled out. It should be remembered that the Chinese response to the American National Missile Defence and Theatre Missile Defence Systems might lead to larger deployment of missiles – long, medium and short range. Short-range missiles would be deployed with Taiwan in mind. However, these missiles can be reprogrammed to target India, which has implications for Indian security.
The discussions concluded with a focus on the particular achievements of the President’s visit. The speaker explained that the visit made a difference in terms of creating a better atmosphere for future substantive talks. Moreover, the Chinese never looked at high-level visits as ‘problem-solving’ but rather perceived them as the culmination of progress achieved or its beginning. Relations between the two countries had soured after the nuclear tests. Visits like these had the potential to build a ‘positive atmosphere’ and, seen in that perspective, the visit was a success.