IPCS Nuclear Security Programme

Since its inception, the IPCS has been working on various issues related to disarmament, especially Nuclear Disarmament. We are the only research institute in South Asia that focuses on all aspects of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), including Chemical, Biological and Radiological weapons.

The Institute has undertaken numerous projects, both on an individual and collaborative basis, on the issue of WMDs.

The Nuclear Security Programme aims to strengthen the Institute's efforts on the above issues.

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Second Annual Workshop on Nuclear Disarmament and Regional Security
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IPCS Workshop Report

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The Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), as part of its Nuclear Security Programme supported by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), organizes annual workshop for young scholars that provides basic introduction to nuclear disarmament, regional security issues and provides opportunities for research on nuclear issues. The primary objective of these workshops is to help build capacity among young scholars, refining their ability to analyze, criticize and think with an open mind.

The workshops are held each year, over a period of three days, with a maximum of 30 participants selected from leading colleges and universities from all over India, the UK and the US. The first workshop took place in August 2008 in New Delhi, followed by two regional workshops in Chennai in September 2008. They include highly interactive sessions; experts/scholars are carefully chosen to provide brief introductions to the topics, followed by a substantial discussion between the participants and the experts. In addition, relevant documentary films are shown to provide a holistic approach to some current issues.

This year the workshop was held from 20-22 August 2009 in New Delhi, and it included a new dimension, a working group session, which allowed for greater interaction among participants themselves as well with the faculty. Participants were divided into three groups and were assigned topics beforehand for which they had to coordinate among themselves and make a case presentation on the final day of the workshop. Eminent nuclear scholars from New Delhi’s strategic community acted as resource persons critiquing the presentations and providing feedback and suggestions to the participants on their presentations.

Following is the report of the workshop.
Session I: In Theory and Practice: War, Deterrence and Disarmament

Rear. Adm. Raja Menon

War has been studied throughout human history. Some of the earlier historical figures who studied war are Thucydides, Kuatilya and Machiavelli. They all made strong contributions to the study and phenomenon of war. The fundamental question in all theories on war has been the issue of why states go to war? Answers to this are many and are derived from many standpoints. A Freudian understanding of war would implicate the recalcitrant nature of the human soul. It would argue that human beings are inherently violent in nature. However, more rationalistic explanations would absolve the human turpitude as the cause of war. Rather, according to these explanations, states have real disputes. It is because of a fundamental scarcity of resources and the anarchic environment of the international political system that creates an environment that makes war possible.

States are rationally calculating actors, at least in a minimal sense, who conduct a trade-off calculation between the costs of war and the spoils of war. If the pain of a dispute is greater than the pain of war, states would rather embrace conflict than to suffer the consequences of the unsettled dispute. However, it is to be understood that all states would not calculate under the same assumptions and some states would even bear excessive costs and go to war, Vietnam being a prime example of such a situation in which the North Vietnamese stood ground even under heavy asymmetry of material capabilities.

However, the most commonly used theories of war come from the pen of a German military General called Clausewitz. According to him, war is politics by other means. He conceptualizes war as a mountain and each side of the mountain is a domain of two different organs of the state. If war is conceptualized to be at the peak of this mountain, the climb till the peak has to be negotiated by the diplomatic community of the state, where every possible measure to stop war should be looked out for. But once, the peak has been attained, the descent from the top becomes the domain of the military. It means that once war starts, the military must be allowed to operate with autonomy and authority and the focus should completely shift to winning the war.

The nuclear weapons have however changed this conception of war fighting. As Bernard Brodie pointed out, the absolute character of these weapons does not allow any political objective to remain meaningful, once a nuclear war breaks out. Even though the message was quite clear, the Cold War politics led to the formation of war doctrines which basically involved a crusade for prevailing in a nuclear arms race. Doctrines such as MAD, flexible response, counter-force, counter-value, second-strike etcetera became the jargon for strategizing war. However, basically, the Cold War was fought on the logic of deterrence. Deterrence explains the absence of war between the two great powers during the Cold War, although they fought many proxy wars all over the world.

Session II: Treaties and Organizations

Prof. Rajesh Rajagopalan

The change in the US administration has led to new found excitement in the arms control and disarmament community. The disarmament commitments which President Obama has made have reopened the debate on global nuclear disarmament. Though much of this ‘sweet talk’ is necessary for the 2010 RevCon, it is important to understand the consequences of such a renewed focus on various nuclear disarmament treaties.

The US senate will determine the fate of the current discourse on the CTBT. President Obama has promised a lot on the CTBT but it is doubtful whether he can deliver. The CTBT, similar to the issue regarding healthcare reform, is a highly divisive and partisan issue in the US domestic politics and to believe that the new administration will be able to convince the majority of the senate to ratify the CTBT may be overly optimistic. Moreover, with the Iranian and North Korean recalcitrance the political climate is becoming more and more difficult for a US senate ratification of CTBT. On the FMCT, there has been no real progress in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) for the last 15 years. However, a glimmer of hope was generated when the CD agreed on some substantive issues in June this year, but it has again been destroyed by Pakistan’s new reservations on the whole process. The 2005 NPT RevCon was a disaster by all standards. It is important to understand the importance which the new administration has placed on the 2010 NPT Revcon. The US administration would certainly like to have a
successful NPT RevCon which will again legitimize the non-proliferation regime.

Amb. Arundhati Ghose

Disarmament organizations are international organizations that are instruments used to implement the provisions of various disarmament treaties. There are numerous organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, Conference on Disarmament (CD), Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization and International Monitoring System, to name a few, who are active in regulating the conduct of states on their disarmament commitments.

The CD is the one of the most important intergovernmental, multilateral organization which negotiates disarmament treaties. The Chemicals Weapon Convention and CTBT are two of the most seminal disarmament treaties which have been negotiated under the aegis of the CD.

Similarly, since the conception of the NPT, the IAEA has been authorized as the international body that checks and validates the commitments made by different countries under the NPT. It is a UN mandated agency with a specific purpose delineated under Article 3 of the NPT. The IAEA has a comprehensive safeguards agreement for non-nuclear NPT members covering all of their nuclear material and facilities. However, in case of the five nuclear weapon states the safeguards are voluntary in nature. On the other hand, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is a business cartel formed by countries that trade in nuclear material and technology to control the trade of sensitive nuclear items. It is politically and commercially driven which was evident from the NSG clearance, on the sale of sensitive nuclear material, given to India under the provisions of the Indo-US civilian nuclear agreement.

Session III: Nuclear Policies and Strategies-I: India and China

Maj. Gen. Dipankar Banerjee

The main individuals responsible for the development of China’s nuclear weapons programme were Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. They both had a clear and realistic understanding of the nature and role of nuclear weapons, as well as the weapons’ effects and limitations. The programme was dependent on the design and scientific knowledge support given by the Soviet Union, though these relations strained midway when the Soviet Union withdrew support.

With regards to the Chinese doctrine, the Chinese fifth Defence White Paper published on 29 December 2006 openly discussed specific steps and target milestones in building a modern military force. Most importantly, the white paper contains two paragraphs specifically describing China’s nuclear strategy, a topic never addressed before in a white paper. It covers China’s fundamental rationale for maintaining nuclear weapons i.e. to deter other nations from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against China, its commitment to a no-first-use (NFU) policy, its commitment to not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones, its commitment to reinforce its stand for a comprehensive prohibition and complete elimination of nuclear weapons, its commitment to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent force and its commitment to avoiding a nuclear arms race among others. Since there has always been a gap between China’s policy and practice, apprehensiveness shrouding China’s lofty nuclear posture was raised. Like many other things about China, it is not clear what exactly is happening internally and whether the policy is being adhered to. China is the least transparent of the nuclear-weapons states and its doctrine remains ambiguous.

India did not immediately respond to China’s nuclear test in 1964, but it continued to keep its nuclear options open. Despite having capabilities by the 1960s, it did not demonstrate them until 1974 when it conducted a nuclear explosion, which it termed as a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE). In 1998, India conducted a full-scale nuclear test and subsequently claimed to have attained nuclear capability. Five years later, India formalized its nuclear doctrine where it included its main goals of establishing a “credible minimum deterrent” and pursuing a policy of “no-first-use.” Additionally, India is unequivocally committed to total nuclear disarmament.

Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli

Although the official Chinese policy has not changed, many analysts are beginning to question China’s long-term commitment to its policies of ‘no-first-use’ and minimum deterrence. One can point to alleged inconsistencies between China’s ambitious nuclear modernization plans and its stated policy. According to some analysts China has begun to directly target several Indian cities which may indicate that China is reevaluating its current policy. One can argue that China is gearing towards the capacity to move from a minimum deterrence to a limited deterrence strategy. Under limited deterrence, China would need to target nuclear forces (counter-force) in addition to cities (counter-value), which would require expanded deployments. However, such a capability may still be a long way off. Additionally, both China and India have maintained an NFU policy. Though indications are that China is reconsidering its NFU policy from unconditional to conditional, but this has not been officially acknowledged. The credibility of the Chinese nuclear policy remains in question, as well as its implications for South Asian security and the broader international community.

China’s response to the Indo-US nuclear deal was not forthcoming and many viewed it as an effort by the United States and India to ‘contain’ China. India was disappointed by China’s attempt to block the NSG waiver and restrict India’s access into the ‘nuclear club.’ Historically, India and China have a dynamic relationship of competing for strategic space in the international arena, but recently attempts for reconciling have been made. In the 2006 Joint Declaration, India and China underlined the importance of expanding their civilian nuclear energy programmes and agreed to promote cooperation in the field of nuclear energy consistent with their respective international commitments and concrete steps are being
made to ensure this. Further, it seems that new levels of cooperation are developing between the two countries with reports that a hotline is in the pipeline between the Prime Ministers of the two countries as a confidence building measure to maintain regular contacts at the highest level. These positive steps at developing strategic trust are conducive towards strengthening the international non-proliferation regime.

Session IV: Nuclear Policies and Strategies-II: India and Pakistan

Prof. PR Chari

India’s nuclear policy and strategy are not binary in nature and are structured to cope with threat perceptions arising from both Pakistan and China. India transformed into a quasi-nuclear weapon state in 1974 after conducting a PNE and into a nuclear weapon state in 1998. Its nuclear doctrine is based on the assumption that nuclear weapons remain instruments solely for national security. India’s NFU policy against nuclear adversaries and its application to the India and Pakistan context illustrates the difficulty in determining who attacks first due to their geographical proximity. Despite India’s voluntary moratorium on further nuclear testing it remains adamant on not joining the CTBT. The debate remains that if the US ratifies the CTBT, will that sufficiently pressurize India and will Pakistan then follow suit; is Pakistan’s signing of the CTBT dependent upon India signing first?

India and Pakistan were on the brink of a nuclear war on two separate occasions, Kargil War in 1999 and the border crisis in 2001-2002. Both these events accentuated nuclear deterrence and reinforced the belief that nuclear war is unlikely to erupt in the future between these two nations. Pakistan launched its Kargil aggression presumably in the confidence that nuclear deterrence would ensure that India would not use its conventional forces across the line of control for fear of escalation to the nuclear level. During the Indo-US nuclear deal negotiations, the Bush Administration made India an exception to rules of international conduct and Pakistan was denied this same privilege. Now the question arises whether the deal under the new Obama administration may be accorded a different relevance in light of the broader Afghanistan-Pakistan policy. Pakistan’s reaction to the Indo-US nuclear deal was relatively restrained, but it is obvious that they felt it was discriminatory towards them and undermined their broader relations with the US. Prior to the finalization of the deal rumors leaked out of a similar deal developing between Pakistan and China, though several reports denied it and it seems unlikely it will occur at this point.

Dr. D. Suba Chandran

There is a belief in India that it understands Pakistan better than any other country, due to its shared history and culture, but this is not accurate. It is important to analyze the historical context under which Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme was initiated. One must place Pakistan’s nuclear programme in context to understand whether it is solely India-centric or if there were other reasons that determined the birth of its nuclear programme. Though one cannot deny that a major reason why it developed nuclear weapons was to balance India’s conventional superiority. It views its nuclear weapons as a deterrent against conventional war with India and follows a doctrine of ‘we must have whatever India has.’ This is reflected in Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s statement in 1965: “If India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own. We have no other choice.” Pakistan regards its nuclear weapons as a symbol of national pride, as a ‘crown jewel,’ their most precious strategic asset, and as a way to maintain its territorial integrity from foreign powers. Zia-ul-Haq propagated the concept of an ‘Islamic Bomb,’ which meant that its nuclear bomb belonged to the larger Muslim world.

In light of recent reports, the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons have come under dispute. This notion also stems from the insecurities the international community felt with Pakistan after the AQ Khan network was discovered and controversies emerged about whether it was driven by a state policy.

Session V: Nuclear Policies and Strategies-III: The US and Russia

Prof. Chintamani Mahapatra

The international situation with respect to the position of nuclear weapons does not seem to be in favour of disarmament. This is highlighted by the fact that the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty) between the United States and Russia has been terminated. The FMCT (Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty) is still being negotiated with limited progress being made. And the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) has hit a road block. Apart from this the United States and Russia still continue to posses 95 per cent of all nuclear weapons and plan to upgrade their nuclear arsenal in the future. It is not only the United States and Russia but also France and Britain that are indulging in vertical proliferation. In this context the Chinese are a part of both vertical and horizontal proliferation. Of the five nuclear weapons states only China has a clear policy of ‘no first use.’ Syria and Iran are suspected of pursuing a
nuclear weapons programme, while North Korea has tested a nuclear device. Of the 167 signatories to the IAEA only 70 states do not foster a weapons programme and a fourth of the signatories have not agreed to the Additional Protocol. Added to this there is little progress made in the preparation to the 2010 NPT RevCon. In the event the 2010 RevCon fails like the one in 2005 then there is ample scope for the NPT to collapse. This will be a serious setback to the global efforts on disarmament of nuclear weapons.

President Obama’s speech in Prague has been the first concrete public statement made by any American President. The speech has touched upon a few significant issues and positions of the American government, such as, that nuclear weapons are not a top priority in the present US security strategy, thereby creating hope for arms reduction; established optimism for smooth negotiations between the US and Russia on the lines of START; the possibility that the new US administration will push for the CTBT ratification; strengthen the IAEA; dealing appropriately with violators; tighter control over ENR technology; and conveyed the continuance of the Indo-US civil nuclear deal.

Currently, the US government has indicated that they may negotiate with Iran to abandon their weapons programme by offering them incentives for cooperation or imposing sanctions. Whereas, in the case of North Korea, the commencement of the six-party talks was welcomed, parallel with North Korea maintaining its 2005 commitments. The US government recognizes the need in tackling the black market in radiological materials along by safeguarding any loose nuclear weapons.

Dr. Vidya Shankar Aiyar

In recent years the position of the Russian government has changed to a considerable extent. The Russians have overcome the safety and security of nuclear installations since the collapse of the Soviet Union. This included the nuclear submarine fleet and the debate of the need to have a nuclear triad. Since 1993 the original Soviet policy of ‘no first use’ has transformed to a ‘first use’ policy. All Soviet era nuclear weapons have been secured in Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus.

Russia’s nuclear policy is set out in several published documents. For instance, The Defence Ministry White Paper of 2003 claims that Russian armed forces no longer train for the eventuality of a nuclear threat as the likelihood is seen as having receded considerably. President Putin has highlighted several broad based internal and external security threats. Unlike in 2003, the present national security policy paper and the military doctrine are ambiguous. Russia is undergoing a rapid military modernization programme and has aims of being the top five economies within the next five years. There seems to be a level of sincerity between the US and Russia in the wake of START I expiring at the end of 2009. Fruitful negotiations are currently underway and both countries have agreed to replace START with a new treaty to reduce their stockpiles of nuclear weapons and to work towards a long term goal of a nuclear free world. Nuclear deterrence has been the core of Moscow’s nuclear policy and as relations between US-Russia progresses it will continue to be an important factor. Though Russia’s nuclear policy is likely to gradually shift away from the United States in the advent of new international considerations arising.

Session VII: WMD Terrorism

Dr. Ajay Lele

The first use of the term ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’ can be traced back to the weapons tests prompted by Hitler at Guernica in Spain; immortalized by Picasso in his painting ‘Guernica.’ The context of WMDs is no more restricted to state actors, but also includes non-state actors. WMD terrorism can be nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological weapons-related terrorism. The rationale behind such terrorism is noted in the changing psychology and tactics of terrorist organizations. These can be used to generate ‘fear’ as a tool of economic and political blackmail and to achieve logistical and psychological advantage. WMDs in this sense are weapons of mass disruption.

At present, the possibility of nuclear terrorism is least likely. Groups like Al Qaeda may possess tactical nuclear devices but not their delivery mechanisms. However, radiological terrorism can be a reality. The ‘Dirty Bomb’ is in fact an ordinary bomb with supplementary materials like Cesium 137, which are easily available. Biological terrorism, also called germ warfare or futurist threat was seen in the case of the Rajneesh Cult. Chemical weapons can be acquired comparatively easily and its use was witnessed in Japan’s subway incident. A nuclear terrorist attack may involve certain technical limitations and uncertainty. Weather conditions like wind direction is intrinsic to the geographical extent of the damage created by the attack. The terrorists cannot be certain that the damage will be restricted to their area of interest. Other possibilities are sabotage of nuclear sites, aerial attacks on nuclear installations and ‘dirty bombs.’

The threat of WMD terrorism looms large in South Asia, given the proliferation history of nations in the region (Pakistan and the AQ Khan network), Al Qaeda links in the region, WMD bazaars in volatile regions like NWF and various unstable nations in the region (Nepal, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka). However, there are technical limitations; they don’t guarantee limiting damage to a particular area; and it may alienate sympathizers and reduce popular support. The possibility of WMD terrorism in South Asia, within the next five years, depends largely on the stability of the region, particularly Pakistan. No terrorist organization has communicated a major intent, though hoax cases and accidental blasts are possible. Potentially, the US troops in Afghanistan may be targets and issues like Kashmir, the Taliban’s spread in Pakistan are important factors. Though Russia’s nuclear policy is likely to gradually shift away from the United States in the advent of new international considerations arising.

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used by terrorists - robotics, sensor technology, ICT, technical intelligence, biotechnology, etc. Threat evaluation by states is over simplistic and it is necessary to use a cost-benefit analysis. A threat assessment is a complex task, because of the changing nature of threats.

Working Groups

Sessions

Global Nuclear Disarmament: Rhetoric or Reality?
India and Nuclear Disarmament
Indo-US Nuclear Deal: The Road Ahead

As part of the workshop, the participants were divided into working groups focusing on three relevant issues: Global Nuclear Disarmament: Rhetoric or Reality, India and Nuclear Disarmament, and the Indo-US Nuclear Deal: The Road Ahead. The groups were asked to deliberate on these issues during the workshop and present their analysis on the final day of the workshop. Senior scholars acted as resource persons and provided their comments and conclusions based on the group presentations.

In the context of US President Barack Obama’s Prague speech in April 2009 and the seminal Wall Street Journal article by the ‘Quartet,’ comprising of Henry A. Kissinger, Sam Nunn, William J. Perry and George P. Schultz, a new initiative on nuclear weapons elimination is emerging. The possibility of a world without nuclear weapons is not a contemporary phenomenon and its roots can be traced to the Cold War period. The participants analyzed this recent revival by discussing whether these arguments are merely rhetoric or are an impending reality that can be sustained to ultimately achieve a world free from nuclear weapons. While it is not likely to be possible in the immediate future, attempts can definitely be made to devise ways and possibilities towards this goal.

Given the horrific destructive capacity of nuclear weapons, India has believed that a world free of nuclear weapons would enhance both global security and India’s own security. Thus India has historically advocated that the highest priority be given to nuclear disarmament. Based on the present scenario, the participants traced the roots of India’s belief in nuclear disarmament and assessed whether it was a viable option in the future.

The introduction of the Indo-US Nuclear deal has added a new dimension in South Asia and the international system at large. Opponents of the deal believe that it undermines the NPT and that it may lead to a potential arms race in an already unstable South Asia. Some analysts also view the deal as a strategy for the US and India to balance China’s power in Asia. The participants analyzed issues concerning the deal; its implications for Indo-US relations; the objectives of the Indo-US nuclear deal; responses to the deal in India and the United States; and its implications for the global non-proliferation regime as well as the future of the nuclear deal.

APPENDIX

I. Programme of the Workshop

Thursday, 20 August 2009

1000-1115 hrs
SESSION I: In Theory and Practice: War, Deterrence and Disarmament
Speaker: Rear. Adm. Raja Menon

1130-1300 hrs
SESSION II: Treaties and Organizations
Panelists: Amb. Arundhati Ghose and Prof. Rajesh Rajagopalan

1400-1515 hrs
SESSION III: Nuclear Policies and Strategies-I: India and China
Panelists: Maj. Gen. Dipankar Banerjee and Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli

1530-1700 hrs
SESSION IV: Nuclear Policies and Strategies-II: India and Pakistan
Panelists: Prof. PR Chari and Dr. D Suba Chandran

Friday, 21 August 2009

1000-1115 hrs
SESSION V: Nuclear Policies and Strategies-III: The US and Russia
Panelists: Prof. Chintamani Mahapatra and Dr. Vidya Shankar Aiyar

1130-1300 hrs
SESSION VI: Working Group Meetings

1400-1515 hrs
SESSION VII: WMD Terrorism
Panelists: Dr. Ajey Lele and Dr. D Suba Chandran

1530-1700 hrs
SESSION VII: Documentary Film Show
The Last Best Chance
Saturday, 22 August 2009

0945-1115 hrs
SESSION IX: Global Nuclear Disarmament: Reality or Rhetoric?
Resource Persons: Amb. Salman Haidar and Prof. PR Chari

1130-1300 hrs
SESSION X: India and Global Nuclear Disarmament
Resource Persons: Mr. NS Sisodia and Brig. Arun Sahgal

1400-1530 hrs
SESSION XI: Indo-US Nuclear Deal: The Road Ahead
Resource Persons: Brig. Gurmeet Kanwal and Dr. Vidya Shankar Aiyar

II. Participants

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