


IDENTITY AND ASIAN POWERS:

WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION?


Bhavna Singh, Panchali Saikia & Per Refseth



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IDENTITY AND ASIAN POWERS:

WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR REGIONAL

Report of a conference organized by the IPCS in collaboration with the Sigur Center for Asian Studies, George Washington University on 21 February 2011

INTRODUCTION

Prof. Amitabh Mattoo, Honorary Director General, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies

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The Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), established in August 1996, is an independent think tank devoted to research on peace and security from a South Asian perspective.

Its aim is to develop a comprehensive and alternative framework for peace and security in the region catering to the changing demands of national, regional and global security.

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INDIA

The present seminar is a part of a three year project named 'Rising Powers Initiative' and aims at reaching a better understanding of how identity issues and power transitions affect the international policies of China, India, Korea and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Research on identity issues has not yet expanded enough to have analytical rigour. Thus, this project aims to contribute substantially to the literature on international relations by defining and examining identity issues.



Prof. Michael Brown, Dean, Elliot School of International Affairs, George Washington University

It is important to focus on identity issues amongst nations as any nation lacking a national identity is likely to be subsumed by internal problems and consequentially lack initiative for regional cooperation. Identity indicates not only the policy preferences but also a country's alignment in terms of unilateral or multilateral inclinations. Moreover, identity issues change overtime and with globalization and knowledge revolution taking place at a rapid pace today, the challenge is to fathom future developments. Though it is much clichéd that international problems require international solutions, notwithstanding, individual initiatives on part of countries can prove much more beneficial in finding solutions to such global problems.

KEYNOTE ADDRESS

Mr. Siddharth Varadarajan, Strategic Affairs Editor of The Hindu and Editor of Gujarat: The making of a Tragedy

Discussions on identity issues need to be contextualized within the evolving dynamics of media, academics and other organizations influencing the geo-politics of any nation. Today, Asia has emerged as the economic dynamo of the world. While the rise of Japan in the 1980s provided a thrust to development in Asia, it is now China's undeniable rise which is fuelling the Asian rise in the aftermath of the global financial crisis.

Taking a larger perspective it is imperative that one considers the 'rise of Asia as a region' more significant than the 'rise of China as a country alone,' despite it being the central pillar of this ascendance. The economic rise of countries in this region has however led to a rush for capability enhancement and military moderniza-

tion deriving from the insecurities which exist due to unresolved historical disputes and weigh heavily on the

future contours of Asian security. At the same time Asia also seems to be emerging as a hub of problems like nuclear proliferation and rivalry in outer-space. Thus, how these countries will deal with their historical issues will determine the future of the region.

Historical rivalries are compounded by the fact that Asia today lacks a strategic architecture and a pan-Asian identity. Sub-regionalism is more prominent and stronger in Asia as explicated in the functioning of ASEAN, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the Shanghai-5 and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Any substantial effort to link these regional organizations has been completely absent. The East Asian Summit (EAS) initiative is still in a nebulous phase and despite the high degree of trade through imports and exports it has not succeeded in bringing these sub-regional organizations into a simplified whole. Incessant power struggles are evident in these regional organizations as Asian powers contend for influence amongst each other. Independent India has not lacked a strategic culture, but admittedly, it has drawn too close to the US which has irked several members of the strategic community. Though as a democracy India is expected to support the US, however, ambivalence as strategy provides it an opportunity to state its interests even if they are in opposition to the US. India's rediscovery of Asia itself has gone through three phases: Look East Policy, engagement with the West, Look north especially Central Asian Policy. It coincides with the rediscovery of Asia's identity by other neighbouring powers like Russia, who act as stabilizing factors in the Asian region. India now needs to look beyond an Asian system to an international system and lead Asian engagement to build a world strategic culture.



CHINA

Prof. Song Wei, School of International Studies, Peking University

Since the mid-1990s scholars studying Chinese foreign relations have engaged in an extended and often rather breathless debate over the meaning of China's changing international profile. Amongst these writings there is a widespread agreement about one basic fact: since the early 1990s China has become a much stronger country. The question for those interested in an Asian security structure is thus- what does China want to do with its new found power?

While it is possible to begin to answer such a query through focusing on the issues of Chinese intentions, receptiveness to international normative influences, and, more broadly, the evolution of China's "worldview", national identity should be seen as the foundation upon which other additional factors develop. If ideas matter in influencing the trajectory of a state's rise, then it is worthwhile to take such an observation a step further to the claim that such constructs are inextricably linked to political identities.

In the early 1960s several scholars emphasized the traditional culture or the central-empire status of China in East Asia and especially the "Century of Humiliation" for modern China in their analysis of Chinese foreign policy. For example, Professor Mark Mancall from Stanford University pointed out several elements of Chinese traditional worldview like the world order is hierarchical rather than anarchical and China is the central authority in the system. He argued that such superiority orientation in Chinese tradition identity evolved into modern nationalism after the century of humiliation and concluded that the new China would not be deferential to a uni-polar world order and thus predicted the collapse of the Sino-Soviet alliance.



Identity is best understood with a direct consideration to the multiplicity of sites in which it is socially constructed and contested in China. While ideological orientations matter in the politics of each country, in China, particularly during the first few decades after the establishment of the PRC it was often literally a matter of life or death, as garnering a political designation of "rightist" could condemn an individual to years of imprisonment, while the "ultra-leftist" label was subsequently toxic after Deng's ascendancy to power in the late 1970s. There are two potential research frames for moving the discussion of Chinese national identity forward. The first hinges on a drive toward definitional precision and clarity. And the second seeks to disaggregate what are identified as five foundational components of national identity (particularistic vs. universalistic values; order vs. rights; left vs. right; hard power vs. soft power; open vs. inward economics) in the region.

Frame One: Particular versus Universalistic Values

The question of values, particularly the challenge of squaring the preservation of that which is nominally understood to be “Chinese” with the development of a modern nation-state forms one of the central themes of modern Chinese history. Alongside such interrogations of defining the point of intersection between China and the outside world, stands the internal identity dynamic of forming a unified state from the remains of a dynastic political system whose boundaries were nebulous and fluid, and which encompassed a diverse group of peoples.

Frame Two: Order versus Rights

If the contemporary Chinese search for national unity (in the face of perceived external and internal challenges) can be identified as a foundational component of modern Chinese national identity, then the quest for stability is of only slightly lesser importance. As with the emphasis on unity and preserving uniqueness, the drive for stability appears to have deep historical roots within China.

Frame Three: Open versus Inward Economies

Like other contending topics in national identity, different groups in China have very different insights on its international economic relations, in which certainly the left vs. right distinction appears. Indeed, self-reliance (zili gengsheng) was one of the key slogans which framed the PRC's economic relationship with the outside world for much of the post-1949 period. This changed with Deng Xiaoping's four modernizations in 1978 and continuing the rigour China has come to recognize that it would have to work in accordance with the global economic structure and has opened up its economy to outside influences.

In the long run it is possible to predict that the moderate and “soft power” policy line will become more influential in China, and a more liberal national identity may develop as well. If this occurs, then one is likely to see more pragmatic approaches by China to its national interest. This would be accompanied by a decline in more confrontational identity markers. Yet, evidence of such a shift is still incomplete, much of China's national identity politics remain quite fluid and indeterminate, thus, requiring even greater attention and focus in the years to come.

Discussant

Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli, Professor of Chinese Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University

The literature on this subject is highly vague, esoteric and value-laden and thus this paper is a good attempt to improve and contribute to the larger corpus of literature. A differentiation between ‘identity formation’ and ‘nationalism’ has been made at the outset. Four main aspects can be highlighted in the paper: first, there is one basic underlying assumption which holds that the formation and contestation of the identities in China is worked at the domestic levels. Second, an emphasis on the theory of constructivism. Third, a much focused analysis and research agenda and fourth, effective implementation of survey methods and cognitive techniques.

The paper applies similar methods as the identity measuring indices suggested by Yoshiko Herrera, Rawi Abdela, Alastair Iain Johnston in their book ‘Measuring identities: A guide for social scientists’. It looks at management studies- Shinjiru- Strategy and Management Journal and some constructivist writings but the essential focus is on universalistic and particularistic consideration of China's foreign policy, which is a problematic from the perspective of the Chinese state. One of the dominant theories has been realism under which there have been state focused assumptions, influence of political leaderships and policy oriented studies that the Chinese scholars have been subjected to in the last few decades.

Some scholars have identified four core aspects of China's identity: national rights, national interests, and means of production and theory of reform while others have looked at it in terms of negative, positive or antagonistic identity and argue that China is increasingly shifting towards a status quoist rather than revolutionary identity. China is today looking at the security challenges from a multi-dimensional perspective especially the non-traditional challenges. Shijie Chengchi- World politics and Community journal looks at multidimensional analysis of contemporary dynamics of war and peace, which can help in value-additions to the paper. At the same time the authors can also factor in the Community theory process and the Confederation theory which is looking into similar issues.

Differences in Chinese discourse also need to be taken into account- Hu Jintao, and China's role in the regional forums needs to be taken into account. The paper also needs to bring in to its framework- what are the linkages between China's discourse on lost territories and the problems that China has faced vis-a-vis the Senkaku islands or the South China Sea issue. While the conclusions in the paper concludes that domestic policies garner more attention and China is likely to take a moderate and soft-power based approach, how does this analyze the recent assertiveness in China's behaviour internationally.



Discussion

China national identity has been growing, evident in its assertive nationalism and its attitude towards other countries. Especially, the People's Liberation Army has been very aggressive as far as the border with India is concerned and the Pakistan occupied Kashmir region. Will this assertiveness continue despite the rhetoric of harmonious world and what would be China's stand after the change of the current leadership? Will the new leadership endorse the discourse on harmonious world or will it come out with a new strategy to characterize its view?

How far is it right to conclude that China will showcase a more soft-power based image even though it is increasingly using its hard power in the international arena? National identity is not a unitary construction. The discourse of identification is woven around different issue like while for a particular region it would be most easy to identify itself as Confucius' birth place, while for another it would be easier to align themselves as the progenies of the Yellow Emperor. Thus within a nation as well, there could identity distinctions based on regions, historicity and ethnicities. Another question that needs to be addressed is how much influence do the bloggers have on the policy making?


So far, many Chinese scholars have used constructivism as a theory to trace identity formation. However, their analysis has proven doubtful given the upsurge in sub-regional identity formation. Chinese assertiveness has significantly increased in the last two years since the free flow of information has given wider access to the historical facts in China and the public opinion guided by these facts has forced the government to take a tougher stand on its national interest. Second, propaganda has also promoted this trend further, while the Chinese government is trying to adopt a moderate approach in foreign policy; the internal pressure is becoming greater and greater. The new-leftists have become more influential in the media but they are not in a position to dominate Chinese politics.

JAPAN

Prof Isao Miyaoka, Keio University, Tokyo, Japan

National identity is not only a conception that emerges internally within a country, but also a social concept that emerges through the way a country interacts with others and is seen by others that national identity must be considered as a factor. But how to conceptualize and measure identity is both challenging and controversial.

The changing perception held by Japanese policymakers regarding Japan's state identities is by conducting a computer-assisted content analysis of the annual Defense White Papers published annually between 1976 and 2006. The computer program is a particular code which calculates a ratio of the identically coded sentences focusing on four core areas- first, members of the west; second, economic powers; third, peace loving nation and fourth US-Japan alliance. After the end of the Cold War, however, the self-definition of a "Member of the West" is mentioned only in the historical context of the U.S.-Japan alliance. The Defense White Papers published in the Cold War period avoid the use of the term "alliance" for U.S.-Japan security relationship. By contrast, the frequency ratio of this code is in the general trend of increase in the 1990s and peaked in 2006. Japan's identity of Peace-Loving Nation has been constituted by the principle of pacifism enshrined in Japan's 1946 constitution. The Japanese government finds it unconstitutional to exercise the right of collective self defence with US and to dispatched arms troops to other countries with a purpose for using force. Constitutionally it is difficult to engage in military assistance to US unless Japan is attacked by a third country. This is why, during the cold war Japan avoided to use the term alliance, which seemed contradictory to Japanese identity of Peace-Loving nation.



However the increasing use of the term 'alliance' after the end of cold war reflects the gradual acceptance of the norm of mutual military aid. The identity of Peace-Loving nation has become increasingly more compatible with military means as long as they are not related to combat. The Japanese government decided to dispatch the self defence forces overseas for non-combat mission such as logistical support to foreign forces and humanitarian assistance. The LDP-led Japanese government increasingly identified itself with the United States, while slowly accepting the norm of mutual military aid which indicates a sense of Japan's collective identity with US. Collective identity builds on two other kinds of identity: type and role identities. On one hand, a type is a social category based on actors' intrinsic properties such as values and institutions. On the other hand, a role consists of a social position in relation to other actors and a set of its related norms. Collective identity is constituted by sharing the

role of friend who are “allies and do not use violence to settle their disputes and work as a team against security threats.”

Meanwhile, DPJ continuously attaches great importance to the identity of peace-loving nation. The DPJ’s “Basic Policies on Security” of June 1999 refers to “the fact that Japan and the United States have broadly shared the values of democracy and market economy” and “recognizes that the Japan-Security Treaty is the most important pillar of Japan’s security policy. DPJ has ideally attempted to transform the U.S.-Japan security relationship from an asymmetrical security community to a more equal expedient alliance.

Prof. Mike Mochizuki, Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington University (GWU)



The concept East Asian Community in mass media is popular as an initiative from Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama who invoked the example of the community-building experience in Europe that eventually developed into the European Union and proposed forming an East Asian community by overcoming differences between Japan and China. However, EAC had deep historic wills in Japan and it is not a concept from the Prime Minister. During the 1950s Japanese intellectual aspiration Japan develop pan-Asian economic community to cross cold war pacific basin region and in 1970s Japan worked to embraced ASEAN as a way to develop and further promoted the ideas and formation of APEC process and the ASEAN Regional forum. After the end of U.S. military involvement in Vietnam, ASEAN became the centerpiece of Japan’s policy in the Asia-Pacific region.

After Hatoyama’s resignation, Prime Minister Naoto Kan and his government have repeatedly emphasized how the alliance with the United States is the cornerstone of Japan’s foreign policy. The public climate in Japan has changed substantially regarding China. After the September 2011 Chinese fishing trawler collision incident, Japanese views of China have become much more negative Since then Japan’s foreign policy stance pretty less emphasise on East Asia community building and stressed much more importance on the US-Japan alliance. In the new defence programme guidelines of December 2010, Japan shifted away defence force concept to dynamic defence policy. Japan now places much greater emphasis on defence of south-west shifting away from the old cold war process from north.

The change within the DPJ government can also be seen in terms of economic reforms. There are no longer open discussions on Free trade agreement with China or Republic of Korea. The current government under Kan is shifting away from East Asia community notion to a soft balancing strategy against China and increasing coalition with Republic of Korea, Australia and India. However, there are certain constraints on how far Japan will be able to balance this strategy against China. First, in terms of the economic interest, China not only provides the commercial opportunity to Japan but in many ways the dynamism of Chinese economy, makes it the lifeline for Japanese economy. Second, the peace state identity continues to impose constraints. Japan has refrain its defence policy as long as the barriers of use of force is not reached, because of the peace state identity the movement for reviving the constitution and the three non —nuclear principle, the movement has become less powerful today. Third, the budgetary constraints. Despite soft balancing policy against China the budgetary constraints in defence budget is sever.



Japan has been exploring different options regarding institution building or architecture for the region such as the ASEAN+ 3 and with the support of Japan the East Asian summit includes Australia, New Zealand, India and the US. But what matters more is how the gender will be shaped in EAS rather than the composition and what will be Japan’s role in it. The Japanese agenda should not emphasis on revival of Asian identity but rather a combination of these four identities of trading, maritime and democratic state which will shape its future approach.

Discussant
Amb. Arjun Asrani, Former Indian Ambassador to Japan

The Japanese people have genuinely become pacifist as a reverence to what they have experienced in the World War II and have accepted the constitution with its Article 9 that was imposed by the Americans. How far will it be possible for Japan to continue with that Article under the constitution without the support of the US? There is a role contradiction here, the Japanese government under NDP or under DPJ, want to overcome the earlier role of junior partner but also want the article 9 to remain in the constitution because of its pacifism. Japanese do not wish to offer any equality in terms of need and yet want equality and not a junior role. But, however pacifist they are they have to face the reality.



In reference to India and Japan alliance, the LDP government and also the successor DPJ government have repeated India's agreement on security. There is exchange of military personnel in defence educational institutions, joint exercises. Also the Indian coast guard and navy have provided safety against pirates in seas around India. Whereas on the other side, Japan cannot even provide the R & D cooperation in defence cooperation to India. It is not the article 9 that prohibits Japan from doing so but it is a cabinet decision taken by Japanese government in 1960 that they shall not export any defence equipments or technology but there can be seen an exception in terms of exchange of such equipments with US, which is unrealistic. It is also important to note that Japan has been providing economic substance to US activities abroad. Japanese pay US every year around 5 billion dollar. In the Kuwait war Japanese paid 13 billion dollar to US. Today, Japan needs a charismatic leader, who is able to pull Japanese people out of this imposed arti-

cle and have it amended in the interest of the whole region.

The concept of pro-Asia became popular in Japan in the 19th century under Kookaburra who looked upon Asia as the mentor of Japan. The bridge between Japan and Asia can be seen in its history where Japan has continued to import influences from Asia in terms of language, culture and religion and not from west. Buddhism in Japan came from Asia, and the script and characters of Japanese language came from China. It is only in late 19th century with spread of western science and industry Japan started valuing western contribution. This is when there was the controversy between the pro-Asia Kookaburra and Fujiyama which was entirely a western approach. Japan should now move ahead and think beyond these term peace and the pro Asian concepts.

Prof. Mochizuki well defines in his paper about the present Japanese policy, Both Mayuzumi and Hatoyama embrace of a regional community building that reflects combination of material motivation and calculation, First, harness China's economic dynamism and seek new regional commercial opportunities at the time of japons economic stagnation; Second, balance the expansion of Chinese power and influence by enhancing relations with other countries in Asia pacific region and Third, continue to rely on US security commitment while cultivation material security and reassurance.

It is necessary that one differentiates between openness and inclusiveness in reference to the East Asia Summit (EAS) which constituted countries apart from ASEAN +3. However, the East Asia Community concept is still open and Chinese and many other countries could prefer the composition of ASEAN + 3. But ever if EAC is constituted, Japan should step ahead and support the inclusion of other countries other then ASEAN+ 3. Today, Japan's role apart from a peace loving nation should be to create an excellent bridge between west and Asia whether it is through EAC, EAS or other security arrangements that exist. Other contribution that Japan has made in post war period which needs recognition is that economic power is sometimes more important then military power. Even though economic power cannot completely replace the military power, to a great extent it is as important as military power.

Discussion

The concern for Japan today is the question of Taiwan moving closer to China. It is of fundamental importance to India and ASEAN, whether Japanese have thought beyond and whether Taiwan should break away from military type of stability as provided in the US-Japan relationship and the East Asia security architecture from early 1990's to present. Although in past Japanese were concerned that it will be caught in the cross fire between US and China over a Taiwan crisis, the defence policy community now is concerned that Taiwan is moving closer to China and therefore it needs to reduce the strength of US commitment in this part of world. On the other hand the Japanese foreign and defence ministers issued a list of common strategic objectives and one of them was peaceful resolution of conflict in Taiwan. Japan was reluctant to mention Taiwan in public document but since 2005 it has started to mention.

Japan sees itself as working with China on the basis of trade and increasing its capabilities. However there is a conflicting idea, as on one side there is the hostile actions from Chinese on the other it is not clear how Japan is working its relationship with them. The interaction between Japan and China on the national identity count at forth even more assertively, with China asserting its national interest. In the context of peace making nation how is Japan going to react in terms of not letting its national interest hampered from assertiveness of China. Is it pacifism or a new strategy where it can get equal footing with China and assert its own national interest? Japan has two track policies, either by developing with other maritime states and second is to stabilize with China. Japan has had a robust Asia policy since 1960 and directed primarily at South-east Asia, because of the problems of cold war, towards China; also Japan was



a leader in opening up China to rest of the world. In terms of republic of Korea Japan had lacked behind 1990 summit and the brace of South Asia. It has focused much on Southeast Asia and China and therefore needs to review its Asian policy.

It is important to note that the process of globalization does create interest which comes as a part of the national interest. If the global, economic and political power is shifting into an era of redefining new contours for security and economic boundaries there is also shift in identities. Some are advance and some like Pakistan is lost, in the process of discovering the identity. Asia does not need any bridge to west, in a globalised world there is all bridges, it is instead Japan that needs a bridge to Asia, and it has redefine many of the postulates in which its current strength and weaknesses are based are shifting. In past, Japan's security was protected by US and depended on US .Today; Japan has an independent strategic player broadened scope of including other countries for security interest. Japanese government emphasised diversification of US-Japan alliance and give emphasis of new bilateral relations-India, Australia and South Korea and there is much more room for defence cooperation in Sea-space, air space, cyber space in pacific and Indian Ocean region.



SOUTH KOREA

Prof. Greg Brazinsky, Associate Professor of History and International Affairs, George Washington University

In South Korea there are two identity dynamics that have been critical in shaping policy outcomes. Within each of these dynamics there are competing identities. In particular, these dynamics are first the state — national identity dynamic, in which state identity competes with national identity, second is the conservative — progressive identity dynamic, in which an identity that is more based on political and economic order competes with a progressive identity that is rights based.

'National identity' is something that transcends the political boundaries between North and South Korea. It refers to Koreans notion of themselves, as a single people, with a common ethos, language, culture and history that can be traced back more than 4000 years. This notion of a single Korean nation first emerged during the late nineteenth century--partially in response to the encroachment of Western and Japanese influence on the peninsula. Although the combination of Japanese colonialism and national division after World War II has precluded the formation of a modern Korean nation state, the idea that a single Korean nation state should exist has persisted, even though the reality has not.

At the same time, during the last sixty years, the division of Korea has also engendered separate North and South Korean state identities. Although these identities are more limited in their geographic scope, they are more universalistic in their ideals and concerns. The formation of a separate South Korean "state identity" was heavily encouraged by the United States during the Cold War. Initially anti-Communism—which South Koreans shared with other "Free World" nations during the Cold War—constituted the core of this identity but over the last six decades South Korean identity has also incorporated other ideals and goals such as free market capitalism and political democracy. Although in some ways, South Koreans view North Koreans as their brethren, they have also come to see them as an "other" during the last sixty years.

In short, South Koreans recognize certain ideas and practices which make them a distinctive country, different from both North Korea, and the rest of Asia. In the South Korean case, it is most useful to talk about conservative identity as one that emphasizes order over rights. In particular, South Korean conservatives place national security and economic development ahead of individual rights.



Today, South Korea has made a great progress towards becoming a functional liberal democracy and the society itself has become more oriented toward individual liberty than order, and the identity of many South Koreans have shifted in this direction. Nevertheless, there are many South Koreans today that prefer marginally greater economic prosperity or security to marginally greater political liberty or rights. Most groups and individuals in South Korea are influenced by some combination of these different forms of identity in reality, and competition between these identity types occurs both between groups that orient more toward one or the other and within the psychics of individual citizens and leaders. Often, these identities are shaped and reshaped by a combination of processes, interactions and events. Actions taken by other actors may provoke a shift toward one of these identities.

The tension between South Korean state identity and nation identity is perhaps



most apparent in the country's rapidly changing representations of North Korea. The idea that Koreans living on both sides of the thirty eight-parallel belong to a common nation and are thus brethren is a powerful one in both North and South Korea.

Aside from its relationship with North Korea, South Korea has traditionally placed perhaps the greatest emphasis on its relationship with the US who played a complex and formative role in South Korea during the last six decades. As a result, the US has become central to how South Korea sees itself. When viewed from the perspective of "national identity" the US generally gives rise to a great deal of ambivalence in South Korea. On the one hand, it was the US that defeated Japan during WWII ending Japanese imperialism and enabling the liberation of Korea. At the same time, however, the US bears a great deal of responsibility for the initial decision to divide Korea in 1945 and for the subsequent

division of the peninsula into separate states.

South Koreans' identification with a broader Korean nation is a major wellspring of hostility and friction between Japan and South Korea today. The legacy of Japanese colonialism has left Koreans on both sides of the peninsula highly sensitive to almost any type of political or military assertiveness on the part of Tokyo.

Discussant

Prof. Vjayanti Raghavan, Associate Professor, Centre for Japanese, Korean and North East Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi

Although there are dangers of drawing parallels, there can be found similarities between India and Pakistan with South and North Korea. In both Pakistan and North Korea the identities have evolved more politically, trying to keep the population together. The North Koreans have constantly felt the need to keep up the identity where they were trying to prove they were more legitimate than South Korea. North Korea felt strongly about being the true Korea. North Korea has unfortunately got stuck whereas South Korea has moved away. Even though Bangladesh is a much more homogenous than Pakistan, there might be drawn parallels to Pakistan when it had an east and west wing, where Bangladesh evolved and made their own Bengali identity with a more inclusive policy and the people of Bangladesh seeking an identity for themselves, whereas Pakistan is still struggling viewing themselves as an Islamic identity. Like in North Korea, this identity which is thrust down on the public from the top is questionable as to how long will it survive?

Discussion

What are the recent threats in terms threats coming up to become obstacles to regional cooperation in reference to both North and South Korea and of Korea vis-a-vis Japan. Brinkmanship is important in North Korean policy. It is their way of seeking attention. They need aid but they do not want to get pushed to reform. They can be very threatening and that is all they have left. Has South Korea peaked in terms of its economic power? Obama referred to South Korea as a country on the cutting edge which should be followed. South Korea is in ways one of the most successful of the rising powers, combining economic prosperity and true democracy. South Korea may have a lot to teach the world, and Korea should be studied as an example.

INDIA

Prof. Amitabh Mattoo, Honorary Director General IPCS & Prof. Deepa Ollapally, Associate Director, The Sigur Center for Asian Studies, George Washington University

The popular image of India as a confident and energetic actor is at odds with its behaviour on the world stage, for example labelling itself a developing country at WTO negotiations while demanding a permanent seat in the Security Council. This ambivalence is largely a result of balancing conflicting identities rooted in historical experience, political culture, along with a long standing mismatch between material constraints and ambitions.

The identity that has best described India's global identity the last two decades is that of a 'bridging power', which can be defined as a power that comfortably straddles different global power structures, engages multiple regions and audi-





ences, and promotes seemingly inconsistent normative values and practices, and offers itself as a negotiator between these worlds and ideas. The ambivalence is not producing anxiety but rather a certain comfort in the role that could be described as 'bridging'.

There are some convergences in the identity literature where the following assumptions can be made: First, identity is a socially constructed phenomenon. Second, it makes sense to talk in terms of state identity, despite some limitations. Third, identity theory may be complementary to other theories, for example with rational choice theory. Finally, identity can be viewed as one input into state policymaking, not that it has a determining effect, but rather a constraining or permissive influence on foreign policymaking.

India's state identity draws from a range of sources that can be collapsed in to 3 key state identities. These have led to two dominant representations of the state

in the post-independence period that may call the "autonomous state" from 1947-1991; and from 1991 the "bridging state".

The first is civilization entitlement. India does not see itself only as a 'normal nation state', but as a civilization, and this is a core value in the country's identity. India's outsized sense of self was not defined by or limited to conventional modern or western military and economic terms. India's post colonial leadership sought to play a role well beyond what its material capacities would have dictated.

The second key state identity is post colonial nationalism. Transcending India's colonial humiliation and experience has been a major pre-occupation of Indian leadership. The sharpened identity as a developing state has both objective and subjective elements which have made it hard to let go off, even as India is perceived as joining the ranks of major powers.

Third is secular democratic tradition which became really important in the aftermath of partition, and became an inviolate principle of Indian identity. Crafting Nehru's vision a political definition of India is neither monopolized nor simplified, but allowed it to have a single political identity despite huge internal differences of religion, caste, regional culture and so forth. Anything stricter was seen as leaving the state open to social conflict.

The key value that has motivated Indian foreign policymakers has been the notion of strategic autonomy, and even though external conditions have shifted and the idea of being this autonomous power is changing it continues to circumscribe Indian foreign policy choices. Considering foreign policy means generally, two major taboos are unlikely to be crossed. No formal alliance structure or the appearance of alliance, and secondly, no use of force to settle disputes or fulfil ambitions. These are strong norms that are going to continue despite the changes in India's profile. India's policy preferences in Asia are significantly informed by its core value of national autonomy. This is borne out in four ways in the Asian region: First, the discourse and policy action supporting multipolarity in conjunction with China and Russia; Second, the reluctance to engage in democracy promoting soft power and Third, the underlying resistance to an Asian form of containment and the strong support for institutionalism in the region.

A number of other policy preferences held by India that could contribute toward regional cooperation includes preference for a multipolar world, strong norm against alliances, favouring of soft security architecture, non-intervention, discursive diplomacy and multilateralism to embed state into the region but selective multilateralism globally. India may be particularly well positioned to play the role of a bridging power more effectively, matching its state identity with a new international role. But to what extent India can play this role will be influenced by the question; will this century be an Asian or Chinese century?

Discussant

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It is important to ask the question 'where do identities come from?' Because it matters whether identity is an independent variable, and whether this is identities as a cause of specific policy choices or whether it is reflecting some other deeper causes. That is important when there is a kind of ambiguous position where material and structural factors are not the most important factors and they do not explain everything.

Identity has a relationship with larger material and structural factors. A lot of the arguments that have been made with regard to 'bridging power' and the post 1991 changes, are all determined because they are all the same answers



you would get if you looked at them in a materialistic argument. If India were much weaker, we wouldn't be discussing this. That is fundamentally a structural and material condition.

How much identity matters compared to interest. You can't think of interest outside of identity, but the problem is that identity is instrumentally. A lot of our policies are instrumentally used. What role do individuals and leaders have in framing these identities.

Discussion

Some of the key markers of Indian state identity are exactly the same markers as the Chinese employ. India won't have the luxury of being a bridging power much longer. India hasn't had to make any hard choices in the past, but India won't be that lucky in the future. What does India want to do with its new found power, and what does India want to achieve by being a permanent member of the Security Council? India has good reasons for being ambivalent. When talking of hard power, India's limited military production and infrastructure makes it impossible to be anything other than an ambivalent power.



PERSPECTIVES ON INDIA'S IDENTITY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATION

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National identities especially for young nation-state, the identities are crafted by elite. In terms of India's identity and foreign policy, Jawaharlal Nehru laid down certain principle and policies, but after him the principles got hollowed out. What constituted India as the great power? In the 1948 Constituent assembly Nehru said that, 'All great powers have atom bomb and India will be great power'. Much of as hard power policy is washed by indirection and the other great concept of India representing third world was Non-alignment both in the structural terms as balancer between east and western block. The newly emerged country accepted under the remarkable part of Nehru's leadership. Subsequent to Nehru there has been no such leader with the intellect or one with that vision. India lost sight after Nehru. Policy is comprehensible, made understand to the people and vision of the leader leading the country.

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Identity is not stable it is constructed and reconstructed. Identity is a political experience and hence we have political identity, rise and decline of identity and cultural politics. India is primarily a political identity. Secularism, multiculturalism, pluralism, is projected as the identity of India and these are not individual identities. There are too many Individual identities, too many ethnicities for any one nation and because it is a multinational state it has essentially a political identity which needs to retain democracy, secularism, essential political part of very idea of Indian state. This identity has been reflected in foreign policy and did not come from any particular head of anyone individual or leader; it was a process and part of a movement. Non-alignment came out of a national movement and the conjuncture and political actors that Indian foreign policy had to play with in early years of its formation and it provided the base of what India is today. India has not become an emerging power from a vacuum nor from a sudden new economic growth or foreign policy but there is continuity and it rest on these policies.

The idea of India of great power is reflected in foreign and domestic policy which is in transition. There has been a recent clear shift bringing new aspects into Indian foreign policy. The shift came in 1990 with new liberal policies and foreign policy of an emerging power to math with economic policy crafted by elite. Therefore there is the ambivalence, because of the pressure of continuity, force of history, culture, political and economies. In this transition the new things introduced in Indian foreign policy is India as a great power and what it wants to do with the



power. India was more clear about what it wanted to do with the power in 1950's and 1960's when it supported democracy, anti-colonialism, anti-racism, independent foreign policy, no block etc. Currently because it wants to be great power it has believed that it can be a great power by having more nuclear weapons and there was great discourse that attached itself to have a muscular foreign policy to become a great power. There is an opposite trend today; there is a taboo on nuclear weapons. There is a need for normative use of power norms. India had this normative use of power the norms of power and India is shading those powers such as norms for democracy, landmines and support international court of justice, leading country in Security Council resolution. India wanting to be great power has lead to some kind of alignments even though India is hesitant of having any military alliance the strategic partnerships and the military engagement with western US Russian using some amount military deviance to become a great power. There is also the whole idea of multi polarity, part of flexibility, tradition and continuity multiple strategic partnerships are not confined to one agreement but to every bilateral agreement and it is almost a multiple strategic partnership. What is the Consequence in this search for becoming a great power? What the people of the country want otherwise it will be from the great power. Intervention may not be military but using the concept of hegemony; the neighbouring countries today have negative aspects of India as a great power, which earlier used to be these relationships much more as equal. If India wants to be great power the importance should be given to these normative and values rather than military massive or just economic aspects.

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In the realist perspective identity is less important and it becomes intermediate. What matters is the structural conditions and the context within which the state operates and the power that determine the interest. Given certain context and power one can frame different identity but all of those identities will be under same policy. There is usually some dissonance between these context, power and identity. There is such dissonance in Indian context too. In 1950 a lot of Indian's importance such as importance of Nehru's opinion was sort not because India was powerful, or due to its independence movement or the non-alignment movement but because India was seen as a potential power. India and China is in the same situation within the global context, having unipolar in which there is single great power and lot of other powers becoming strong but not as same league as US. These middle second rank powers like India and China have the same interest and for these countries US is important. The most important relation for these powers is with the US.

There is a structural variable and condition that determines the identity but there is also dissonance. The structural condition and context today is not a stable, as India and China is growing fast and there is a unipolar system which is not going to last, either we will have bipolar system or Chinese unipolar system. All of these cultural variables will be used to craft a different identity which will allow us to ally with other countries. There is a material and structural condition that define the way we frame identity. Identity can be frame and reshape it according to the contextual conditions



Discussion

Can we produce a new kind of foreign policy deeply based on identity and not on reality? The Internal coalition influences the regional cooperation of a country. There is also a need to have normative Ideas and reinforce the right kind of identity. The Structural context is only one factor and it is not determinative. There is different foreign policy for India or any country given a particular structure. For example Japan could have become rational but identity variable as constraint as structure was not determinative. How identity will matter in shaping policy choice, identity does not matter it is instrumental domestic politics, the leadership or role of western interest, social movement, what derives Indian foreign policy. Foreign policy is an elite decision making to radical framework and therefore the notion of identity becomes complex. It important to have definitional assumption because for regional cooperation Indian foreign policy vis-a-vis China, Pakistan is simpler rather

then mix of complexity of issues diversity of religion and ethnicity and it is a close door institution.

However, arguments were made that, India and China both have the similar structural conditions and similar policies but there is a difference in the reaction from the rest of the world on their nature of rise and what constitutes that difference is identity. On one hand where China's rise is seen as threatening and India's is not, it is India's democratic regime, its identity, soft power approach and transparent power which makes it different.