Since its inception, the IPCS has been working on various issues related to disarmament, especially Nuclear Disarmament. We are the only research institute in South Asia that focuses on all aspects of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), including Chemical, Biological and Radiological weapons.

The Institute has undertaken numerous projects, both on an individual and collaborative basis, on the issue of WMDs.

The Nuclear Security Project aims to strengthen the Institute’s efforts on the above issues.

This project is supported by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI)
The Institute of Peace and Conflict studies, organized a discussion over the Nuclear and security policies of Australia and Japan and its implications on India.

The discussion was initiated by Kimberley Layton, Australian Intern at IPCS, who delineated over the Australian security and Nuclear Policy followed by the Japanese Intern, Tomoko Kiyota, who discussed the Japanese approach.

Rekha Chakravarthy and Vidisha Shukla discussed the implications of the Australian and Japanese Nuclear policy on India.

Prof. Rajesh Rajagopalan and Dr. Vidya Shankar Aiyar, acted as Resource Persons for this event and commented on the initial presentations and the discussion.
Kimberley Layton

It is not logical for Australia to have nuclear weapons since it is a member of the ANZUS Treaty of 1952 and enjoys nuclear guarantees from the US. Moreover, there is a strong public opinion against the presence of any kind of nuclear weapons on Australian soil. The Australian government has a tough nuclear material export policy which is in compliance with the regulations of the non-proliferation regime and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Environmental concerns have also been an important reason for Australia's aversion to Nuclear energy. The people of the country have opposed uranium mining, import and dumping of radioactive nuclear wastes in the countryside sourced from overseas, as also the establishment of more nuclear power plants.

One of the recent trends in public opinion in Australia has been a decline in the number of people who oppose nuclear power and the setting up of nuclear power plants in the country. Whereas the absolute numbers of those who are against nuclear energy are decreasing, the numbers of those who are ambivalent in their responses are increasing.

The labour party is in favour of revising the NPT to prevent countries from withdrawing from the NPT regime and pushing for a new resolution in the UNSC to seek penalties for those who withdraw from the NPT and/or violate its provisions as was the case with North Korea and Iran.

Australia’s non-proliferation strategy is a reflection of its middle power status and projects Australia as a responsible stakeholder in the international society. The normative dimension of such a position increases the over all influence of Australia in world affairs. Australia has recently given around two hundred and fifty thousand dollars to the IAEA for tackling nuclear terrorism in Southeast Asia. Australia is looking forward to the 2010 NPT review conference and working closely with Japan to make the NPT regime more robust.

Tomoko Kiyota

While Japan advocates global nuclear disarmament, at the same time, it also needs the US nuclear guarantee to address its security concerns. It is interesting to note that in the past Japan has advocated the first use of nuclear weapons in case of a nuclear conflict. President Sato is believed to have asked President Lyndon Johnson to use nuclear weapons against China even if it were to attack Japan using conventional weapons. Even in recent times, Japan has asked the US administration not to declare a No-First Use policy against North Korea. Japan was reluctant in signing the NPT and took six years to do so. These episodes reveal the contradictory nature of Japan’s nuclear disarmament policies.

The opinions of the people of Japan on the issue of Nuclear weapons may be broadly divided into three main groups. Firstly, there is a substantial section of the population which is strongly against nuclear weapons. They are against any activity which involves the use of nuclear technology or any other aspect related to it. This section was vehemently opposed to the Indo-US nuclear deal. The second section of people is a little more understanding of the dilemmas facing Japan and feel that the security guarantee is necessary for deterrence against nuclear threats from states like China and North Korea. Lastly, there are people who feel that Japan should keep its option of going nuclear open, if the future demands such a response.

Further, the constitution of Japan doesn’t prohibit the country from possessing nuclear weapons. The restrain over nuclear weapons is not constitutional in nature, but a consciously decided policy of the Japanese state. The ‘national promise’ (*kokuze*) of the
have security assurances under the US nuclear umbrella. Like other allies covered by US deterrence, Japan and Australia are fierce advocates of non-proliferation. Therefore, as US allies, their policies are bound to reflect those of the US.

Japan’s and India’s nuclear narratives are more or less similar. Japan advocates nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and so does India. Japan has a policy on seeking nuclear deterrence as an ally of the US; India stayed outside the alliance system and was extended deterrence from either of the superpowers during the Cold War. Japan also has a policy of keeping its nuclear option open; India, on its part, kept its nuclear option open and even exercised it.

The implication of the nuclear policies of Japan and Australia for India can be divided into two issue areas. One is the issue of nuclear cooperation and the other is the perennial issue of non-proliferation. The balance is tilted towards the latter since Japan and Australia have declined nuclear commerce and cooperation despite the granting of the NSG waiver.

Japan and Australia are reluctant to cooperate because of their internal political compulsions. The public opinion in these countries is against any sort of nuclear commerce with countries that are not signatories to the NPT. However, there is no reason to believe that their policy of non-cooperation with India regarding nuclear commerce will remain unchanged forever; market demands are likely to take over the politics surrounding the issue. India has signed deals with France, Russia, Canada and Kazakhstan and after the NSG waiver there is no compulsion on its part to seek cooperation from either Japan or Australia.

When Japan and Australia call on India to join the non-proliferation regime including accession to NPT, CTBT and FMCT, three issues need to be highlighted. First, in which capacity would they like India to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty: as a nuclear weapons state or a non-nuclear weapons state? If the answer is the latter, which Nakasone’s speech also referred to, then there is a problem because India is not going to do that. India is a declared nuclear weapons state and it can only join the NPT as such. Second, on the question of the CTBT, there is a section within the Indian scientific establishment which emphasizes ‘freedom of testing’ since it is not very confident of the efficiency of our weapons technology. The CTBT debate is highly fragmented in India. Third, when it comes to the FMCT, there is a dilemma regarding the amount of fissile material which India has and whether it is enough for a credible minimum deterrence? The FMCT debate is also very fragmented.

### Rekha Chakravarthi

Japan and Australia are allies of the United States and both

1960s, which comprised three non-nuclear principles, has guided the behaviour of successive Japanese governments. These principles are (i) not to manufacture nuclear weapons, (ii) not to possess nuclear weapons, (iii) not to introduce nuclear weapons. Accession to the NPT regime in 1976 further emboldened the non-nuclear principles by making them legally binding.

Even after the conclusion of the Indo-US nuclear deal, Japan has declined any cooperation with India on the issue of nuclear commerce. Also, Japan would like India to sign and ratify the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state.

Though Foreign Minister Nakasone, elaborating Japan’s laid down nuclear policy in a 11-point proposal called the “Conditions towards Zero – ‘11 Benchmarks for Global Nuclear Disarmament’”, called for global nuclear disarmament, he didn’t explicate the roadmap or course of action which the international community must follow for the realization of the goal of global nuclear disarmament.

The logic of nuclear deterrence allows states to secure themselves and their allies with minimal employment of human resources and at considerably low costs of man and material.

Nuclear Policies of Japan and Australia

The logic of nuclear deterrence allows states to secure themselves and their allies with minimal employment of human resources and at considerably low costs of man and material.
Vidisha Shukla

Australia’s policy of nuclear trade and commerce is heavily influenced by domestic factors and economic needs. Domestic factors such as public opinion, environmental factors like the issue of radioactive waste, and economic incentives are important variables. As far as the issue of non-proliferation is concerned, India has a better track record than China which is widely believed to have proliferated nuclear technology and material to Pakistan and also to Iran, Libya and North Korea. This appears to be a contradiction especially since Australia is so unequivocal in its commitment to non-proliferation and its avowed aversion to trade with states who have violated non-proliferation norms.

Though the Japanese Foreign Minister’s speech is of great significance, he hasn’t said something new. The three S’s – Safeguards, Safety and Security – which he mentioned in his speech were basically proposed and approved by the G8 during the Hokkaido Summit last year. Also, Japan wants India to join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state, which is against the declared stand of the Government of India. India will not sign the NPT under these conditions.

While both Japan and Australia are getting protection under the Nuclear Umbrella, they are advising others to forego the nuclear option. It would be extremely hard for Australia and Japan to talk of Nuclear disarmament and Non-proliferation without US protection.

Prof. Rajesh Rajagopalan

A nuclear guarantee to Australia and Japan is a much cheaper option for the US compared to a security guarantee which involves conventional weapons. A conventional guarantee would imply stationing of American troops in these countries and would also raise the issue of the stability of conventional deterrence which is highly questionable. The logic of nuclear deterrence allows states to secure themselves and their allies with minimal employment of human resources and at considerably low costs of man and material.

There is no apparent paradox in the nuclear and security policies of Australia and Japan. There is a consistency in their approaches whereby both countries seek American assistance in securing themselves from nuclear threats and also advocate global disarmament. The approach serves their security interests well as they are able to benefit from the US nuclear guarantee while at the same time acting as champions of disarmament, increasing their influence and rapport within the international community. Moreover, it is an approach which the US has consistently followed over the years, advocating global nuclear disarmament as well as advancing its nuclear capabilities. Non-proliferation is a deeply-held American value and its allies are kowtowing the American line.

Dr. Vidya Shankar Aiyar

Whereas the discussion clearly brought out the reasons for Japan’s equivocal approach in its nuclear policy, the paper presented on Australia has been more balanced in that it does not take a clear stand on why Australia is engaged in selective trade of nuclear material? Moreover, there is a decrease in the number of people who oppose nuclear weapons in Australia. The reason for such behaviour also remains unclear.

The determination of foreign policy involves a number of variables and therefore, the context of foreign policy decisions needs to be mentioned. Australian foreign policy in the field of nuclear commerce cannot be explained by looking at the public opinion alone. Economic and strategic gains must be acknowledged as factors influencing the formulation of the state’s decisions.

Most of the discussion on Australia’s and Japan’s nuclear policies was centered around the debate
relating to the non-proliferation treaty. However, the NPT is just one of the elements of the global discourse on nuclear disarmament. Their outlook on the FMCT and CTBT also requires to be analyzed with a need to clearly delineate their approaches in these areas.

Political factors play an important role in the phenomenon of nuclear proliferation. States are motivated to go nuclear not only to deter existing or potential adversaries, but also to gain political leverage in the international arena. The concept of deterrence is highly irrelevant in the present scenario where nuclear weapons serve a symbolic purpose of increasing the prestige and influence of a state rather than any actual threat reduction.

**Annexure I**

**Conditions towards Zero 11 Benchmarks for Global Nuclear Disarmament”**

*Text of the Speech by Japan’s Foreign Minister Hirofumi Nakasone (Excerpts)*

I would like to propose the following 11 benchmarks for promoting “global nuclear disarmament” based on the three major pillars that I mentioned earlier -- nuclear disarmament steps by all states holding nuclear weapons, disarmament and non-proliferation measures by the entire international community, namely multilateral measures, and measures for countries seeking peaceful uses of nuclear energy -- and explain them as concisely as possible. I would appreciate it if you would refer to the materials distributed to you as necessary.

1. **Nuclear Disarmament by All States Holding Nuclear Weapons**

Under the first pillar, all states holding nuclear weapons, i.e. the five NPT nuclear-weapon States and countries that are yet to accede to the NPT and that hold nuclear weapons, should take concrete measures to significantly reduce their nuclear arsenals. I propose five benchmarks in this regard.

(Leadership of and Cooperation between the United States and Russia)

First is the leadership of and cooperation between the United States and Russia. It is important and one of the keys that the leadership of and cooperation between the United States and Russia, both of which have actively advanced nuclear disarmament so far, are enhanced. Japan welcomes the disarmament measures so far taken by these two countries and supports the idea that they are responsible for exerting their leadership in nuclear weapons reduction. To be more specific, I expect that the United States and Russia will lead the world toward a new security order by holding comprehensive bilateral strategic dialogue to conclude a successor treaty to START I at an early date, further reduce nuclear warheads, build mutual confidence regarding missile defense and strengthen the framework for controlling nuclear weapons and material.

(Nuclear Disarmament by China and the Other States Holding Nuclear Weapons)

Second is nuclear disarmament by China and the other states holding nuclear weapons. It is vital for the promotion of global nuclear disarmament that these countries take nuclear disarmament measures, including the reduction of nuclear weapons, while enhancing transparency over their arsenals. In addition, it is necessary for these countries to freeze the development of nuclear weapons and missiles and other delivery vehicles that would undermine the momentum toward
nuclear disarmament while the United States and Russia are making nuclear disarmament efforts. Furthermore, it is important that the nuclear disarmament efforts made by the United Kingdom and France over the past several years will be further enhanced.

(Transparency over Nuclear Arsenals)

Third is ensuring transparency over nuclear armaments. It is necessary to break the vicious circle in which the lack of transparency over nuclear armaments fuels suspicions and worries among neighboring countries, which in turn trigger a military build-up. Dispelling mutual suspicions and building confidence through the enhancement of mutual transparency over military force will help to strengthen regional stability. Therefore, I strongly urge all states holding nuclear weapons to make regular and sufficient information disclosure concerning their own nuclear arsenals, such as the numbers of nuclear weapons, excess nuclear fissile material and delivery vehicles. Also, I would like to propose a new concept of "culture of information disclosure," which the states holding nuclear weapons should work together to nurture.

(Irreversible Nuclear Disarmament)

Fourth is irreversible nuclear disarmament. Nuclear disarmament measures would be useless unless they are irreversible. Japan welcomes nuclear disarmament measures so far taken by some states holding nuclear weapons, such as the dismantlement of nuclear warheads, nuclear testing sites and facilities to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes, and urges the states holding nuclear weapons that have not yet taken such irreversible disarmament measures to implement them.

(Study on Future Verification)

Fifth is a study on future verification of nuclear weapon dismantlement. As reduction of nuclear arsenals proceeds, highly accurate verification of nuclear weapon dismantlement will be required. While proceeding with the verification of nuclear warhead dismantlement, sensitive information concerning nuclear weapons needs to be strictly protected in order to prevent leakage of such information. Japan welcomes the initiative of the United Kingdom and Norway to conduct technical research on this verification approach. Attaching importance to science and technology diplomacy, Japan is ready to contribute to this initiative through cooperation with the relevant Japanese organizations that have relevant expertise in this field.

2. Measures to Be Taken by the Entire International Community (Multilateral Measures)

The second pillar consists of measures to be taken by the entire international community, namely multilateral measures. In order to realize a world free of nuclear weapons, it is necessary that while states holding nuclear weapons engage in nuclear disarmament, the entire international community adopts and complies with universal norms for disarmament and non-proliferation. I propose three multilateral measures as benchmarks.

(Ban on Nuclear Tests)

First is a ban on nuclear tests. I welcome the new U.S. administration’s positive stance toward the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, or the CTBT. I hope that the United States will ratify this treaty before the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Japan will work with China, India, Pakistan and other countries whose ratifications are necessary for the treaty's entry-into-force for their early ratification of the CTBT, and will draw up "a program to promote the early entry-into-force of the CTBT", which is to make demarches on early ratification and to contribute to the establishment of a global verification system. With the aim of helping such countries realize ratification of the CTBT, Japan will provide technical training for seismology experts from relevant countries. Furthermore, Japan calls for a moratorium on nuclear tests, pending the entry into force of the CTBT.

(Ban on Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapon Purposes)

Second is a ban on the production of fissile material for weapon purposes. Negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, which bans the production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium that are used for nuclear weapons, have not yet started. The international community should commence immediate negotiations on this treaty and impose quantitative limitation on nuclear weapons. I also strongly urge all countries to declare a moratorium to freeze the production of fissile material for weapon purposes pending the conclusion of this treaty.

(Restrictions on Ballistic Missiles)

Third is restrictions on ballistic missiles capable of delivering a nuclear warhead. As in the case of North Korea, the development of ballistic missiles has been a source of suspicions and tensions in regions around the world, including Northeast Asia. Under these circumstances, Japan supports the globalization of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty between the United States and Russia, and the EU’s move to propose a treaty to ban short- and intermediate-range ground-to-ground missiles. The international community should place increased priority on considering how to impose effective global restrictions concerning ballistic missiles.

3. Measures to Support Countries Promoting Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

In addition to promoting the global disarmament and non-proliferation efforts I mentioned just now, it is also important to promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In recent years, an increasing number of countries have shown interest in introducing or expanding nuclear power generation from the viewpoint of energy security and the fight against global warming. Needless to say, when promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy, it is important to ensure nuclear non-proliferation, prevent nuclear terrorism and ensure nuclear safety. This is the third pillar, and I propose three benchmarks in this regard.

(International Cooperation for Civil Nuclear Energy)
First is to promote international cooperation for civil nuclear energy. Japan took an approach, called “3S”, referring to safeguards, nuclear safety, and nuclear security and is striving to make the importance of “3S” an international common understanding. Japan intends to help countries in newly introducing nuclear power plants to do so in a way that ensures the 3S. Japan has been supporting human resource development and capacity building, in particular, in Asian countries newly introducing nuclear plants. Japan, in cooperation with the IAEA, plans to host an international conference in Tokyo this autumn on nuclear security related to Asian countries, particularly those introducing nuclear power plants. This will be the second such conference, after the one in 2006, also in Tokyo, whose outcome was highly appreciated.

In addition, Japan is making active contributions to the international debate about the assurance of nuclear fuel supply, for example by proposing the establishment of a system for the registration of individual countries' nuclear fuel supply capacities with the IAEA.

(IAEA Safeguards)

Second is the IAEA safeguards. Japan believes that it is important to enhance transparency over the nuclear activities of individual countries by ensuring that all countries promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy implement the highest level of the IAEA safeguards, specifically, the NPT Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and the Model Additional Protocol, and Japan has been actively working towards their universalization. On various occasions, including the IAEA seminars and the Asian Senior-level Talks on Non-Proliferation, Japan has shared its knowledge and experiences concerning the implementation of the IAEA safeguards with other countries. Japan will continue such efforts.

(Prevention of nuclear terrorism)

Third is nuclear security. As I mentioned earlier, we need to deal with the threat of nuclear terrorism. To prevent nuclear terrorism, it is essential to enhance the management of not only nuclear power plants and related nuclear fuel cycle facilities but also the control of all nuclear and radioactive material. Japan welcomes President Obama’s proposal to make a new international efforts to strengthen the control of nuclear material and host a “Global Summit on Nuclear Security.” Japan will cooperate with the United States in efforts to bring this global summit to a successful conclusion.

Japan will do its utmost so that the 11 benchmarks for global nuclear disarmament that I mentioned can be accomplished. In particular, we plan to propose these benchmarks at the 2010 NPT Review Conference and foster a favorable environment for a successful conclusion of this Conference. Meanwhile, I hope that the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, which I mentioned at the beginning of my speech and which is co-chaired by former Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi and former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, will draw up a set of realistic, action-oriented proposals that will guide all countries toward a world free of nuclear weapons at its final meeting scheduled to be held in Hiroshima this autumn. Japan appreciates the initiative that the Australian government exerted in the establishment of this International Commission and will continue to provide as much support as possible to the Commission.

In one scene of a blockbuster movie released last year, the hero survived a nuclear blast by hiding inside a refrigerator. I was surprised at the soft image about nuclear blasts that was indicated by this scene. A nuclear blast would destroy everything in an instant. I was worried that such a naive perception could spread worldwide. Japan is the only country that can communicate the devastation of a nuclear bombing to future generations based on first-hand experiences of an actual nuclear attack. Through the United Nations Programme of Fellowships on Disarmament, Japan has invited more than 650 diplomats from various countries to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and many participants in this programme are now occupying key posts responsible for promoting disarmament and non-proliferation policies in national governments. I believe it is Japan’s mission to convey to all people around the world the facts of the calamity of nuclear bombings that happened in August 1945 in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, across the boundaries of various political viewpoints and ideologies.

It is nearly a decade since the end of the 20th century, which was a century of wars. Whether or not future generations can live in a world free of nuclear weapons depends largely on the results of what we are doing now to tackle the challenge ahead of us. I am pleased to announce that to rally international efforts in this area, Japan is planning to host an international conference early next year to encourage concerted actions by the international community to promote global nuclear disarmament. I would like to tentatively name this conference “The 2010 Nuclear Disarmament Conference”. As the Foreign Minister of the only country to experience the devastation of nuclear bombings, I would be most delighted if the outcome of this conference, together with the 11 benchmarks that I proposed, led to a successful conclusion of the 2010 NPT Review Conference and helped us take a great step toward nuclear disarmament.

Thank you very much for your kind attention.